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ABSTRACT 
 
With the steady increase in the market share of organic food over the last 30 
years, some farmers have switched from “conventional” to “sustainable” agricultural 
practices in order to capitalize on those new markets. Are the practices the only things 
that need to change?   
Building off of Warwick Fox’s conception of “transpersonal ecology,” 
transpersonal agroecology (TPAE) is the name given to a proposed alternative mindset 
of the farmer derived from various alternative agricultural theorists of the last 100 years. 
These writers oppose the scientism and economism that typify industrial agriculture, 
subscribe to the notion that experiences of "identification" between the farmer and the 
beings on the farm are an important component of a truly sustainable agriculture, and 
suggest that a truly sustainable agriculture requires a radical critique of the metaphysical 
assumptions that underlie modern agricultural practices. A case is made that a process 
metaphysics (based on the philosophy of A.N. Whitehead) can productively support a 
transpersonal agroecological way of being on the farm with its requisite sustainable 
agricultural practices.   
Finally, though many theorists have analyzed both industrial and sustainable 
agriculture from an ideological perspective, most of them partake of a subtle form of 
materialism, recapitulating the belief that relationships among beings are exclusively 
external. This subtle materialism precludes the farmer from ascribing interiority to the 
majority of the beings she is in relationship with.  Revisiting transpersonal agroecology, 
with an understanding of interiority, yields a truly holistic, integral agriculture that takes 
seriously the mindset of the farmer and the interiority of the beings on the farm.
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Agriculture will remain a tragedy so long as it is kept separate from the 
problem of the human condition.   And the human condition will remain a 
tragic problem as long as it is kept separate from the problem of 
agriculture. (Jackson, 1984, p. 161)   
What does philosophy have to do with sustainable agriculture? I’ve faced this 
question, in various forms, many times throughout my career here at Iowa State 
University. 1  For instance, after taking a course entitled “Pedagogies of Dissent,” which 
was offered by the Educational and Leadership Policy Studies department, I was 
compelled to bring the knowledge of critical theory to my fellow students.  I was 
afforded the opportunity at one of our “Conviviums,” a weekly student social gathering 
that follows our Graduate Program in Sustainable Agriculture seminar (“Colloquium”) 
every Wednesday.  I had a formal presentation planned, along with a handout, but 
afterward I noticed that most of the people assembled were confused at best.  “What 
does social justice have to do with raising pigs?” asked one of my classmates.   
Another example comes from a student screening of the documentary To Patent 
a Pig.  In our discussion afterward, I noted that “my heart hurt”, which was an attempt to 
                                                          
1 The tone of the introduction and conclusion of this dissertation differs significantly 
from the chapters contained herein.  Let the reader be assured that this is purposeful.  
This introduction, along with the conclusion, has afforded me the opportunity to make 
an autoethnographic attempt at scholarship (Spry 2001). 
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express my (at that time) unstructured moral discomfort with what I perceived to be the 
numerous instances of unethical human behavior exhibited in the film.  Again, this level 
of inquiry was greeted by apathy, and the closest thing I got to a positive response was 
from a student colleague who, throughout the rest of our time in GPSA, referenced my 
comment as an example of the necessity of multiple perspectives for the project of 
sustainable agriculture, even if no one really seemed to know what that meant.  
One final example will segue to this dissertation.  “Foundations of Sustainable 
Agriculture” is the one theory class we students in GPSA are required to take.  In this 
class, the instructors attempt to introduce as many of the philosophical implications of 
sustainable agriculture as possible.  As noted by Teresa Opheim, executive director of 
Practical Farmers of Iowa (PFI), in our bi-annual program retreat, this is an especially 
difficult task because we, as a program, are not only focused on “agroecology,” which 
seems to have fewer implications, but are instead focused on “sustainable agriculture”, 
which has overt political and social implications, even in the name alone.   Studying 
“sustainable” agriculture necessitates the existence of an “unsustainable” agriculture, 
thus pitting “us” against “them.” 
In their effort to educate GPSA students on the full spectrum of implications, the 
instructors of “Foundations” directed our attention to the concept of “positivism” in the 
philosophy of science.  To my astonishment (and, to be honest, my horror), there were 
students in the course, graduate students who were actively involved in research at ISU, 
who couldn’t differentiate between the work that they did as scientists and the concept 
of “positivism,” the now debunked belief that science is capable of delivering “value-
free” and “objective” “facts” about reality.  This experience, coupled with the textbook 
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for the course, Paul Thompson’s The Spirit of the Soil (1995), which I found to 
unrealistically privilege rationality and discredit spirituality (I later found out that this 
was also a problem for Campbell, 1998), elicited from me an email rant to my professors 
about the necessary role of love in sustainability.  As a result of that email, one of the 
professors allowed me to have her session the next day in class to talk about love, and I 
took her up on that offer.  Unfortunately, the result was no different than my previous 
attempts to interject values into the discussion.  In my presentation, I used supporting 
content from Aldo Leopold, Thomas Berry, Martin Luther King Jr., Joseph Campbell, 
Gregory Bateson, Ervin Laszlo, Joanna Macy, Mircea Eliade, Curtis White, Michael 
Polanyi, Jean Gebser, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and Edgar Morin, to no avail.  I got 
the same blank stares advocating for love as I did when I advocated for social justice and 
when I talked about my moral feelings. 
Therefore, I decided to do research that would consider whether the people 
involved in the project of sustainable agriculture, the progenitors and practitioners of the 
extension service, organic agriculture, the land ethic, perennial polyculture, and more, 
had something to say about the mindset of the farmer.  As it turned out, they did.  Not 
only that, but the theorists in each of the fields that I studied for my dissertation, 
sustainable agriculture, process metaphysics, and environmental philosophy, also took 
up the larger issue that frames the question opening this dissertation:  “Why does 
philosophy matter at all?”  The bulk of this introduction will be an answer to this 
question from within each of the disciplines discussed herein. 
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Dissertation Organization 
But first, allow me to provide some wholeness.  The goal of this dissertation was 
to develop a philosophy for sustainable agriculture by identifying a coherent tradition 
from within the writings of a representative selection of key figures within the 
sustainable agriculture movement.  Chapter two is the end result of the first attempt at 
such a philosophy, explicitly centered on the interiority of the farmer.  Transpersonal 
Agroecology (TPAE) is a theory that asserts that the mindset of the sustainable farmer is 
just as important as her practices and that the mindset TPAE theorists advocate for is 
one that is against scientism and economism and supportive of experiences of 
identification between the farmer and the beings with which the farmer is in relation, 
supportive of the processes and alternative epistemologies and methodologies whereby 
those experiences are engendered, and supportive of the conversations about values and 
spirit that accompany such experiences and practices. 
Chapter two drew inspiration, both ideologically and methodologically, from 
transpersonal ecology, which itself is based on the environmental philosophy known as 
deep ecology (DE).  Here, as a way of elucidating the purpose of chapter three, we will 
also draw on deep ecology here.  DE is articulated as a set of eight basic principles, the 
belief in which constitutes a person being a “deep ecologist.”  However, it is generally 
accepted that there are many sources for and influences on the platform of deep ecology 
and that a multitude of actions and decisions can flow from this platform.  Similarly, the 
purpose of chapter three is to put forward process metaphysics as one possible source for 
a TPAE way of being in the world, not to suggest that it is the only source for TPAE.  As 
Arne Naess, the founder of deep ecology, puts it: “the situation reminds us that very 
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similar or even identical conclusions may be drawn from divergent premises.  The 
principles (or platform) are the same, the fundamental premises differ.” (Session & 
Devall, 2001, p. 225).  As it pertains to sustainable agriculture, TPAE (the similar or 
even identical conclusions) can be drawn from divergent premises (Fukuoka’s Zen or 
Bailey’s Christianity).  The point of chapter three is to show that TPAE can also be 
drawn from a process metaphysics, and that in doing so the sustainable agriculturalists 
are assisted in important ways, such as the ability to adjudicate between competing 
centers of value (to choose one being over another—the very definition of agriculture) 
and the revisioning of the human as an ecologically benevolent actor. 
Finally, chapter four is a bookend to chapter two.  Chapter two is a treatment of 
the interiority of the farmer.  Chapter four is a treatment of the interiority of the non-
human beings on the farm.  Chapter four flows out of and is informed by 
TPAE.  Whereby most modern philosophical theorists of sustainable agriculture neglect 
the subjectivity of the more than human world, implicit in many of the TPAE theorists is 
an awareness of the interiority of the beings on the farm and the necessity of a reciprocal 
relationship between those beings and the farmer for a truly sustainable 
agriculture.  Taken altogether, chapters two through four articulate the concept of an 
“integral agriculture,” one that not only takes seriously biology and ecology, but also the 
mindset of the farmer, the interiority of the beings on the farm, and puts forward process 
metaphysics as a possible ground from which these integral ways of agricultural being 
can take root. 
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Sustainable Agriculture 
This section will introduce the second chapter, “Transpersonal Agroecology: The 
Metaphysics of Alternative Agricultural Theory,” and it will show philosophy’s 
relevance for agriculture by discussing articles by John Ikerd and Fred Kirschenmann.  
Both Ikerd and Kirschenmann are global leaders in the field of sustainable agriculture, 
and both have written about the role of philosophy in sustainable agriculture.  Indeed, 
both find it to be absolutely necessary. 
Ikerd wrote a chapter in the book Sustainable Agroecosystem Management: 
Integrating Ecology, Economics, and Society (2009), titled “Rethinking the First 
Principles of Agroecology: Ecological, Social, and Economic,” in which he challenges 
“advocates of agroecology” to “answer the questions of why designing and managing 
sustainable agroecosystems should be a critical priority and why the ecological, social, 
and economic dimensions of agriculture must be integrated to ensure agricultural 
sustainability” (Ikerd, 2009, p. 42).  Ikerd believes that “most scientists avoid such 
questions because the answers ultimately depend upon basic beliefs or first principles,” 
which are “inherently philosophical rather than scientific in nature” (ibid.).  
Transpersonal agroecology (TPAE), the theory outlined in chapter two, is the outcome 
of such an effort.  Building upon both deep ecology and transpersonal ecology, 
environmental philosophies that are distinguished by their emphasis on rethinking 
traditional Western first principles, TPAE not only builds on Ikerd’s work by 
encouraging a conversation on values and the role of spirit, but also puts forward some 
practical steps toward fundamental reorientation at the agricultural level using concepts 
like identification and alternative epistemologies and methodologies.  This latter 
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concept, alternative epistemologies, has significant overlap with Ikerd’s understanding 
of “common sense,” which he defines as “our inner sense or intelligent insight” (Ikerd, 
2009, p. 43, 44).  While Ikerd takes a significantly different course than TPAE to come 
to his conclusions, he reflexively expresses the principles he is discussing—like 
diversity and trust—when he states at the end of his work:  “Perhaps better ways can be 
found for defining or explaining these first principles of agroecology” (ibid., p. 51).  I 
am certainly not purporting to have found a “better” way of discussing first principles, 
but I am suggesting that I have found a different way, one that is based on the collective 
understanding of various individuals who either helped or are currently helping to define 
the very field of agroecology.  Their collective interest in these philosophical issues 
surely gives more weight to Ikerd’s insistence that a discussion on first principles is 
necessary. 
Similar to Ikerd’s call for the revision of the basic axioms of agroecology is 
Kirschenmann’s conclusion that “unless farmers and non-farmers alike recognize their 
common need to re-think core values, we are not likely to see the evolution of a new 
ethic for agriculture that reflects our new understanding of how nature works” 
(Kirschenmann, 2004, p.175).  In his chapter from Agroecosystems Analysis (2004) 
titled “Ecological Morality: A New Ethic for Agriculture,” Kirschenmann argues that we 
need both an “enlightenment approach” as well as an “incentives approach” towards 
shifting our cultures core values (ibid., p. 170, 171).  Kirschenmann uses the work of 
sustainability theorist David Orr to suggest three “enlightenment” strategies to bring 
about change: the dramatization of our ecological crises, “more accurate and telling 
metaphors and theories,” and political change (ibid., p. 170).  However, Kirschenmann 
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also thinks that more pragmatic “incentives” are necessary, such as policy-driven or 
market-driven initiatives, like the Conservation Resource Program and the organic foods 
market, respectively.  But what is of utmost importance, in Kirschenmann’s view, is the 
articulation of an agriculture that resolves the “fundamental human paradox” whereby 
people are both “part of a web of life” and yet, all too frequently, people’s actions betray 
that understanding.  TPAE is most certainly an “enlightenment” approach in 
Kirschenmann’s framework, an attempt at a “more accurate theory” that better 
articulates the mindset of a sustainable farmer.  As such, TPAE “internalizes” the 
“ethical dissonance” (Kirchenmann, 2004, p. 173) of humans as both a part of nature 
and apart from nature, mainly through the concepts of ‘identification,’ whereby a farmer 
comes to identify with the farm and the beings on the farm, and ‘process,’ which has the 
farmer responding to and carrying out changes in themselves and the farm as a result of 
their identifications.  Like Kirschenmann, TPAE is concerned with values, as well as 
scientism and economism, but it also addresses the role of spirit and alternative 
epistemologies and methodologies for creating an “ecological morality” as it is related to 
agriculture.  Therefore, the second chapter can be seen as a working out of both Ikerd 
and Kirschenmann’s insistence that sustainable agriculture be examined from a 
philosophical level. 
 
Process Metaphysics 
Process metaphysicians who write on environmental issues, such as John Cobb, 
also make a case for the importance of philosophy or, more specifically, metaphysics.  
In most instances, they link the discussion of metaphysics to solutions for the 
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environmental crises facing the planet.  In this case, sustainable agriculture is used as a 
specific solution to unsustainable conventional agriculture, the latter having significantly 
contributed to the environmental crises.  Hence, their case for addressing environmental 
issues at a metaphysical level serves as proof that eco-agricultural issues should also be 
dealt with at that level. 
One way that process metaphysicians argue for the primacy of metaphysics is to 
highlight the role ideas play in social change.  Additionally, if many of the problems of 
the eco-crises stem from an unsustainable worldview or conception of reality, then 
simply changing one’s metaphysics will cause much of their unsustainable behavior to 
change.  Finally, process metaphysicians will assert that their metaphysics will actually 
bring order and clarity to an individual’s life in ways that the dominant metaphysics 
doesn’t.  
This “subject as primary” process metaphysic is contrasted with the dominant 
metaphysics, described as “the mechanical model” by Cobb, in an article directly 
addressing the implications of a different metaphysics, or, as he puts it, “global horizon” 
for agriculture.  Cobb wants “to suggest changes in our basic ways of thinking that can 
undergird our quest for a sustainable agriculture” (Cobb, 1984, p. 206). The mechanical 
model envisions reality in terms of self-contained substances whose relations are 
external.  The “ecological” model, which is synonymous with process metaphysics, sees 
substances being constituted by “its relations to other things” (ibid., p. 211).  
Conventional agriculture follows the mechanical model, whereas an ecological farmer 
“prefers to keep herself and other people closer to the plants and animals,” eschews 
making decisions based solely on economic concerns, and values “the richness of 
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experience of the people involved” (Cobb, 1984, p. 208).  Here Cobb reiterates this 
distinction as it pertains to land: 
The idea of land as a resource whose value is what human beings are 
prepared to pay for it expresses the substantial-mechanical way of 
thinking.  The idea of the land as a community in which human beings 
can participate destructively or constructively is an ecological way of 
thinking.  In this context the value is found in the life it contains and in its 
capacity to contribute richness to living experience. (Cobb, 1984, p. 212) 
Throughout the essay, Cobb highlights the importance of analyzing fundamental 
assumptions about reality and the relevance of such an activity for agriculture: “We 
cannot solve the problem of sustainability in agriculture without looking at the 
fundamental assumptions on which other aspects of our corporate life are based,” and 
“[O]nly as there is real conversion of perception by the emergence of a new horizon will 
the question of this conference, that of a sustainable agriculture, come to command wide 
attention” (ibid., p. 209, 216).  The following three sections further articulate why and 
how a shift at the metaphysical level needs to be a part of alternative agricultural theory.  
 
Power of Ideas 
One presupposition in arguing for a change in metaphysics is the belief that ideas 
have power and that changing ideas lead to desired effects.  Benzoni makes the point 
that people “not only live their lives, but also lead them in accord with accepted ideals or 
possibilities” (Benzoni, 2007, p. 155).  Therefore, if one could change people’s ideas of 
what is possible, especially at such a fundamental level as the metaphysical level, then 
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an entire set of novel possibilities could arise.  This explains Benzoni’s assertion that 
“ideas have efficacy” (Benzoni, 2007, p.2).  Other process theorists describe the belief in 
the power of ideas in other ways.  Armstrong-Buck talks about social change being 
“hastened by the conscious formulation of ideals,” and Cobb and Griffin write that 
“[N]ew ideals can enter history and slowly produce changes that make their embodiment 
possible… Institutions can be changed by ideas as well as by force” (Cobb & Griffin, 
1986, p. 251, 112). 
 When applied specifically to the environmental crises, Birch and Cobb believe 
that we need new environmental ethics to counter the current ethics--anthropocentrism 
and rationalism--that shape our unsustainable relationship to the natural world (Birch & 
Cobb, p. 143-144, p. 175).  They use as an example the animal rights movement, which 
has been misunderstood as a “sentimental luxury” as opposed to “having fundamental 
prophetic import for the structure of ideas by which society lived” (ibid., p. 148).  Here, 
they give an example of how process metaphysics would have practical implications: 
It has not been wrong to view animals as means to our ends.  What has 
been wrong has been to view them as only means.  Ethics, law and 
economics should take account not only of the uses of animals, but also 
of their rights, which are correlative with their potential for richness of 
experience. (ibid., p. 154) 
 
Worldview 
 
Another possible analogue between transpersonal agroecology and process 
thought, emphasized by Griffin, is that just as “environmentalism is a movement seeking 
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a worldview,” so too does transpersonal agroecology need a metaphysics to ground its 
beliefs (Griffin, 1994, p. 190).  Process theorists have many ways of describing the 
outcome of adopting their metaphysics, all of them pertinent to the project of sustainable 
agriculture:  ecological attitude, ecological ethic, and ecological worldview (Cobb & 
Griffin, 1976, p. 63,76; Benzoni, 2007, p. 5; Griffin, 1994, p. 191). 
 The efficacy of adopting a process metaphysic that results in a more ecological 
being stems from the fact that “[e]very view of reality has ethical implications” (Birch & 
Cobb, 1990, p. 141).  There is an awareness that, in relationships, treatment follows 
belief.  Birch and Cobb apply this awareness to animal rights again: “other animals will 
be respected only as they are genuinely experienced in a different way, and that change 
will involve a change in the way human beings experience themselves as well” (ibid., p. 
144).  The cyclical and mutually implied nature of change, from worldview to 
experience to self-awareness (which is constitutive of and affected by worldview), will 
be addressed in each of the chapters of this dissertation.  For now, the quotes serve as 
illustrations of the connection between a theory about the nature of reality and the 
subsequent experience of reality as a result of the theory.  Cobb makes an additional 
case for metaphysical change beyond its efficacy; he believes that because unsustainable 
theory “has both shaped and expressed our dominant perceptions and sensibility, it is 
necessary to change our vision of reality as well” (Cobb, 1999, p. 322). 
Yet another argument for metaphysical change is that people need to be 
motivated at a sufficient depth to manifest the requisite changes or, to put it another 
way, people need to act from inclination (Cobb, 2001, p. 113; Birch & Cobb, 1990, p. 
144).  One of the benefits of marshalling energy from the metaphysical level to tackle 
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our ecological crises is that, if action is taken as the result of an everyday worldview, 
then the individual will have a larger set of reserves to draw from in difficult situations 
compared to the individual who has to constantly make moral decisions contrary to his 
or her given worldview or metaphysics (Birch & Cobb, 1990, p. 144). 
 A more specific example will serve this enterprise well here: “Modern science, 
with its ‘Cartesian scientific doctrine of bits of matter, bare of intrinsic value,’ has had 
negative consequences, because it fostered ‘the habit of ignoring the intrinsic worth of 
the environment which must be allowed its weight in any consideration of final ends.’  
To abolish the notion of vacuous actuality would be to establish the basis for replacing 
this bad habit with the habit of reverence:  ‘Everything has some value for itself…By 
reason of this character, constituting reality, the conception of morals arises.  We have 
no right to deface the value experience which is the very essence of the universe’ 
(Griffin, 1994, p. 194). 
 
Clarity and Order 
 
The third benefit of addressing the issue of sustainable agriculture from the 
metaphysical level using process metaphysics is that process metaphysics has, as an 
internal criterion, the requirement that the metaphysics bring order and clarity to a 
person’s daily experience of reality by affirming and illuminating this experience.  
Armstrong-Buck gives one of the best summaries for the importance of metaphysics, in 
general, and, particularly, process metaphysics.  She states that metaphysical views can 
help to “satisfy our need for coherence as we struggle to interpret our lives… [and] offer 
the possibility of going deeper than common sense or mass consciousness” (Armstrong-
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Buck, 1991, p. 31).  Process metaphysics marries a belief in the power of reason to 
interpret some part of reality and the necessity that a metaphysical system have 
applicable value, all the while understanding that, in Armstrong-Buck’s words, “such a 
system is always a tale spun by a finite being from its own finite perspective…They are 
not pronouncements of a godlike reason, but rather, adventures of the imagination” 
(ibid., p. 32). 
This feature of metaphysical views can support the project of transpersonal 
agroecology in two ways:  First, it meshes well with the idea of “process” that comes 
from TPAE, the fact that a practitioner of TPAE will have a worldview that orders her 
intellectual experience in a way that confirms her agricultural experience, thus further 
solidifying her worldview.  Second, given that farmers are notoriously a practical bunch, 
the emphasis on order and clarity derived from a coherent metaphysical worldview will 
assist in their efforts to gain adopters. 
 There are two ways that process theorists conceive of the clarifying benefits of 
their metaphysics: theologically and ecologically.  Cobb and Griffin (1976) are 
addressing theological issues in the following quotation, but it is easy to see how it 
would translate to transpersonal agroecology, “As a convincing notion of deity emerges 
that illumines human experience and coheres with our understanding of the world, the 
demand for an isolated and abstract proof [of God] diminishes. A theistic vision of all 
reality can gain adherence best by displaying its superior adequacy to other visions” 
(Cobb & Griffin, 1976, p. 43).  This could easily read: As a convincing notion of 
transpersonal agroecology emerges that illumines farmers’ experience and coheres with 
an ecological understanding of the world, the demand for an industrial and monocultural 
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agriculture diminishes.  A transpersonal agroecological vision of the farm, and of all 
reality, can gain adherence best by displaying its superior adequacy to other agricultures. 
 Benzoni approaches this concept from an explicitly ecological awareness.  He 
applies Whitehead’s criterion of philosophical coherence to the modern western axiom 
of the separation of humans with nature and finds it lacking: “For Whitehead, any 
ontological divide between human beings and the rest of creation is untenable because it 
is finally incoherent” (Benzoni, 2007, p. 131).  Armstrong-Buck quotes from Session 
and Devall’s criteria for an deep ecology metaphysics to show how, contrary to the 
beliefs of many Deep Ecologists, a process metaphysics is deeply ecological:  “An 
appropriate metaphysics for the emerging ecological perennial philosophy would 
provide a structural account of the basic unity and interrelatedness of the universe while 
at the same time accounting for the importance and uniqueness of individual beings” 
(Armstrong-Buck, 1986, p. 241-242)  Process metaphysics does both of those things.  It 
accounts for interconnectedness by claiming that everything in a subject’s past (keeping 
in mind that everything in this metaphysic is a subject) participates in constituting that 
subject in the present, which has implications for the future.  It accounts for the worth of 
individuals by locating value in subjective experience, which is the experience of 
everything that exists.   
However, what is unique about process metaphysics, and why it lends itself well 
to agriculture, is because it allows for adjudication, or decisions to be made, in situations 
between competing centers of value.  Also, it provides a conception of the human being 
that properly values humans as ecologically benevolent agents in a world of interrelated 
subjects.  Chapter three will highlight both of these important concepts (adjudication and 
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proper valuing) while also demonstrating the almost one-to-one overlap between TPAE 
and process metaphysics, grounding TPAE in a theory of reality that reinforces those 
ways of being and relating. 
 
Environmental Philosophy 
J. Baird Callicott, whose thinking figures prominently in the fourth chapter of 
this dissertation, tackles the subject of philosophy’s relevance head on, starting with the 
title of his article on the subject, “Environmental Philosophy Is Environmental Activism: 
The Most Radical and Effective Kind” (Callicott, 1999).  Callicott begins with two 
“pictures of philosophy” that mirror my experience at Iowa State, (i) philosophy as 
irrelevant (the perspective of some of my classmates) and (ii) philosophy as “the most 
potent force of social change imaginable,” (my own perspective) (Callicott, 1999, p. 27).  
Callicott takes the reader through various “antiphilosophers,” such as Kenneth Sayre and 
Bryan Norton, who dismiss the possibility of the second “picture” being true (ibid., p. 
29, 30).  Callicott counters their disbelief by arguing that “environmental philosophers, 
rather, are attempting to articulate a new worldview and a new conception of what it 
means to be a human being” (ibid., p. 30).  He goes on to say, “People come to believe 
that old norms…should be abandoned, and new ones adopted…only when their most 
fundamental ideas about themselves and their world undergo radical change” (ibid.).  
Callicott acknowledges that people don’t just come running to philosophers when their 
culturally given sense of self is challenged, but he also explains, “rather 
philosophers…give voice to the otherwise inchoate and inarticulate thoughts and 
feelings in our changing cultural Zeitgeist” (ibid., p. 32).  Callicott believes that the 
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environmental philosophers of the 20th and 21st century, such as Leopold, Naess, 
Rolston, and Plumwood, among others, will have as much effect on a future non-
anthropocentric society as 17th and 18th century philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke, 
Bentham, and Kant, had on the abolishment of slavery. 
Callicott sees the “inescapability of metaphysics” as a result of living “today in a 
culture undergoing a profound paradigm shift” (Callicott, 1999, p. 34, 36).  He, like 
many of his colleagues cited in the fourth chapter, analyzes the Western worldview, but 
he does so here in order to show how the structures of thought in the West (as I imagine 
they do everywhere) have their source in philosophy: “Who could say that this 
fundamental element of the prevailing Western worldview [mechanism] was not the 
creation of philosophers?...Look around you at this thoroughly mechanized 
environment.  It didn’t just happen.  It isn’t just the result of an inevitable process of 
blind technical evolution.  It is, rather, the direct legacy of Western natural philosophy 
going all the way back to the pre-Socratics” (ibid., p. 39). 
Callicott then echoes Lynn White Jr. by stating that if Western philosophy got us 
into this mess, then it can surely help to get us out.  He quotes White: “The issue is 
whether a democratized world can survive its own implications.  Presumably we cannot 
unless we rethink our axioms” (ibid., p. 40). 
Chapter four is an attempt at this enterprise.  In reviewing several high-level 
analyses of the conceptual landscape of sustainable and industrial agriculture, an 
unfortunate commonality was uncovered, relative to the concerns of Aldo Leopold and 
Thomas Berry:  none of these analyses challenged the materialist aspect of the Western 
worldview.  They all accepted, either explicitly or implicitly, the belief that a 
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fundamental character of the material world is the absence of a subjective, 
phenomenological, interior reality.  However, through a return to the TPAE theorists of 
chapter two, it will be shown that interiority is necessary for a truly holistic, integral 
agriculture.  Callicott provides a summary of this effort: 
Of course, we philosophers do not simply create new environmental ideas 
and ideals ex nihilo.  Rather, we try to articulate and refine those that the 
intellectual dialectic of the culture has ripened.  To employ a Socratic 
metaphor, we philosophers are the midwives assisting the birth of new 
cultural notions and associated norms.  In doing so we help to change our 
culture’s worldview and ethos. (Callicott, 1999, p. 43) 
Two quick asides will facilitate the transition to the second chapter.  First, permit 
me to exploit a metaphor.  Liberty Hyde Bailey, an agricultural theorist whose thought is 
essential to both TPAE and Integral Agriculture (TPAE combined with an understanding 
of the interiority of the more than human world), is credited with being the father of the 
extension service, an idea born through Bailey’s efforts, as the dean of Agriculture at 
Cornell University, to assist a wealthy New York land owner with some problems he 
was having at his vineyard.  Bailey also gave us The Holy Earth in 1915, a truly holistic 
intellectual effort that represents one of the earliest attempts at an Integral Agriculture.  
Perhaps it has taken 100 years for the ideas he set forth in that book (and others) to 
finally “ripen,” in Callicott’s words.  Or better yet, perhaps those ideas, ripe at the time, 
were bottled up and allowed to ferment, so that we people of the 21st century can have 
our minds altered by the radical ideas that Bailey (and others—Leopold, Steiner, 
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Jackson, and Wendell Berry) put forward about who we are and what our proper 
relationship to the more than human world should be. 
Finally, I’d like to recount an anecdote about my process of writing the fourth 
chapter.  I first read Callicott’s “The Metaphysical Transition in Farming: From the 
Newtonian-Mechanical to the Eltonian-Ecological,” (1999) and I thought that my fourth 
chapter would just be a critique of that article from the perspective of TPAE and 
scientism.  In following up on Callicott’s work, I found the article “The Worldview 
Concept and Aldo Leopold’s Project of ‘World View’ Remediation” (2011).  I was 
happy to see Callicott accepting more of Leopold’s spiritual offerings, but I still found 
his work to be scientistic, in that spirituality was presented in service to science.  What 
was most interesting, though, was that he also put forward Thomas Berry as someone, 
like Leopold, who understood the relationship between and necessity of spirituality and 
sustainability.  I found this association interesting because, while it is explicit with 
Berry, I also viewed Leopold as expressing the necessity of interiority as well. For me, 
this association indicated something that was important for environmental ethics, even if 
Callicott hadn’t pointed it out. 
At the same time that I was exploring Callicott’s thinking, I was also researching 
other efforts at analyzing agriculture from an ideological level.  I found a dozen or so 
articles or books in that vein, and all of them neglected to address the implications of the 
interiority of nonhumans.  I thought this would be my fourth chapter: a survey of the 
paradigmatic agricultural analysis literature in order to highlight the neglect of the issue 
of interiority.   I spent the entire month of August 2014 writing 16,000 words that I 
thought would be more than enough material to meet the 10,000 word count limit of the 
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journal to which I was hoping to submit.  I sent my first draft out to my major professors 
in September thinking that I would just have to do some minor editing and cutting, but 
one of my major professors, Kevin deLaplante, gave me some feedback that changed the 
trajectory of the chapter.   
My characterization of what he told me is as follows:  I really didn’t say 
anything.  My first thought was, “I wrote 16,000 words, how could I not have said 
anything?!?”  But what he really meant by his feedback was that I didn’t provide proof 
for my concern.  So what if they didn’t include interiority?  Why do they need to?  
Kevin told me to return to TPAE as a way of making that case.  I was hesitant to do so, 
but I didn’t know why.  Instead, I thought I could find something in Worster’s book, 
Nature’s Economy, to articulate why, like the new organicists Worster discusses, the 
meta-theorists were “constrained” in their effort to “promote a deeper sense of 
integration between man and nature…and to let all the appended scientific arguments 
go” (Worster, 1994, p. 337).  But I didn’t quite find what I needed.  Again, Kevin 
encouraged me to return to TPAE and I finally did, only to discover the reason for my 
initial hesitation.  Love, amongst the other things eventually delineated in chapter four, 
was an explanation of both the fact that meta-theorists left out an account of interiority 
and the fact that it matters.   
Here I am, yet again, having to talk about love.  To be honest, I didn’t want to do 
it.  I didn’t want to have to stand up in front of a bunch of “hard” scientists and “social” 
scientists and talk about how love matters in sustainable agriculture.  But as I hope to 
have shown in my fourth chapter, it does matter!  As does creatureliness, a realistic 
appreciation of our interconnectedness with the more than human world, and the sacred. 
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The concept of interiority plays a fundamental role in these aforementioned endeavors as 
well.  Finally, as Callicott has argued above, these seemingly “esoteric” philosophical 
ideas have real world implications.  In terms of an integral agriculture, through the 
understandings outlined above, the farmer develops a sensitivity that allows her to have 
a genuine conversation with nature, the land, and the beings with which she is in 
relation.  I trust that this attempt to show how philosophy is important for sustainable 
agriculture, my final one at Iowa State as a student, will meet with more success than my 
previous attempts.  I say “trust” here because, with the assistance of my committee and 
particularly my co-major professors, as well as the assistance of journal editors and 
anonymous readers, I am more confident that the scholarship contained within this 
dissertation is ripe and ready to share. 
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CHAPTER 2. TRANSPERSONAL AGROECOLOGY: THE METAPHYSICS OF 
ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL THEORY 
 
Modified from a paper published in 
The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 
 
Travis Cox 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Industrial agriculture has taken over as the dominant form of food production 
globally, resulting in alternative production methods converging as a sustainable counter. 
Unfortunately, the ideological and metaphysical underpinnings of these alternative 
agricultural philosophies have been ignored as have the metaphysics of industrial 
agriculture. Using transpersonal ecology as a disciplinary analogue, this paper 
demonstrates an ideological commonality among alternative agricultural theorists, such 
that the term transpersonal agroecology covers their beliefs like the term transpersonal 
ecology covers the commonality of deep ecologists. The commonality is threefold. First, 
theorists are united in opposition against the scientism and economism that make up the 
productionist mentality. Second, there is awareness that in the practice of sustainable 
agriculture there is a process for and experience of identification with the beings on the 
farm, and with the farm itself. Finally, theorists contribute to the transpersonal 
conversation through their emphasis on values, alternative methodologies, and spirit.    
 
Introduction 
For most people, sustainable agriculture pertains to the on-farm activities of 
practitioners, such as cover crops, integrated pest management, and no-till. This is true 
even for the off-farm activities of consumers, who choose to purchase their food locally 
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or look for the USDA organic seal. However, a study of the progenitors of sustainable 
agriculture, people such as Albert Howard, Masanobu Fukuoka, and Rudolf Steiner, 
who developed organic agriculture, natural farming, and biodynamics, respectively, 
indicates that there is something more than just practice to sustainable agriculture. There 
is something deeper at the level of the mind-set of the farmer.  
By employing transpersonal ecology (TE) as a disciplinary analogue, including 
direct quotes from the aforementioned theorists, as well as many others, this article 
shows that sustainable agriculture has implications for the worldview of its practitioners. 
These implications include an opposition to the scientism and economism of industrial 
agriculture, a sense of the process and experience of identification with the farm and the 
beings on the farm, an awareness of alternative methodologies and epistemologies, and 
an explicit role for values and spirit. The end result of this study is a theory, 
transpersonal agroecology (TPAE), that conceptualizes the commonalities of these 
alternative agricultural theorists and thus opens a discussion about the deeper and more 
human aspects of sustainable agriculture and provides a framework with which to guide 
such a discussion. 
 
Methodology 
The enterprise of bringing to light the transpersonal aspects of alternative 
agricultural theory could be undertaken in numerous ways. For the purposes of this 
article, several seminal texts from the field of sustainable agriculture and from the past 
100 years were chosen. Two main criteria were used to select theorists and texts.  
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First, selected individuals contributed in some way to shaping actual agricultural 
practices. Steiner has a peculiar place in this group of selected theorists, given that he 
was not an agriculturalist and that any clarifications about biodynamics practice were 
thwarted by his death a year after his lectures. Therefore, Koepf, Pettersson, and 
Schaumann (1976) were used here in order to show a theory in action. Also, Bailey 
might be a new name to many people, even those aware of some of the history of 
sustainable agriculture.  Bailey, Dean of Agriculture at Cornell University from 1903 to 
1913, is credited with being a pioneer of the national Extension Service, and was 
appointed Chairman of the National Commission on Country Life by president 
Theodore Roosevelt in 1908 and author of its final report in 1909 (Minteer, 2006; Peters, 
2006). 
Second, selected individuals were ones representing more contemporary voices, 
particularly the voices of farmers and leaders in the field of sustainable agriculture. Aldo 
Leopold appears to be the odd man out in this group. He neither created an alternative 
agricultural practice nor was he even a farmer. Leopold was included because he 
discussed farming at length in A Sand County Almanac, which fills a gap in the time line 
of the other selected authors. Also, Leopold is widely recognized as the forerunner of 
modern environmental ethics, and because TPAE will obviously contribute to that 
discipline, his inclusion here was necessary. Finally, it should be noted that many of the 
terms included here were used as synonyms. For instance, alternative agriculture, 
sustainable agriculture, and agroecology were all used more or less interchangeably. 
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Transpersonal Ecology 
 
TPAE draws its inspiration from TE as defined by Warwick Fox (1990). Fox 
quoted various deep ecology (DE) thinkers to show how there is an even deeper level 
uniting the members of the DE family. Colloquially, DE is “deep” because it asks 
questions about the assumptions that typify modern thinking. Philosophically, deep 
ecologists have articulated a set of basic principles and have noted the various sources 
from which they draw. 
However, Fox noticed that many deep ecologists also share similarities of other 
kinds—similarities not articulated in the literature. He pointed out that most deep 
ecologists are against issuing moral “oughts” and are for human “self-realization” as a 
condition of DE. Drawing on the discipline of transpersonal psychology, Fox argued that 
it would make more sense to call the discipline of DE transpersonal ecology because 
most adherents of DE reveal a transpersonal awareness in articulating a sustainable 
human relationship to the natural world. 
Transpersonal was a better term for Fox for a number of reasons. First, it has 
explicitly psychological ties, which he thought better expressed the nature of DE 
because Naess (the DE founder) articulated it as a psychologically, rather than 
axiologically, based approach to the understanding of the human relationship to the 
natural world. Second, the term can be used in a number of etymologically appropriate 
ways: as beyond, as changing thoroughly, and as transcending. Fox’s key concept was 
identification, through which an individual widens the sense of self through ecological 
awareness to include more and more of the natural world. Therefore, Fox could say that 
TE goes beyond other forms of ecophilosophy because it has a different sense of self, 
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one that is changed thoroughly as a result of the process of identification, and has 
transcended the limitations associated with a narrower conception of self. This is 
significant because a major tenet of DE/TE is that it is not anthropocentric, meaning it 
does not confer upon humans “unwarranted differential treatment” (Fox, 1990, p. 89). 
Thus, the particularly Western concept of self as a skin-encapsulated ego separate from 
and superior to the natural world is left behind, and a more inclusive, big self is 
embodied. 
 
Transpersonal Agroecology 
 
TPAE is similar to TE in several ways. First, the theory is derived by comparing 
and finding similarities among the quotations of various alternative agricultural 
theorists. Second, TPAE mirrors TE in that the proponents are united both in opposition 
and in subscription. Where TE theorists are united in opposition to issuing moral oughts, 
TPAE theorists are united in opposition to a productionist mentality, and where TE 
theorists are united in subscription to individuals becoming ecologically self-aware 
though a process of identification with the natural world, TPAE theorists are focused on 
farmers becoming ecologically self-aware through the process of identification with the 
land that they work. 
Therefore, to paraphrase the deep ecologist Freya Mathews (Fox, 1990, p. 85, 
86), TPAE is concerned with the metaphysics of agriculture. From the point of view of 
TPAE, the thing that is wrong with industrial agriculture is that it offers the farmer an 
inaccurate conception of the self. It depicts the personal self of farmers as existing in 
competition with and in opposition to nature. They thereby fail to realize that if their 
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farming methods destroy the environment, they are destroying what is in fact their larger 
selves. 
To paraphrase Fox (Fox, 1990, p. 79), who discusses the deep ecologist John 
Rodman, TPAE is the view that the sense of self of the farmer can be as expansive as the 
individual’s identifications and that a realistic appreciation of the ways in which we are 
intimately bound up with the world around us, especially with the farm and the beings 
on the farm, inevitably leads to wider and deeper identification, and hence alternative 
modes of farming. 
For instance, Rudolf Steiner was of the position that the farmer should be 
conceived of as a meditator: 
Oh, it is very much that he meditates in the long winter nights! He does 
indeed acquire a kind of method—a method of spiritual perception. Only 
he cannot express it. It suddenly emerges in him. We go through the 
fields, and all of a sudden the knowledge is there in us. We know it 
absolutely. Afterwards we put it to the test and find it confirmed. 
(Steiner, 1958, p. 51–52) 
Masanobu Fukuoka, in The One-Straw Revolution, gave his own take on the 
Buddhist eightfold path:  
Unless people become natural people, there can be neither natural 
farming nor natural food. In one of the huts on the mountain I left the 
words, “Right Food, Right Action, Right Awareness” inscribed on a 
pinewood plaque above the fireplace. The three cannot be separated from 
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one another. If one is missing, none can be realized. If one is realized, all 
are realized. (Fukuoka, 1978/2009, p. 147) 
Liberty Hyde Bailey, in The Outlook to Nature, invoked something very similar, noting 
both action and awareness in the growing of food: 
It is all a drama, intense, complex, ever moving, always dying, always re-
born. I see a thousand actors moving in and out, always going, always 
coming. I am part of the drama; I break the earth; I destroy this plant and 
that, as if I were the arbiter of life and death. I sow the seed. I see the 
tender things come up and I feel as if I had created something new and 
fine, that had not been seen on the earth before; and I have a new joy as 
deep and as intangible as the joy of religion. (Bailey, 1915/2013, p. 79) 
In his writing, Wendell Berry directly connected soil and spirit: 
It is impossible to contemplate the life of the soil for very long without 
seeing it as analogous to the life of the spirit. No less than the faithful of 
religion is the good farmer mindful of the persistence of life through 
death, the passage of energy through changing forms. (Berry, 1997, p. 86) 
Finally, Wes Jackson, in Becoming Native to This Place, demonstrated a similar view: 
What if we had an ecological worldview as our operating paradigm? An 
ecological worldview is also an evolutionary worldview. Time-honored 
arrangements would inform us of what has worked without our running 
the empirical experiment. Our evolutionary/ecological worldview would 
inform our decisions, inform our do’s and don’ts in scientific 
investigations. This is another way of saying that we must turn to nature 
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to inform us, to serve as a reference, must turn our thoughts to building a 
science of ecology that reflects a consultation of nature. Ecology is the 
most likely discipline to engage in a courtship with agriculture as we 
anticipate a marriage. (Jackson, 1996, p. 25)  
 
Transpersonal Agroecology: Opposition  
Productionist Mentality 
For the purposes of this article, the productionist mentality that the TPAE 
theorists are united against is the one defined by Keller and Brummer (2002) in “Putting 
Food Production in Context: Toward a Postmechanistic Agricultural Ethic.” In this 
article, a productionist way of thinking about agriculture was typified by four 
components. First, the productionist approach is mechanistic, in that it believes that the 
natural world can best be understood as a machine. Second, because it views nature as 
just a complex and complicated machine, it does not ascribe intrinsic value to the natural 
world. Third, it has an accompanying epistemology that separates facts from values, 
gives credence to only those aspects of reality that can be quantified, and uses science as 
the only method to solve agricultural problems. Fourth, its quantitative and mechanistic 
thinking is easily translated into the realm of economics, thus promulgating “an 
economic model of human–nature interactions” (Keller & Brummer, 2002, p. 265).2 
                                                          
2 Additionally, Paul Thompson (Thompson, 1995) has written a book about agricultural 
ethics that discusses the productionist paradigm, but he separates out the economics, and 
his treatment of the issue in general has been actively criticized, with even Thompson 
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As their direct quotes will demonstrate, for TPAE theorists the problematic 
scientific and economic aspects of the Keller and Brummer definition are too mild. A 
more accurate explanation of the productionist mentality is that it comprises economism 
and scientism to the point that economics and science are given weight beyond what 
they can be shown to deserve (even according to their own individual theories) such that 
a productionist belief in science and economics becomes a fundamentalist ideology 
rather than a theory. For instance, Berry (1997, p. 89) wrote that “the discipline of 
agriculture—the ‘great subject,’ as Sir Albert Howard called it, ‘of health in soil, plant, 
animal, and man’—has been reduced to fit first the views of a piecemeal ‘science,’ and 
then the purposes of corporate commerce.” 
 
Scientism 
 
There are two facets to scientism (Peterson, 2003). One is methodological, in that 
science is taken as the only true way to acquire knowledge. The other is ideological, in 
that scientific understanding is believed to have trumped other disciplines such as ethics 
or religion. Both kinds of scientism are reflected in the objections of TPAE theorists.  I 
quote from the following theorists by way of illustration: 
Bailey: 
I preach the near-at-hand, however plain and ordinary, -- the cloud and 
the sunshine; the green pastures; the bird on its nest and the nest on its 
                                                          
admitting his shortcomings (Campbell, 1998; Raffensperger, 1998; Thompson, 1998). 
This paper focuses more on Keller and Brummer’s characterization. 
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bough; the rough bark of trees; the frost on bare thin twigs; the mouse 
skittering to its burrow; the insect seeking its crevice; the small of the 
ground; the sweet wind; the silent stars; the leaf that clings to its twig or 
that falls when its work is done. Wisdom flows from these as it can never 
flow from libraries and laboratories. (Bailey, 1915/2013, p. 9–10) 
Howard: 
The insistence on quantitative results is another of the weaknesses in 
scientific investigation. It has profoundly influenced agricultural 
research. . . . Many of the things that matter on the land, such as soil 
fertility, tilth, soil management, the quality of produce, the bloom and 
health of animals, the general management of livestock, the working 
relations between master and man, the esprit de corps of the farm as a 
whole, cannot be weighed or measured. (Howard, 2010, p. 211) 
Berry: 
But under various suasions of profession and personality, this legitimate faith in 
scientific methodology seems to veer off into a kind of religious faith in the power of 
science to know all things and solve all problems. . . . This religification and 
evangelizing of science, in defiance of scientific principles, is now commonplace and is 
widely accepted or tolerated by people who are not scientists. (Berry, 2000, p. 19; see 
also p. 24) 
Leopold: 
One of the facts hewn to by science is that every river needs more people, 
and all people need more inventions, and hence more science; the good 
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life depends on the indefinite extension of this chain of logic. That the 
good life on any river may likewise depend on the perception of its 
music, and the preservation of some music to perceive, is a form of doubt 
not yet entertained by science. (Leopold, 1949, p. 154; see also p. 138)  
Steiner described the scientistic fixation upon the physical in this way: 
You see a magnetic needle. You discern that it always points with one 
end approximately to the North, and with the other to the South. You 
think, why is it so? You look for the cause, not in the magnetic needle, 
but in the whole Earth, inasmuch as you assign to the one end of the 
Earth the magnetic North Pole, and to the other the magnetic South.  
Anyone who looked in the magnet-needle itself for the cause of the 
peculiar position it takes up would be talking nonsense. You can only 
understand the direction of the magnet-needle if you know how it is 
related to the whole Earth. Yet the same nonsense (as applied to the 
magnetic needle) is considered good sense by the men of to-day when 
applied to other things. . . . The several spheres of modern life have 
suffered terribly from this, and the effects would be even more evident 
were it not for the fact that in spite of all the modern sciences a certain 
instinct still remains over from the times when men were used to work by 
instinct and not by scientific theory. (Steiner, 1958, pp. 19–20) 
Here is some perspective from Fukuoka, who was referred to by Berry as “a 
scientist who is suspicious of science” (Fukuoka, 1978/2009, p. xiii): 
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But scientific truth can never reach absolute truth, and philosophies, after 
all, are nothing more than interpretations of the world. Nature as grasped 
by scientific knowledge is a nature which has been destroyed; it is a ghost 
possessing a skeleton, but no soul. Nature as grasped by philosophical 
knowledge is a theory created out of human speculation, a ghost with a 
soul, but no structure. (Fukuoka, 1978/2009, p. 125; see also p. 113)  
Early on in Becoming Native to This Place, Jackson took up the fact–value 
divide that pervades Western culture, in which science and the facts it discovers are 
believed to be value free and therefore closer to true knowledge: “But the reality is that 
our values are able to influence the genotype of our major crops and livestock” (Jackson, 
1996, p. 21). He went on to talk about “Chicago Board of Trade genes,” or “fossil fuel 
wellhead genes,” meaning that the values that have led us to industrialize agriculture and 
create a food system based on fossil fuels have directly affected the breeding of plants 
and animals, so that their very genome reflects the ideology that went into their creation. 
Jackson then contrasted these industrial agriculture values and genes with a story about a 
Native American woman who saved both the large and small ears of corn because “corn 
is a gift of the gods and to discriminate against the small in favor of the large would be 
to show a lack of appreciation for the gift. What she was doing, in genetic terms, was 
maintaining genetic diversity. Values dictate genotype” (ibid., p. 22). 
Where Jackson eventually settled, with the help of Douglas Sloan, was on the 
idea that there is a “scientific and technological worldview” that is quantitative and 
mechanistic and that our culture has expanded this worldview beyond its discipline “to 
the point that it has become our all-encompassing picture of the universe as ultimately 
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dead, mechanical, meaningless” (Jackson, 1996, p. 38). This is essentially scientism 
which, when coupled with the institutions of today, “has been thousands of times more 
ecologically destructive than the church–state alliance ever was” (ibid., p. 109). 
However strong his criticism, Jackson made sure to point out that “none of this suggests 
an end to science so much as an end to our emphasis on science only as we now know 
it” (ibid., p. 41). 
 
Economism 
 
Economism is analogous to scientism: where scientism believes that the 
scientific method provides the only recourse to true knowledge, economism is the 
ideology where “the needs and values of business have come to dominate society” (Uhl, 
2004, p. 240). 
Though profuse in his opposition to scientism, Fukuoka dealt with economics 
sparingly. In one place he gave an example of when an economic advantage becomes a 
social disadvantage for the farmer: “The competition then brings the prices down, and 
all that is left to the farmer is the burden of hard work and the added costs of supplies 
and equipment. Now he must apply the wax” (Fukuoka, 1978/2009, p. 87).  
In The Holy Earth, Bailey commented on economics in much the same way that 
Jackson commented on science—by placing it in proper perspective: “The morals of 
land management is [sic] more important than the economics of land management”  
(Bailey, 1915/1988, p. 35).  
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Bailey also wrote:  
We shall learn how to distribute the satisfactions in life rather than 
merely to assemble them. Before this time comes, we shall have passed 
the present insistence on so-called commercial efficiency, as if it were the 
sole measure of a civilization, and higher ends shall come to have 
control.” (Bailey, 1915/1988, p. 45; see also p. 52)  
Jackson, with the gift of historical perspective, had an additional critique to add 
to the charges against economism. Besides noting that “more modern economists will 
have to admit that much of what is important to the life-supporting system and culture 
does not compute” (Jackson, 1996, p. 112), Jackson was acutely aware of “economic 
imperialism” (ibid., p. 100) operating in agriculture because “economic anxiety has 
increased and preoccupation with economic issues is higher than ever” (ibid., p. 105). 
This awareness of the assumptions of economism led him to conclude that “we should 
not expect sustainable agriculture to exist safely as a satellite in orbit around an 
extractive economy” (ibid., p. 26). 
When reading Howard, it is difficult to divorce his disdain of scientism from his 
disdain of economism, since he was so aware of the ways that the two work together 
against what he perceived to be the real goals of agriculture. Consider the following: 
Agricultural research has been misused to make the farmer, not a better 
producer of food, but a more expert bandit. He has been taught how to 
profiteer at the expense of posterity—how to transfer capital in the shape 
of soil fertility and the reserves of his live stock to his profit and loss 
account. (Howard, 2010, p. 213; see also 1947/2006, p. 31–32)  
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Also: 
The slow poisoning of the life of the soil by artificial manures is one of 
the greatest calamities which has befallen agriculture and mankind. The 
responsibility for this disaster must be shared equally by the disciples of 
Liebig and by the economic system under which we are living. (Howard, 
2010, p. 236) 
And: 
However, in some places, the focus of his derision was clear: 
But economics has done a much greater disservice to agriculture than the 
collection of useless data. Farming has come to be looked at as if it were 
a factory. Agriculture is regarded as a commercial enterprise; far too 
much emphasis has been laid on profit. . . . The nation’s food in the 
nature of things must always take first place. The financial system, after 
all, is but a secondary matter. Economics therefore, in failing to insist on 
these elementary truths, has been guilty of a grave error of judgment. 
(Howard, 2010, p. 213) 
Leopold wrote: 
The “key-log” which must be moved to release the evolutionary process 
for an ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely 
an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what is 
ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient. 
(Leopold, 1949, p. 224) 
37 
 
In that same text Leopold also wrote, “The fallacy the economic determinists have tied 
around our collective neck, and which we now need to cast off, is the belief that 
economics determines all land-use. This is simply not true” (Leopold, 1949, p. 225). 
Berry is similar to Howard in that he sees the negative implications of the 
mutually reinforcing mentalities of scientism and economism: 
The collaboration of boomer science with boomer mentality of the 
industrial corporations has imposed upon us a state of virtually total 
economy in which it is the destiny of every creature (humans not 
excepted) to have a price and to be sold. In a total economy, all materials, 
creatures, and ideas become commodities, interchangeable and 
disposable. (Berry, 2000, p. 132) 
Finally, Steiner also took exception to economism. He stated it most bluntly 
when he wrote this passage: 
No one can judge of Agriculture who does not derive his judgment from 
field and forest and the breeding of cattle. All talk of Economics which is 
not derived from the job itself should really cease. So long as people do 
not recognize that all talk of Economics—hovering airily over the 
realities—is merely empty talk, we shall not reach a hopeful prospect, 
neither in Agriculture nor in any other sphere. (Steiner, 1958, p. 19) 
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Transpersonal Agroecology: Subscription  
 
Identification 
 
In articulating the theory of TE, Fox expounded upon the idea of identification in 
his own way, highlighting three ways in which an individual can expand the sense of 
self—personal, cosmological, and ontological. Critics of Fox find his specific 
characterization problematic. For instance, Stavely & McNamara feel it is not properly 
transpersonal, in that it still focuses on an individual’s conscious intentions, whereas the 
transpersonal lies outside of conscious intentions (Stavely & McNamara, 1992).  
But even when taking Fox’s definition of identification as the sole criterion for 
justifying TPAE, as opposed to enlarged possibilities, there is still sufficient evidence, 
and this exercise serves as a good introduction. Again, Fox characterized the three paths 
to expanding self-identity as personal, cosmological, and ontological. Personal 
identification “refers to experiences of commonality with other entities that are brought 
about through personal involvement with these entities” (Fox, 1995, p. 249). Ontological 
identification “refers to experiences of commonality with all that is[,] that are brought 
about through deep-seated realization of the fact that things are” (ibid., p. 250–251). 
Cosmological identification “refers to experiences of commonality with all that is that 
are brought about through deep-seated realization of the fact that we and all other 
entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality” (ibid., p. 252).   
As these three forms of identification pertain to TPAE, both the personal and the 
ontological match up well with TE.  The cosmological, on the other hand, can be 
delineated into three nuanced sub-categories--a cosmological identification (a) where 
there is no distinction between self and world, (b) through the realization that all things 
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are interconnected, and (c) through the understanding that individuals “belong” to the 
environment. 
In his writing, Fukuoka demonstrated a “no-distinction” cosmological 
identification: 
My thinking on natural food is the same as it is on natural farming. . . . If 
people will acquire food through “no-mind”** [emphasis added] even 
though they know nothing at all about yin and yang, they can attain a 
perfect natural diet. **A Buddhist term which describes the state in 
which there is no distinction between the individual and the “external” 
world [emphasis added] (Fukuoka, 1978/2009, pp. 127–128). 
 Berry wrote on “interconnected” cosmological identification: 
 For some time now ecologists have been documenting the principle that 
“you can’t do one thing”—which means that in a natural system whatever 
affects one thing ultimately affects everything…. The Creation is one; it 
is a uni-verse, a whole, the parts of which are all “turned into one” 
(Berry, 1997, p. 46; see also p. 22). 
 Bailey and Steiner both wrote on “belonging” cosmological identification.  
Bailey did so with regard to the “countryman,” as opposed to the “city man,” where the 
countryman does not think of the qualities, or “features” of the country, because “all the 
features are his; he escapes neither weather nor season, since he belongs to the country 
as much as the trees and fields belong to it [emphasis added] (Bailey, 1915/2013, p. 69).   
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Steiner uses similar phrasing but addresses the nature of all humanity: 
As human beings we cannot truly say that we are separate. We cannot 
sever ourselves. We are united with our surroundings—we belong to our 
environment [emphasis added]. As my little finger belongs to me, so do 
the things that are around us naturally belong to the whole human being 
(Steiner, 1958, p. 49).  
Berry wrote on personal identification: 
On the other hand, an agriculture using nature, including human nature, 
as its measure, would approach the world in the manner of a 
conversationalist. . . . On all farms, farmers would undertake to know 
responsibly where they are and to “consult the genius of the place.”…The 
use of the place would necessarily change, and the response of the place 
to that use would necessarily change the user. The conversation itself 
would thus assume a kind of creaturely life, binding the place and its 
inhabitants together, changing and growing to no end, no final 
accomplishment, that can be conceived or foreseen [emphasis added]. 
(Berry, 1990, pp. 208–209)   
Finally, Leopold spoke about ontological identification: 
We know now what was unknown to all the preceding caravan of 
generations: that men are only fellow-voyagers with other creatures in the 
odyssey of evolution. This new knowledge should have given us, by this 
time, a sense of kinship with fellow-creatures; a wish to live and let live; 
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a sense of wonder over the magnitude and duration of the biotic 
enterprise [emphasis added]. (Leopold, 1949, p. 209) 
 As the field of TPAE is cultivated and begins to bear fruit, it may well turn out 
that there are many more paths to identification than those laid out above.  The purpose 
here is not to make the claim that the short list above constitutes the definitive role that 
identification plays in TPAE.  Instead, it should be seen for what it is: the use of a 
previously successful framework applied to a new field in an effort to show a novel 
finding and to suggest further exploration.  Thus, it is enough to say that in TPAE, as it 
is being first articulated, the alternative agriculture theorists are cognizant of the role that 
personal, ontological, and cosmological identification play in sustainable agriculture. 
Process 
 
When explaining the second component of TE, the subscription to self-
realization through identification, Fox used Naess to say that the importance of the 
concept lies in the process of identification, in which identification is more than a 
similarity; it is a commonality.3 For TPAE, what is important is not only the concept of 
commonality, but also the explicit nature of identification being a process. This 
distinction is important because, for farmers, the process is going to be the specific 
farming practices that engender this awareness of commonality and the feedback loop 
that this awareness creates. Part of the loop has implications for modifying the farming 
practices. The other implication is for the farmer. TPAE theorists make explicit the 
                                                          
3 But not to be mistaken for identity, “that I literally am that tree over there, for 
example” (Fox, 1990, p. 81). 
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developmental nature of this new way of relating to the natural world, and some go so 
far as to directly connect the growth of the human individual with the kind of 
relationship the farmer has with the land. Finally, many theorists make this process of 
development explicit by noting that it is taking place within the daily activities and 
existence of the farmer. It is a way of being of in the world that develops over time 
through a new way of relating and understanding. 
Fukuoka was particularly attuned to the role of development in the relationship 
between farmer and land: “Ultimately, it is not the growing technique which is the most 
important factor, but rather the state of mind of the farmer” (Fukuoka, 1978/2009, p. 
46), and, “The ultimate goal of farming is not the growing of crops, but the cultivation 
and perfection of human beings” (ibid., p. 119). 
Bailey is very similar to Fukuoka when it comes to the role that development 
plays in his theory—it is huge.4 In fact, The Holy Earth seems to be written specifically 
to advocate the moral and spiritual development of the farmer in relationship to the land. 
He wrote that “one does not act rightly toward one’s fellows if one does not know how 
to act rightly toward the earth” (Bailey, 1915/1988, p. 2; see also p. 1). He then went on 
to say: 
The living creation is not exclusively man-centered: it is bio-centric. We 
perceive the essential continuity in nature, arising from within rather 
                                                          
4 Bailey (as well as the other theorists quoted in the rest of this section) is not 
unequivocal like Fukuoka, and so italics will be used here (as well as elsewhere in this 
section). 
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than from without [emphasis added], the forms of life proceeding 
upwardly and onwardly in something very like a mighty plan of 
sequence, man being one part in the process [emphasis added]. (Bailey, 
1915/1988, p. 23; see also p. 24) 
Bailey was also aware that this process occurred through the daily experience of the 
farmer, where “the reverential attitude is the result of our feeling toward the materials of 
life,-- toward the little things and the common things that meet us hour by hour” 
[emphasis added] (Bailey, 1915/1988, p. 88).  In addressing all three aspects of the 
process of identification—the implications for the farmer and farm, inner development, 
and the quotidian nature of the process, Bailey could be characterized as holistic in his 
understanding of just how this process of identification unfolds.   
If one were to enumerate all of the philosophical benefits of A Sand County 
Almanac, surely one positive would be Leopold’s capacity to show how the power of 
human worldviews is manifested through day to day situations.  This would put him on 
par with Bailey in terms of the holistic nature of his thinking.  However, Leopold’s 
emphasis on the everyday is diffuse throughout the work, so the following two 
quotations focus on his awareness of the implications of worldviews for farmer and land 
and the developmental process, respectively.  Leopold wrote: 
The cowman who cleans his range of wolves does not realize that he is 
taking over the wolf’s job of trimming the herd to fit the range. He has 
not learned to think like a mountain. Hence we have dustbowls, and 
rivers washing the future into the sea. (Leopold, 1949, p. 132) 
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And: 
These two farmers have learned from experience that the wholly tamed 
farm offers not only a slender livelihood but a constricted life. They have 
caught the idea that there is pleasure to be had in raising wild crops as 
well as tame ones. (Leopold, 1966, p. 203) 
Koepf et al. give an example of where the implications, “new possibilities,” are 
explicitly tied to “daily work”: 
Over and above their [the forces within plants, the soil, and the universe] 
actual application they open for the spirit in man new possibilities of 
achieving a clear and conscious relationship to the world of forces 
appearing in living organisms. In turn the daily work is given more of a 
meaning and an aim. (Koepf et al., 1976, p. 31) 
In addressing the processual quality of identification in TPAE, Jackson 
illuminates the recursive nature of the developmental aspect, in a way that mirrors 
Berry’s characterization of personal identification in the previous section: 
I am not talking about how we can load up with different kinds of ideas, 
different thoughts that various people have had about the world. I am 
talking about how, as Sloan puts it, the “quality of consciousness” itself 
can change, and how this affects what we can experience and know of the 
world. (Jackson, 1996, p. 39; see also pp. 107–108) 
Finally, as noted above, Berry is keen on the iterative element of development, 
which should have an enormous impact on daily living.  For instance, Berry is of the 
position that the “mentality of conservation” (Berry, 1997, p. 28) is divided between 
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protection and production.  In Berry’s estimation, a third way has not been articulated 
because conservation “is not yet sensitive to the impact of daily living upon the sources 
of daily life [emphasis added]” (ibid.).  Elsewhere, Berry makes a point of equating the 
“good” with the everyday: 
Good work is not just the maintenance of connections—as one is now 
said to work “for a living” or “to support a family”—but the enactment of 
connections. It is living, and a way of living; it is not support for a family 
in the sense of an exterior brace or prop, but is one of the forms and acts 
of love. (Berry, 1997, p. 139) 
Thus, many TPAE authors felt it necessary to bring into focus the processual 
nature of identification, with implications for the farm and farmer, with an awareness 
toward human development, and an understanding that this process gets embodied 
mainly through day to day life on the farm.  While there may be some debate within 
transpersonal disciplines about the nature of ecological or spiritual identity and 
development, with an eye toward the possibility of a totalizing conversion experience, it 
seems clear that, in TPAE, it is not a one-time experience, but a way of being for the 
farmer in relationship to the farm, which affects the farmer and has effects for the farm, 
and is continually refined on daily, seasonally, and yearly bases.   
 
Transpersonal Agroecology: Contribution 
 
A final aspect of TE that is necessary in the discussion of TPAE is Fox’s (1995, 
p. 199) assertion that TE is not subordinate to transpersonal psychology (TP). This is 
true of TPAE in two ways: (a) TPAE is not subordinate to TE, and (b) TPAE is also not 
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subordinate to TP. There are important aspects of TPAE that are mentioned tangentially 
in the other two theories. The fact that they may not be central concepts in TE or TP in 
no way diminishes these concepts’ importance for TPAE. 
 
Values 
 
For instance, Fox did not talk very much about values in delineating his theory of 
identification. However, Stavely and McNamara (1992), in summarizing Fox’s position, 
characterized it as a “reorientation of value theory from instrumental and intrinsic value 
explanations to ecological values as axiomatic” (Stavely & McNamara, 1992, p. 203). 
Most TPAE theorists raise questions about values in terms of the misguided values of 
modernity, exhibiting a transpersonal orientation that becomes even clearer as other 
aspects of transpersonal theory are overlaid on the agricultural theorists’ concern for 
values. 
These critiques of modern values, or lack thereof as the case may be, and their 
relationship to agriculture, comes in two forms: (a) a simple critique where values are 
forgotten or lost and (b) a critique that also advocates new values.  Fukuoka and Koepf 
et al.’s critiques fall in the first category.  Fukuoka wrote, “Another problem is that 
spiritual and emotional values are entirely forgotten, even though foods are directly 
connected with human spirit and emotions” (Fukuoka, 1978/2009, p. 140).  Koepf et al. 
wrote: 
The crisis, rather, is a structural one, and includes the single farm and the 
positioning of farming in the social fabric. . . . Finally, the crisis includes man. 
When his interest is absorbed in a onesided way by economics and technology, 
47 
 
important human values are lost. The ethical foundations of the farming 
profession remain undernourished. (Koepf et al., 1976, p. 398) 
Jackson also included economics in his critique of modern values but he ties that 
critique to the hope that a new economics will follow from a new way of being in the 
world: 
An extractive economic system to a large degree is a derivative of our 
perceptions and values. But it also controls our behavior. We have to 
loosen its hard grip on us, finger by finger. I am hopeful that a new 
economic system can emerge from the homecomer’s effort—as a 
derivative of right livelihood rather than of purposeful design. (Jackson, 
1996, p. 99) 
Leopold echoes Jackson in making explicit the idea that value change cannot 
come from within a paradigm, but the object of derision here is specifically conservation 
education: 
It defines no right or wrong, assigns no obligation, calls for no sacrifice, 
implies no change in the current philosophy of values. In respect of land-
use, it urges only enlightened self-interest. Just how far will such an 
education take us? (Leopold, 1949, pp. 207–208) 
Finally, Berry (1997) took a different tack than the economics of Jackson or the 
conservation education of Leopold.  Berry addressed “the machine metaphor”, which, 
“in modern agriculture…is allowed to usurp and wipe from consideration not merely 
some values, but the very issue of values” (Berry, 1997, p. 91). He went on to say, “the 
good use of such land (use that is at once full, efficient, and careful) requires something 
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altogether different and is probably unthinkable in terms of our present agricultural 
economy and cultural values” (ibid., p. 186). 
 Whether simply leveling a critique, or coupling that critique with a new vision, 
as it pertains to economics, education, or language, TPAE seeks to bring an 
understanding of values into alternative agriculture practices as an integral part of what 
truly sustainable farming will be.   
 
Alternative Methodologies and Epistemologies 
 
TPAE theorists are explicitly interested in alternative methodologies and 
epistemologies for two reasons, both of which have transpersonal implications. First, 
they react against the fundamentalism associated with the methodology and 
epistemology of the productionist mentality. Second, they advocate a theory of 
knowledge that goes beyond rationality and intellect, including methodologies like 
poetry, art, and conversing with nature, as well as epistemologies which honor feeling, 
sensitivity, and religious knowing. This second part, concern with alternatives, is 
particularly transpersonal in that, in Walsh and Vaughan’s (1993b) estimation, “the 
transpersonal disciplines stand alone in adopting an eclectic epistemology that seeks to 
include science, philosophy, introspection, and contemplation” (Walsh & Vaughan, 
1993, p. 205). This openness to alternatives across methodological and epistemological 
boundaries is important for the next section of this article, where the spiritual 
dimensions of TPAE are explored. By default, a practitioner of these alternative 
agricultural practices must diverge from a reductionistic, mechanistic, materialistic 
epistemology in order for the spiritual to play a role. 
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Fukuoka invoked alternative epistemologies in the two ways that were 
highlighted earlier. On one hand, he pointed to the inability of the intellect to provide 
total knowledge, particularly as it pertains to scientism. On the other hand, he pointed to 
those things that he believes provide the necessary larger picture: 
Scientists think they can understand nature...But I think an understanding 
of nature lies beyond the reach of human intelligence. . . . Why is it 
impossible to know nature? That which is conceived to be nature is only 
the idea of nature arising in each person’s mind. (Fukuoka, 1978/2009, p. 
25; see also p. 154–155) 
Fukuoka went on to tell a story, relative to insect control and who should have a 
say in how it is practiced, about spider webs covering his fields overnight to the point 
that a field-hand rushed to Fukuoka’s house to ask him if he covered his fields in a net. 
He closed the paradigm-shifting story by saying, “The spectacle is an amazing natural 
drama. Seeing this, you understand that poets and artists will also have to join in the 
gathering” (Fukuoka, 2009, p. 27–28).   In ruminating on this theme, Fukuoka later 
included philosophers and “men of religion” on the guest list (ibid., p. 28). 
In his critique, Bailey also included the limitations of the intellect, but he 
emphasized enlarging the scope of what is important in making good agricultural 
decisions, if not good life decisions. Like Fukuoka, he included the heart, writing how 
“soft green things push up out of the earth, growing by some sweet alchemy that I 
cannot understand but that I can feel” (Bailey, 1915/2013, p. 78). In another passage he 
wrote, “The old-time formal and literary attitude, with facility in a particular group of 
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academic subjects, is much to be prized; but sensitiveness to life is the highest product of 
education [emphasis added] (Bailey, 1915/2013, p. 99). 
In these quotations from Outlook, which preceded Holy Earth, Bailey seems to 
be giving voice to the inkling of heart-centered alternative epistemologies. In Holy 
Earth, Bailey took this concept as a given; there are examples of second-level thinking 
seemingly derived from these alternative, spiritual, epistemologies. For instance, “An 
oak tree is to us a moral object because it lives its life regularly and fulfills its destiny” 
(ibid., p. 12). Here he was most explicit, stating that to take nature spiritually isn’t a 
form of dogma but is a form of objectivity available to everyone: “The good spiritual 
reaction to nature is not a form of dogmatism or impressionism. It results normally from 
objective experience, when the person is ready for it and has good digestion” (ibid., p. 
52).    
It would benefit the reader to reflect on this for a moment.  While this last 
quotation is in a section on “alternative” methodologies and epistemologies, Bailey does 
not consider “the good spiritual reaction to nature” at all alternative; in point of fact, he 
thinks it is “normal” and is an “objective experience” (Bailey, 1915/1988, p. 52).  
Besides being in stark contrast to what is currently considered “normal” and “objective” 
in agriculture today, this position is important to note because the epistemology of 
relatedness (through feeling, emotion, or sensitivity) is shared by so many of the 
theorists to such a degree that both Berry (1997) and Koepf et al. (1976) used the same 
terminology as Bailey, the necessity of sensitivity: 
The use of land cannot be both general and kindly. . . . To treat every 
field, or every part of every field, with the same consideration is not 
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farming but industry. Kindly use depends upon intimate knowledge, the 
most sensitive responsiveness and responsibility. As knowledge (hence, 
use) is generalized, essential values are destroyed. As the householder 
evolves into a consumer, the farm evolves into a factory—with results 
that are potentially calamitous for both. (Berry, 1997, p. 31) 
And: 
Nevertheless, it is also important to be able to feel one’s way into the 
processes of nature. It is then important to form thoughts that can 
penetrate into the structure of nature for such thoughts will stimulate 
rather than banish the appropriate sensitivity. (Koepf et al., 1976, p. 125) 
Leopold expressed both a critique and advocated an alternative, writing that 
“nevertheless, there are many discontents in agriculture which seem to add up to a new 
vision of ‘biotic farming’” (Leopold, 1949, p. 222), and “the evolution of a land ethic is 
an intellectual as well as emotional process” (ibid., p. 225).  
So too did Jackson, who with the benefit of time and perspective, was succinct 
and direct in his analysis of current methods and his proposal for the future: “Here lies 
my worry. Most proposals for bringing about a sustainable agriculture and culture carry 
the fingerprints or markings of the Baconian-Cartesian worldview. At best, it amounts to 
Smart Resource Management” (Jackson, 1996, p. 25), and, “If we can [risk looking 
downward from the ecosphere and seeing nature’s ecosystems in the mosaic as primary 
objects of study], then we can fashion a new research agenda for agriculture featuring a 
dialectical interaction with nature and, ultimately, a conversation with nature” (ibid., p. 
111–112). 
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Along with Berry’s contribution to the concept of an epistemology of relatedness 
above, he also leveled critiques and offered an additional alternative: “To define 
knowledge as merely empirical is to limit one’s ability to know; it enfeebles one’s 
ability to feel and think” (Berry, 2000, p. 103, 101; Berry, 1997, p. 48).   Berry’s 
alternative, which could be shown to correspond to an epistemology of relatedness, is 
the belief that “religious faith may be a way of knowing things that cannot otherwise be 
known,” (Berry, 2000, p.28) over and against the scientistic, narrow “definition of 
reality” that E.O. Wilson puts forward as the only legitimate possibility.  
Nowhere is the significance of these alternatives better articulated than by Koepf 
et al.  The following passage serves not only as a conclusion to this section, with its 
summary of the necessity of seeing the limits of a scientistic framework and its support 
for an alternative methodology, but also as a culmination of previous sections.  Notice 
how personal development is mentioned, as is an awareness of the recursive nature of 
the process.  Indeed, this quote offers a nice segue into the final section of the article on 
Spirit:  
Natural science has as far as possible detached man from knowledge in 
order to reach objective results. But in the processes described here man 
works on himself in order to become an ever more complete instrument 
for understanding nature. In doing so he begins to meet layers of reality 
that must remain incomprehensible to one who proceeds only by 
measuring, counting and reckoning. He then experiences more 
consciously something belonging to the most ancient experiences of 
mankind: that in natural beings themselves something lives and works 
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that can only be comprehended if he compares it with his own will and 
indeed grasps it with his own will.  
This is the path that is likely to suggest itself to the farmer, for he 
constantly experiences himself as working in nature out of his will. He 
has to adapt to conditions and yet he can transform them. (Koepf et al., 
1976, p. 200–201) 
 
Spirit 
 
Spirit and a sense of the numinous also exist in TPAE writings, appearing in a 
way that forgoes strict religious affiliation. This too is a shared attribute of 
transpersonalism. One way of looking at it is through Walsh and Vaughan’s attempt to 
define the transpersonal realm. They specifically note that transpersonalism has a 
relationship to religion, albeit a complicated one. They begin with a “simple definition 
of religion” as “that which is concerned with, or related to, the sacred” (Walsh & 
Vaughan, 1993a, p. 5). They went on to say that the overlap occurs where transpersonal 
experiences are religious and religious experiences are transpersonal. This definition, in 
which an individual has an experience of the sacred outside the boundaries of 
institutionalized religion, matches almost exactly the accepted definition of a spiritual 
experience, which also matches much of the writings of the TPAE theorists.  For 
example, Fukuoka wrote: 
So for the farmer in his work: serve nature and all is well. Farming used 
to be sacred work. When humanity fell away from this ideal, modern 
commercial agriculture rose. When the farmer began to grow crops to 
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make money, he forgot the real principles of agriculture. (Fukuoka, 
1978/2009, p.113; see also p. 111) 
As its name suggests, Bailey’s The Holy Earth was directed entirely toward the 
spiritual relationship between humanity and the earth, and this is especially true for 
farmers. Even in The Outlook to Nature, Bailey was clear about the role of spirit and, in 
particular, its relationship to agriculture, and at the end of the book it is possible to see 
how Bailey’s thinking honed in on the spiritual in a way that gave birth to The Holy 
Earth: 
The countryman’s training, whether in home or school, should be such as 
to intensify his spiritual reactions. There is a danger that we miss the 
reverential attitude toward life… One stimulates it in himself only as he 
feels that the earth is holy and that all the things that come out of the 
earth are holy….Such an attitude of mind as inclines one to pause to 
listen to a bird’s song (even though he may not stop his work), to give 
more than a passing glance to a potato plant, to inhale some deeper 
draught of the fragrance of new-plowed land, will produce in him a sweet 
seriousness that will stand him in good stead in stress and strain, and will 
much reinforce his spiritual stability. (Bailey, 1915/2013, p. 87–88,  80, 
189)  
Given the above, in relation to the preceding sections of this article, it is easy to 
see the “trans” nature of the transpersonal.  This quotation could easily have been 
included in the alternative epistemology section because Bailey here is talking about 
“the reverential attitude toward life” as a learning outcome of proper agricultural 
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training.  Furthermore, it could also have been included in the process section with its 
many references to seemingly mundane agricultural experiences (like looking at potato 
plants or smelling new plowed land) as playing a role in reinforcing the farmers 
“spiritual stability.”   
While the theme of the importance of spirituality and religion, again with regard 
to nature and agriculture, filled the majority of The Holy Earth, in this text, Bailey also 
introduced philosophical, practical, and moral implications, which he used to the same 
effect: 
The sacredness to us of the earth is intrinsic and inherent. It lies in 
our necessary relationship and in the duty imposed on us to have 
dominion, and to exercise ourselves even against our own 
interests. We may not waste that which is not ours. To live in 
sincere relations with the company of created things and with 
conscious regard for the support of all men now and yet to come, 
must be of the essence of righteousness. (Bailey, 1915/1988, p. 
11; see also pp. xi, 20, 78) 
Here, Bailey uses terms like “intrinsic” and “inherent,” which came with their own 
weight at the time that he wrote them, but contain even more now after decades of 
debate over these terms in environmental philosophy.  But he makes these concepts 
practical by relating them to “our necessary relationship” while at the same time making 
them moral by adding that we should adhere to this understanding “even against our 
own interests.”  That is the power of the spiritual:  to contain the religious, moral, 
philosophical, and practical arts within one frame. 
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Few are better at simultaneously containing the religious, moral, philosophical, 
and practical arts than Wendell Berry.  Berry expressed himself on spirituality in 
agriculture when writing “but [farming] is also a practical religion, a practice of religion, 
a rite. By farming we enact our fundamental connection with energy and matter, light 
and darkness” (Berry, 1997, p. 87; see also p. 11, 131). He also stated: 
The “drudgery” of growing one’s own food, then, is not drudgery at 
all….It is—in addition to being the appropriate fulfillment of a practical 
need—a sacrament, as eating is also, by which we enact and understand 
our oneness with the Creation, the conviviality of one body with all 
bodies. (Berry, 1997, p. 138) 
 To bring Leopold into a section on spirit is to be walking a paradoxical tightrope. 
On one hand, Curt Meine, Leopold’s biographer, stated that Leopold was “reticent on 
matters of the spirit” (as cited in Pryor 2011, p. 487).  On the other hand, Leopold’s 
daughter called him “the most religious person I ever knew” (Van Horn, 2011, p. 406).  
While A Sand County Almanac is peppered with religious references, like the “Mosaic 
Decalogue” (Leopold, 1949, p. 202), one would be hard pressed to find Leopold using 
overt spiritual language or concepts in arguing his case.  One important exception (see 
also Leopold, 1949, p. 210) is a story that he tells about an atheist boy who ‘converted’ 
when confronted with “a hundred-odd species of warblers” (Leopold, 1966, p. 230).  
Nothing but the spiritual could grant an understanding of such beauty: “I dare say this 
boy’s convictions would be harder to shake than those of many inductive theologians” 
(ibid., p. 231).  What makes this story so interesting is that Leopold’s brother, Frederick, 
suggested that it was likely that Aldo was writing about himself (Swan, 2010).  This 
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story, and the possible autobiographical nature of it, goes a long way towards describing 
the deep spiritual roots of Leopold’s land ethic, and in turn, the spiritual roots of TPAE. 
Finally, turning to Steiner, there is another spiritual story that bears telling: the 
very origins of biodynamics.  It appears that this method of agriculture was Steiner’s 
answer to the series of questions posed by an agricultural associate, Ehrenfried Pfeiffer. 
[Steiner] had been speaking of the need for a deepening of esoteric life, 
and in this connection mentioned certain faults typically found in spiritual 
movements. I then asked, “How can it happen that the spiritual impulse, 
and especially the inner schooling, for which you are constantly 
providing stimulus and guidance bear so little fruit? Why do the people 
concerned give so little evidence of spiritual experience, in spite of all 
their efforts? Why, worst of all, is the will for action, for carrying out 
these spiritual impulses, so weak?” …Then came the thought-provoking 
and surprising answer: “This is a problem of nutrition. Nutrition as it is 
to-day does not supply the strength necessary for manifesting the spirit in 
physical life. A bridge can no longer be built from thinking to will to 
action. Food plants no longer contained the forces people need for this.” 
A nutritional problem which, if solved, would enable the spirit to become 
manifest and realize itself in human beings!...This puts the Koberwitz 
agricultural course in proper perspective as an introduction to 
understanding spiritual, cosmic forces and making them effective again in 
the plant world. (Steiner, 1958, pp. 7–8; see also Koepf et al., 1976, p. 
24) 
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This quotation also puts the role of spirit in proper perspective: whether it is Leopold’s 
land ethic, Steiner’s biodynamics, or Fukuoka’s natural farming, spirit is instrumental in 
undertaking a truly sustainable agriculture. 
 
Conclusion 
The conceptualization of TPAE and its recoupling with the practices of 
sustainable agriculture are of great importance. As has been shown, TPAE theorists not 
only put forward alternatives to the unsustainable practices of industrial agriculture but 
also challenge the productionist mind-set. Unfortunately, what is taught and undertaken 
as sustainable agriculture is mainly its practice; the unsustainable productionist mind-set 
is left more or less intact. 
 In the academic context of teaching sustainable agriculture, the cause of this 
omission might stem from higher education’s reluctance to entertain the spiritual. Since 
TPAE calls for alternative epistemologies and an acceptance of the spiritual, it tends to 
challenge “the often-unacknowledged presuppositions that guide higher education and 
that can stifle the legitimate exploration of our larger human concerns, including what 
we can call our moral and spiritual concerns” (Zajonc, 2003, p. 50). Shahjahan provided 
a remarkable analysis of the marginalization of spirituality in the academy. His 
conclusion was to “dialogue so that we can address the question of spirituality in 
research from different social locations and spiritual traditions” (Shahjahan, 2005, p. 
703). This article is an attempt to start such a dialogue with the discipline of sustainable 
agriculture. 
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 The economic reasons for ignoring the spiritual in sustainable agriculture are 
inherent in the economic system itself. Vandana Shiva, a farmer and environmental 
leader and thinker, noted that “the organizing principles of development based on 
economic growth render valueless all resources and resource processes that are not 
priced in the market and are not inputs to commodity production” (Shiva, 2005, p. 49). 
C. A. Bowers, ecojustice educational theorist, stated that “one of the hallmarks of 
modernization has been the shift in market relationships from a peripheral though 
essential aspect of community life to the dominant focal point of human interaction” 
(Bowers, 2001, p. 159). In agriculture, this development has taken the form of the 
stereotypical farmer knowing “as much about financing and business accountability as 
his banker,” in the estimation of former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz (Berry, 
1997, p. 33). Therefore, most farmers, even those interested in alternatives, are tied up in 
a system where their primary thinking is done through the lens of business and where 
their intimate relationship with the land is not valued. 
As it stands now, sustainable agriculture seems held back. However, if 
sustainable agriculture, in both discipline and practice, were to take seriously the ideas 
of its founders as they are conceptualized in TPAE, it could more fully deal with what 
Wendell Berry considered the first disruptive boundary of a practitioner of the 
productionist mentality: “Its first disruption is in his mind” (Berry, 1997, p. 71).5  
  
                                                          
5 Here “practitioner of the productionist mentality” is used synonymously with Berry’s 
concept of the “specialist.”  
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CHAPTER 3. GRAFTING METAPHYSICS: HOW TRANSPERSONAL 
AGROECOLOGY BEARS FRUIT WITH PROCESS METAPHYSICS AS ITS ROOT 
 
Modified from a paper to be published in 
Process Studies 
 
Travis Cox 
 
 
Abstract 
Transpersonal Agroecology is a theory, derived from the collective leanings of 
various important thinkers and practitioners in the field of alternative agriculture over 
the last century, which sees the mindset of the farmer to be just as important as her 
agricultural practices.  However, these accumulated intuitions do not provide a coherent 
metaphysics within which to practice TPAE, and a metaphysic is needed in order to 
provide the intellectual and perceptual space for true alternatives to arise.  Process 
metaphysics (PM) not only provides a metaphysical grounding for TPAE, matching up 
with its concepts one-to-one, but it also offers justification for adjudication, which is 
essential for agriculture, and provides a proper valuing of the human from which to 
build human systems such as agriculture.  With PM as the metaphysical basis of TPAE, 
practitioners will be able to situate their on-farm experiences and relationships within a 
coherent framework that positively reinforces their commitment to, and practice of, 
sustainable agriculture. 
 
 
Introduction 
Industrial agriculture is embedded in an industrial worldview that reinforces and 
reflects agriculture as industry.  Many in the sustainable agriculture movement resist the 
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practices of industrial agriculture, but the worldview, at its root, frequently remains 
unchallenged.  However, there is, in the field of sustainable agriculture, an identifiable 
tradition that has been labeled “transpersonal agroecology,” or TPAE (Cox, 
forthcoming), which attempts this necessary worldview reform. 
The theory of transpersonal agroecology (TPAE) is based on the premises of 
some alternative agricultural theorists who believe that a shift in consciousness, 
alongside a shift in practice, is an essential component in the transition from industrial to 
sustainable agriculture.  Representatives of this tradition in the early 20th century include 
American horticulturalist and “father” of the extension service Liberty Hyde Bailey, 
biodynamic progenitor Rudolf Steiner, and one of the founders of organic agriculture, 
Sir Albert Howard.  American ecologist and environmental philosopher Aldo Leopold 
and Japanese agricultural scientist and “natural farmer” Masanobu Fukuoka are two 
middle century theorists.  Finally, Land Institute founder Wes Jackson and farmer and 
man of letters Wendell Berry make up the turn of the 21st century voices within TPAE.  
The “transpersonal” aspect of TPAE finds its source in Warwick Fox’s 
“transpersonal ecology,” TPAE’s methodological and ideological antecedent (Fox 
1995).  Fox used quotes from various theorists of a particular environmental philosophy, 
deep ecology, to highlight an important, yet previously unconscious, commonality 
amongst them.  This commonality pertained to the theorists’ predilection towards 
privileging a kind of human self-realization, in conjunction with an appropriate 
relationship to the natural world, as integral for deep ecology.  Therefore, Fox suggested 
“transpersonal ecology” (TE) as a more appropriate label than deep ecology, where 
“transpersonal experience,” from the discipline of transpersonal psychology, is defined 
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as “experiences in which the sense of identity or self extends beyond (trans) the 
individual or personal to encompass wider aspects of humankind, life, psyche, and 
cosmos” (Walsh &Vaughan, p. 3).  Fox also felt that the new label was etymologically 
appropriate since “trans” could mean beyond, changing thoroughly, and transcending.  
TE went beyond other environmental philosophies through its enlarged concept of self, 
which was changed thoroughly through the process of identification, thus transcending 
the limits of a more narrow sense of self typical of most other environmental 
philosophies.  
Similarly, TPAE goes beyond traditional western concepts of the “self” of a 
farmer, taken for granted from the dominant western metaphysics of science and Judeo-
Christian religions.  This sense of self is changed thoroughly, as are the farming 
practices, through processes of identification from Fox’s framework, outlined below, 
whereby the farmer comes to identify with the farm and the beings on the farm.  Finally, 
in the same way that TE transcends the limits of other environmental philosophies, so 
too does TPAE transcend the limits of industrial agriculture. 
The particulars of transpersonal agroecology are derived from the commonly 
held beliefs of the various theorists. First, they advocate for a reshaping of the 
alternative farmer’s very identity, based on a revised relationship with the beings on the 
farm, as well as the awareness that this revised sense of self is an outcome of the process 
of being in the new relationships.  Second, the alternative agricultural theorists see 
alternative methodologies and epistemologies as relevant, believe a conversation about 
values is necessary, and recognize that this paradigm shift has spiritual implications as 
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well.  Finally, they argue against scientism and economism, which typify the ideology of 
modern conventional agriculture. 
However, at this stage in theorizing about transpersonal agroecology, 
commonalities provide only a beginning.  At present, transpersonal agroecology 
represents the collective leanings of a variety of alternative agricultural theorists.  Much 
like TE before it, TPAE is primarily concerned with experiences of identification, as 
opposed to metaphysical frameworks that engender or interpret these experiences.  So 
while TPAE is enough to show that the psycho-spiritual facet of sustainable agriculture 
has been ignored, what is needed now is a metaphysics that takes into account these 
similarities and provides a way of being in the world that allows the alternative 
agriculture practitioner to participate in daily farm activities that confirm this new way 
of being in the world.  In this paper, I argue that TPAE is in need of an alternative 
metaphysics to support both the philosophical commitments and the daily practices of 
sustainable agriculture in this tradition, and that a process metaphysics (PM) is uniquely 
situated to serve this need.  Additionally, by adopting PM as its established framework, 
TPAE gains two significant benefits.  First, it will be shown that PM lends itself well to 
an environmental ethic that is seeking to discriminate between types of beings, which is 
the very definition of agriculture – the human selection of some species to cultivate and 
others to deter.  Second, as a balance to this capacity for adjudication, PM can be shown 
to provide a conception of human “be-ing” that facilitates a symbiotic relationship 
between humanity and the more-than-human world.  In maintaining this balance, it will 
be necessary to show that, contrary to valid concerns, PM, like TPAE, is not 
anthropocentric.  Therefore, with process metaphysics, transpersonal agroecology has 
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found a ground that not only supports its claims, but actually solidifies them.  To put it 
another way, the mindset of the system of agriculture that comes out of PM is one that 
looks exactly like the mindset of TPAE. 
For some, the question then arises, “If the outcomes are the same, why does 
TPAE need a coherent metaphysics?”  This is an excellent question and one that is 
addressed by the environmental process thinkers who are referenced in this article, as it 
pertains to environmental philosophy (as opposed to TPAE).6  They make the case that 
metaphysical views assign parameters of what is possible, given a particular conception 
of reality.  Relative to agriculture, Cobb characterizes the two metaphysical views, or 
“modes of perception,” as mechanical and ecological (Cobb, 1984, p. 209).  The 
mechanical model, which describes the metaphysics of industrial agriculture, is the 
understanding of reality as “made up of substances” and in which “all relations are 
external” (ibid., p. 210).  The ecological model, on the other hand, thinks “of the 
substantial aspects of things as superficial,” because beings are actual events that endure. 
“Relations to other things are internal.  They are constitutive of each thing” (ibid., p. 
212, 211).  Cobb concludes that “Only as there is real conversion of perception by the 
emergence of a new horizon [read metaphysics] will the question of this conference, that 
                                                          
6 The term “environmental process thinkers” here is meant to delineate those theorists 
who are influenced by Whitehead’s thinking, but have applied his concepts in novel 
ways over the last century.  These thinkers will be referenced much more than 
Whitehead himself because they represent a mature form of his thought relative to the 
issues at hand. 
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of a sustainable agriculture, come to command wide attention” (Cobb, 1984, p. 216-
217).  Henning states: “Taken seriously, our understanding of reality as composed of 
vibrant, organically interconnected achievements of beauty and value, has a dramatic 
effect on how we conceive of ourselves, of nature, and of our moral obligations” 
(Henning, 2009, p. 109). 
Suffice it to say, the purview of this article is not so much an argument for why 
metaphysics are important to environmental philosophy in general and TPAE in 
particular, but rather, more in line with Gunter who attempted to show that 
bioregionalism, Leopold’s land ethic, and Whiteheadianism would all benefit from 
establishing an explicit and intricate relationship, whereby bioregionalism provides the 
praxis, the land ethic provides the beliefs, and the process thought provides the 
metaphysics that supports those beliefs.  To paraphrase Gunter, the central thesis of this 
paper is that the “Theorie” of PM can mutually reinforce the “Praxis” of TPAE in all 
the important ways that have been outlined above (ibid., 219).  
 
Process Metaphysics and Transpersonal Agroecology 
Having defined TPAE and given a preview of its relationships with PM, the next 
step is to provide a working definition for process metaphysics from the 
environmentally-focused process literature.   Whitehead said, “Metaphysics is nothing 
but the description of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice” 
(Whitehead, 1978, 13).  Benzoni says “Whitehead starts with human subjectivity and 
seeks to develop a metaphysical system that characterizes all things.  He strips away all 
characteristics that are not shared by other entities (such as rationality, consciousness, 
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sentience, life), with the goal of arriving at those characteristics (that is, metaphysical 
characteristics) that truly make up all final real things” (Benzoni, 2007, 137). To put it in 
Whitehead’s words: “subjective experiencing is the primary metaphysical situation 
which is presented for metaphysical analysis” (ibid., 160). 
Taking the beginning of Whitehead’s metaphysical project as subjective 
experience, Benzoni’s characterization of where that leads provides the definition of 
process metaphysics for this paper: “Metaphysically fundamental units of reality, the 
ultimate ontological units of existence (or ‘actual entities’), are all alike subjects of 
experience constituted by internal relations to past subjects, which they integrate into 
one felt whole, thereby conditioning the future” (Benzoni, 2007, p. 164).  Thus, having a 
working definition for both PM and TPAE, the next section will delineate the 
similarities between the two, on the way toward showing the crucial additions that PM 
makes to a fully developed TPAE. 
 
Similarities between PM and TPAE 
 
The promise of process metaphysics for transpersonal agroecology does not just 
lie in its adjudication and proper valuing of the human species, though they are 
significant additions to the theory. Almost every aspect of TPAE finds a correlate in PM.  
Not only does PM address the solution-oriented aspects of TPAE, such as identification 
and its process, alternative epistemologies and methodologies, the role of spirit, but it 
also addresses the critical aspects as well, economism and scientism, though in its own 
particular way.  It becomes clear, then, that process metaphysics will serve transpersonal 
agroecology well as the theoretical basis of its alternative worldview. The discussion of 
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the relationship between PM and agriculture has been moved forward significantly by 
Henning and he does a brilliant job of highlighting the issues around the proper human 
diet relative to a “processive cosmos” (2005).  Obviously, what a person decides to eat 
has a tremendous influence of the kind of agriculture that supports it.  However, the 
discussion here is based off of TPAE, which has as its object the mindset of the farmer 
and its relation to agricultural practices, and therefore breaks off from, and contributes 
to, that discussion. 
 
Identification 
The concept of identification is fundamental to TPAE, as it is to TPAE’s 
disciplinary precursor, transpersonal ecology (TE).7  For a TPAE theorist like Bailey, for 
example, the mindset of the farmer and her relationship to the beings on the farm is of 
utmost importance in carrying out the practices of a sustainable agriculture.   
[The farmer] must be instructed in matters pertaining to good schools, good 
churches, good roads, good local government, good politics; he must be stimulated in 
citizenship; and his intellectual and spiritual horizon must be broad enough to allow a 
sympathetic appreciation of the nature of which he is a part (Bailey, 2013, p. 80) 
[emphasis added].  Process metaphysics gives the farmer a different but valid way of 
understanding reality, which in turn produces sustainable actions.  In this understanding 
of reality, the farmer’s experience of identification with the farm is validated.  Palmer, 
when comparing process metaphysics and deep ecology, states, “Feeling, or even 
                                                          
7 For an in-depth discussion of “identification,” see Fox’s book Towards a 
Transpersonal Ecology, Chapter 7 (197-24) and Chapter 8 (249-268). 
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identifying with, that which lies outside the body remains perfectly possible.  Indeed, in 
some sense it is inevitable [with process metaphysics]” (Palmer, 1998, p. 189).  It should 
be noted here that Plamer’s work is a critique of PM as a viable environmental ethic, 
nonetheless, many of her characterizations of the theory are discerning, even if her 
ultimate assessment is incorrect. 
Another way of thinking about identification, a way that is shared by both the 
transpersonal ecology and process metaphysics disciplines, is the concept of self-
realization.  For instance, Griffin notes “For the momentary self to realize its true nature 
is to realize that it is akin to all other things” (Griffin, 1984, p. 198).   Armstrong-Buck, 
in contrasting Whitehead’s metaphysics with Spinoza’s, shows how Whitehead’s view is 
“consonant with the Western emphasis on becoming more conscious as the meaning of 
human life” (Armstrong-Buck, p. 259). The purpose of these two quotes is not to get 
into the theoretical particulars of what self-realization means for PM, but instead to 
indicate PM’s interest in identification by way of self-realization.  The affinity between 
PM’s interest in self-realization and TPAE’s interest in identification will be shown by 
adopting Fox’s framework, which is outlined below. 
TPAE adopted Fox’s identification framework from TE.  Using Fox’s 
framework for PM is appropriate not only because of the similarities, to be discussed 
later, between PM and TPAE, but also because the experiences from the process 
literature match up nicely with Fox’s framework irrespective of their relationship to 
TPAE.  The three experiences of identification for TE are: 1) personal; 2) ontological; 
and 3) cosmological.   
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Personal identification “refers to experiences of commonality with other entities 
that are brought about through personal involvement with these entities” (Fox, 1995, p. 
249).  Ontological identification “refers to experiences of commonality with all that is [,] 
that are brought about through deep-seated realization of the fact that things are” (ibid., 
p. 250-251).  Cosmological identification “refers to experiences of commonality with all 
that is[,] that are brought about through deep-seated realization of the fact that we and all 
other entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality” (ibid., p. 252). 
In the context of process metaphysics, personal identification comes from the 
experience of interconnectivity (Benzoni 137, Birch & Cobb, p. 144).  Again, the terms 
used vary, including “interdependence” (Cobb, 2001, p. 112), “interrelatedness” (ibid., 
122), “interpenetration” (Birch & Cobb, p. 144), “intertwined and interconnected” 
(Henning, 2009, p. 108), and even “kinship” (Cobb & Griffin, 1976, p. 18). What is of 
importance, for process metaphysics’ collaboration with TPAE, is that PM actually 
promotes a way of being in the world that TPAE seeks to elicit. The Bailey quotation 
above requires for a TPAE practitioner a “sympathetic appreciation of the nature of 
which he is a part;” with process metaphysics, “the sense of kinship with all things, 
which has evidently characterized human experiences at most times and places, is 
rationally supported” (ibid., p. 18).  For all beings, relationships are not secondary 
things, they are primary; the entire past goes into creating present individuals who in 
turn influence future beings. Therefore, interdependence is not “simply an ideal but an 
ontologically given characteristic” (ibid., p. 21).  Whitehead himself described his 
metaphysical enterprise as being “mainly devoted to the task of making clear the notion 
of ‘being present in another entity’” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 50). 
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Ontological identification in the context of process metaphysics comes through 
the awareness that “to be” is to be a “subject,” to be an “agent.”  This is vastly different 
than the current modern metaphysics, which takes human beings (or other “higher” 
mammals) to be the only “subjects” in the universe.  For TPAE, to take seriously the 
belief that an object’s exteriority necessitates an interiority, is to put the farmer in the 
correct relationship to the other beings on the farm, because the recognition of that 
interiority facilitates identification.  To put process metaphysics squarely in Fox’s 
framework, the ontological realization of the fact that things are is concurrent with the 
realization that things have subjectivity. This is possible in process metaphysics because 
the theory states that “All metaphysically fundamental entities, all true individuals, are 
‘subjects’…Subjectivity characterizes all levels of reality, and so the world cannot be 
divided into subjects and objects” (Benzoni, 2007, p. 129).8  Ontological identification, 
from a process perspective, centers on this awareness: not only do the things that exist 
have an internal and an external component, but the other being’s internal component is 
self-creative, just like “I” am (Benzoni, 2007, p. 8, 139, 146; Birch & Cobb, 1990, p. 
1439).  Cobb employs strong rhetoric in favor of ontological identification saying, “The 
emergence, in the course of history, of the ability to think of the other as another subject 
                                                          
8 For a further discussion of “subjectivity,” see Benzoni’s comments on “subjects of 
experience” (p. 135) and “agents” (p. 138) and Armstrong-Bucks description of “self-
significance” (“Process Philosophy”, p. 32). 
 
9 In The Liberation of Life, Birch and Cobb discuss “animals as subjects.” 
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and to appreciate the moral demand that this lays upon one – to treat the other as an end 
and not only as a means – is an achievement of civilization that most of us are not 
willing to abandon” (Cobb, 2001, p. 126). 
Finally, there is cosmological identification, or the realization that everything is 
an aspect of a single reality.  Just as with the other two types of identifications, there are 
various ways that process metaphysicians describe cosmological identification.  One 
way is to talk about “The continuity between the nonliving and the living” (Armstrong-
Buck, 1985, p. 247).  Another is the self in relation to the world: “There is no self apart 
from the world or world apart from the self, but the one reality of being-in-the-world” 
(Cobb & Griffin, 1976, p. 81).  Still a third would be to talk about a present individual’s 
relationship to the past and future: “Being a self, in short, involves an inclusion of the 
whole past universe,” or “to be actual is to be involved in the double relation of the 
actuality inheriting the past world and the actuality bequeathing itself to future 
actualities in the world” (Griffin, unpublished, p. 16; see also Benzoni, 2007, p. 159).  
The fourth way of discussing cosmological identification is to relate it to the 
transcendence of the ego, where self-interest becomes Self-interest (Griffin, 
unpublished, p. 34). 
Thus, PM gives an alternative conception of reality that, by its nature, provides 
for transpersonal agroecological experiences, or in Henning’s words “expand the depth and 
breadth of our aesthetic horizons,” particularly as they relate to identification (Henning, 2005, p. 
152).  These experiences can be understood through the lens of “self-realization” but are 
brought into tighter focus in Fox’s three categories of identification:  for PM, the 
personal occurs through various forms of interconnectivity, the ontological through 
subjectivity, and the cosmological through continuity.  And, like TPAE, this 
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identification is not conceived of as a one-time event, but rather a continuous process of 
“becoming.”    
 
Process 
The process aspect of TPAE comes from the theorists’ awareness that the 
experience of “identification” is not a static one.  TPAE theorists recognized the 
dynamism inherent in identifying with the other beings on the farm and, as a result, 
explicitly noted the developmental nature of identification.  Three examples from TPAE 
literature illustrate the internal and dialectical nature of this point: 
Yet we have other relations than with the physical and static materials.  
We are parts in a living sensitive creation.  The theme of evolution has 
overturned our attitude toward this creation.  The living creation is not 
exclusively man-centered: it is bio-centric.  We perceive the essential 
continuity in nature, arising from within rather than from without, the 
forms of life proceeding upwardly and onwardly in something very like a 
might[y] plan of sequence, man being one part in the process. (Bailey, 
1988, p. 23)  (emphasis added) 
Also: 
Good work is not just the maintenance of connections – as one is now 
said to work “for a living” or “to support a family” – but the enactment of 
connections. It is living, and a way of living; it is not support for a family 
in the sense of an exterior brace or prop, but is one of the forms and acts 
of love. (Berry, p. 139) 
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And: 
I am not talking about how we can load up with different kinds of ideas, 
different thoughts that various people have had about the world.  I am 
talking about how, as Sloan puts it, the “quality of consciousness” itself 
can change, and how this affects what we can experience and know of the 
world. (Jackson, p. 39) 
Process metaphysics is so named because the very nature of reality, made up of 
actual entities or subjects, is defined as a process of past subjects informing the self-
organization of current subjects, which will in turn inform the self-organization of future 
subjects.  Reality itself is a process of becoming.  Thus, the intimations of development 
by TPAE theorists find a metaphysical home in process thinking.  Benzoni clearly states 
that “the key point here is that the ‘being’ of an actual entity is in its ‘becoming’” 
(Benzoni, 2007, p. 133).  Birch and Cobb approach it from a sociological perspective 
where “what is truly best for society is not an ideal state to be attained once for all but a 
process in which Life is freed to work its creative transformation” (Benzoni, 2007, p. 
188).  To paraphrase from a TPAE perspective: The “being” of a farmer is in her 
“becoming,” and what is best for the farm is not a static proscription but a process in 
which the beings on the farm are freed to work their creative transformations, which 
affects the farmer, and in turn lays claim on her very “being.”  
 
Alternative Epistemologies and Methodologies 
 
In TPAE, alternative epistemologies and methodologies accompany the 
alternative mindset of the farmer; so too in process metaphysics.  First of all, Whitehead 
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was explicit in wanting his metaphysics to be derived from basic human experience, 
which gives process metaphysics a phenomenological bent.  Second, the theory of 
knowledge that is derived from metaphysics itself is made up of a variety of 
epistemological experiences, including sympathy, compassion, creativity, and the most 
primary form of knowing called “prehension.”  Finally, it can be shown that the 
epistemological and methodological alternatives in process metaphysics match up well 
with TPAE. 
Several process thinkers (Esbjörn-Hargens; Benzoni; Cobb & Griffin; Palmer; 
Armstrong-Buck, 1996) have discussed Whitehead’s experiential criteria as it relates to 
environmental ethics.  As mentioned previously, Whitehead himself wrote “subjective 
experiencing is the primary metaphysical situation which is presented to metaphysics for 
analysis” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 160).  Benzoni, quoting from Whitehead, gives a 
representative example of how the phenomenological aspects of PM pertain to TPAE: 
“Indeed, one of Whitehead’s goals in developing his metaphysics is to do justice to ‘the 
poetic rendering of our concrete experience’ of nature” (Benzoni, 2007, p. 142).  Hence, 
process metaphysics is helping to do justice to the alternative farmer’s experience of 
farming. 
The epistemology of process thinking differs substantially from the epistemology 
based on the “mechanistic” metaphysics derived from a Newtonian and Cartesian 
understanding of the world (Cobb, 1984, p. 210).  The latter would be concerned mostly 
with the forces acting on the discrete objects of the world, only one of which, the 
human, has any subjectivity.  PM, on the other hand, ascribes some form of subjectivity 
throughout reality, and with that subjectivity comes knowing.  Granted, at the primary 
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levels, that knowledge looks very different than it does at the more complex levels, 
including plants, animals, and especially humans.  But this recognition of knowing in the 
most elementary forms of reality opens up new epistemological vistas.  Some of these 
vistas at the higher level include seeing sympathy, compassion, and creativity as forms 
of knowledge (Griffin, 1994, p. 199; Cobb & Griffin, 1976, p. 47-48; Griffin, 
unpublished, p. 24).  The primary revelation for TPAE is “prehension,” which is the 
most basic form of knowing that any subject can have (Griffin, unpublished).  
Whitehead himself called it a “direct mediation of emotional tone” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 
141).   In other words, feeling is a basic capacity of beings in existence and, as such, 
feeling is the most basic form of epistemology, which everything possesses, with sense 
perception and other forms of knowing existing at a higher level. 
In fact, Benzoni goes so far as to say: “The ‘subjective form’ of the data is a way 
of expressing the point that there is no such thing as bare data.  They are always 
prehended with some subjective form, or ‘feeling tone’” (Benzoni, 2007, p. 134).  This 
is markedly different from a Cartesian understanding, because consciousness, as 
understood from a process point of view, by definition does not illuminate prehension:  
“Because consciousness arises, if at all, only in a late phase, it tends to illuminate only 
those elements of experience that themselves arise in a late phase.  The negative point 
here is that consciousness therefore does not cast a bright searchlight upon those 
elements of experience that are truly fundamental in the sense of arising in the initial 
phase of experience” (Griffin, 1994, p. 199).   
For TPAE, this means, when dealing with the more-than-human beings on the 
farm, the “bright searchlight” of a farmer’s consciousness may actually interfere with the 
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information that those other beings are trying to convey on a subtler level.  The 
implications of prehension for TPAE are perhaps best seen in a quotation from Koepf, 
Pettersson, and Schaumann discussing the epistemology of biodynamic farming: 
Natural science has as far as possible detached man from knowledge in 
order to reach objective results.  But in the processes described here man 
works on himself in order to become an ever more complete instrument 
for understanding nature. In doing so he begins to meet layers of reality 
that must remain incomprehensible to one who proceeds only by 
measuring, counting and reckoning. (Koepf et al., 1976, p. 200-201)  
The association of process metaphysics’ alternative epistemologies with TPAE’s 
alternative epistemologies continues with both theories’ emphasis on the role of spirit.  
Griffin expressed an interesting take on this connection when he stated that “an 
epistemological revolution can help promote a moral revolution” (Griffin, 1994, p. 200). 
 
Spirit 
 
Whitehead was explicit in the relationship between God and his metaphysics.  
God’s joy comes from co-experiencing the subjectivity of every entity in existence.  
Also, just as every past entity is involved in a subject’s present becoming, God is also 
present, not commanding adherence, but instead enticing subjects to move into the 
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fullness of their possibilities.10  Griffin (Griffin, 1994, p. 200) quotes Whitehead in this 
way: 
On the one hand, God enters into all other actualities: “The world lives by 
its incarnation of God in itself.  On the other hand, all other actualities 
enter into God: “It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as 
that God is immanent in the world”. (1978, p. 348; see also Benzoni, 
2007, p. 159) 
Therefore, just as spirit has a role in TPAE, so too does it play a role in PM as it 
relates to TPAE.  In TPAE, the role that spirit plays is not formalized.  It can range from 
Fukuoka’s belief in agriculture assisting the spiritual development of the farmer, to 
Bailey’s reverential attitude towards life, or to Steiner’s belief that modern spiritual 
woes are actually an issue of “nutrition.”  In process metaphysics, those concerns are 
addressed by the very role that spirit or the divine plays in the functions of reality: 
Nevertheless, part of what is meant by the divine presence in the world is 
that there is impetus given to each actual occasion to exist as intensely, 
creatively, richly, and harmoniously as it can, given its current situation. 
(Armstrong-Buck, 1986, p. 249; see also Benzoni, 2007, p. 159) 
 TPAE is an agriculture that allows the beings on the farm to exist “as creatively, 
richly, and harmoniously as [they] can, given [their] current situation.”  Spirit, as 
envisioned in process metaphysics, works at a fundamental level that addresses the 
                                                          
10 Throughout their work Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition, Cobb and 
Griffin endeavor to substantiate this position.    
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TPAE concerns before they arise: with the recognition of the divine in all things, the 
farmer develops through relating to that divinity (Fukuoka), establishing a reverential 
attitude towards life (Bailey), and farming with a concern for the health and well-being 
of the more-than-human world such that those beings who are selected for food will be 
full of the forces of life that are traditionally lacking in conventional agriculture 
(Steiner). 
 
Scientism and Economism 
 
For the purposes of this paper, a short section on Scientism and Economism is 
included to further illustrate the overlap between TPAE and PM.  However, this section 
is limited because, while noteworthy, the congruence is not of the same significance as 
those previously discussed, particularly as compared with the contributions of PM to 
TPAE. 
David Ray Griffin, in his introduction to the edited volume, The Reenchantment 
of Science, takes on scientism, but in a different way than do the transpersonal 
agroecology theorists.  Whereas the TPAE theorists challenge scientism because they 
perceive science to have an unjustified monopoly on understanding and articulating 
reality, Griffin’s critique takes science on its own terms and shows that science is 
unfairly limiting its purview, with the results of both critiques being the same.  
However, Griffin is careful to point out, just as Wes Jackson did in TPAE (Cox, 
forthcoming), that a negation of scientism is not a negation of science (Griffin, p. 9-10). 
With regard to economism, Whitehead himself stated: “It is very arguable that 
the science of political economy…did more harm than good…it riveted on men a certain 
79 
 
set of abstractions which were disastrous in their effect on modern mentality” (Daly & 
Cobb, 1994, p. 35-36). Daly and Cobb, who unpack this understanding of economism in 
For the Common Good, are explicit in qualifying their critique in much the same way 
that Griffin did above.  This is where the issue of metaphysics becomes relevant (ibid., 
p. 41). Daly and Cobb state “that when economists deal with living things, and 
especially with large systems of living things, they cannot think of these only as 
resources for fueling the human economy” (ibid., p. 202).  Both PM and TPAE, as 
outlined above, would not allow that to happen because living things have value for 
themselves and for the whole, as well as for others, humans being but one.  Therefore, 
PM’s affinity with TPAE’s understanding of scientism and economism are yet another 
example of the ways that PM provides the fertile ground from which TPAE 
understandings can take root and bloom.  
 
How Adjudication and Proper Valuing of Humans in PM Contribute to TPAE 
 
Besides addressing the significant concepts of TPAE, PM lends itself well to an 
environmental ethic that is seeking to discriminate between types of beings, providing 
justification for adjudication, which is the essence of agriculture.  There are two 
components of PM that support discernment within sustainable agriculture.  First, there 
is no divide between humans and the natural world.   In industrial agriculture, with a 
mechanistic metaphysics as its base, this divide has led to a use-only relationship where 
humans use the natural world for their advantage, which is natural world’s only value.  
With process metaphysics, there is no divide.  Therefore, humans have to take into 
account, as Whitehead said, that “Everything has some value for itself, for others, and 
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for the whole” (Whitehead, 1938, p. 111).  PM’s different understanding about the 
nature of existence, one where everything has value for itself, provides a theoretical 
basis for the transpersonal agroecological way of being in the world, which in turn 
solicits mutually beneficial farming practices. 
This leads to the second component of PM that facilitates making agricultural 
distinctions.  Because everything has value for itself as well as for others, we are put in a 
position of needing to choose, or adjudicate, between centers of value, given that “life is 
robbery.  It is at this point that[,] with life[,] morals become acute.  The robber requires 
justification” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 105). Transpersonal Ecology, one of the theoretical 
bases of TPAE, finds its own roots in Deep Ecology (DE), an environmental philosophy 
that holds as one of its tenets “biocentric egalitarianism,” which means that all life-forms 
have equal value.  Obviously this philosophy doesn’t lend itself well to situations of 
competing values, like agriculture, and Arne Naess, founder of Deep Ecology, states as 
much (Griffin, 1994, p. 201).  
PM, on the other hand, believes that the ultimate purpose of Being (whether 
coming from God or the process of evolution) is subjective experience.  In evaluating 
the subjective experience of all things (because in PM all things, even rocks and the 
tiniest particles of matter, partake in some form of awareness), it is the current 
understanding of process theorists that human beings have the richest subjective 
experience of the beings on this planet, and therefore the needs of human beings take 
precedent over the needs of those beings whose experience is not as complex.  Because 
DE was a precursor to TPAE, and because there are important overlaps, this article will 
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continue to compare and contrast the two, as a way of clarifying the latter, highlighting 
its distinctive nature. 
It would be understandable to think that process metaphysics are therefore 
“anthropocentric,” which is something that transpersonal agroecology, transpersonal 
ecology, and deep ecology are against.  Process theorists, however, don’t see their 
metaphysics as anthropocentric, especially if one uses the definition given by Fox, a 
transpersonal ecologist, who defines anthropocentrism as “an undue emphasis on the 
human” (Fox, 1990, p. 242).  This is because, in striving for the maximum amount of 
rich subjective experience, the adjudication process favors diversity and making those 
difficult decisions between rich centers of experience only rarely.  In fact, a close 
examination of PM shows that the proper valuing of human beings would be in creating 
human systems that not only benefit all human beings but also benefit as much of the 
non-human world as possible. 
 
Adjudication 
 
Agriculture is a conscious human intervention into the natural world, the 
cultivation of some species for human benefit, with the added component of 
discouraging the growth of species that compete for the resources of the desired species 
or endanger the selected species (i.e. “weeds” and predators).  To paraphrase Henning: 
“What kind of agricultural relationship between human beings and plants and other nonhuman 
animals would assure the most inclusive, complex and unified farm?” (Henning, 2005, p. 166).  
This section will illustrate the importance of adjudication for transpersonal agroecology 
while attending to the charges of anthropocentrism, which have been exacerbated by the 
problematic language used by many of the process metaphysics authors. 
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Process metaphysics’ propensity for adjudication follows from its two major 
tenets: 1) the intrinsic value of all things (actual occasions) by the nature of their 
subjectivity, the agency inherent in all actual occasions that enacts the novelty and 
creativity in the universe  and 2) the mutual implication of a past actual occasion into the 
experience of a present actual occasion.  The first tenet stems from Whitehead’s 
understanding that subjectivity or “feeling” accompanies material existence, “where 
there are exteriors there are interiors – they arise together and are mutually arising and 
determining” (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2011, p. 13). 
This stands in contrast to the “mechanical” metaphysics, which posits a 
separation between the human and the natural world, between mind and body, and 
between the subjectivity of people (and perhaps higher mammals) and the unsubjective 
nature of the rest of the world.  Therefore, with process metaphysics “the difference 
between human beings and other creatures is a matter of degree rather than of kind” 
(Benzoni, 2007, p. 128).  To put it another way: 
Each actual occasion has an inwardness, a subjectivity, an experience of 
itself as a self-creating process…Because actual occasions experience 
their self-creation, they have intrinsic value. (Armstrong-Buck, 1991, p. 
32) 
The second tenet of process metaphysics is the belief that each actual occasion in 
the past has some bearing on the possibilities of actual occasions in the present.  
Furthermore, the decisions of an actual occasion in the present will affect future actual 
occasions.  The combination of these two tenets: 1) all things in existence having an 
interior and 2) the past meeting in the present individual to partially determine the 
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future, along with the understanding of “life as robbery,” create the conditions for and 
require adjudication: the subject weighs “conscious” decisions and those decisions are 
deeply affected by and will deeply affect others.  Cobb and Griffin write, “Every 
occurrence grows out of its whole environment and becomes a part of the environment 
out of which all future events come into being.  In the constitution of one event, certain 
others play a particularly large role; so discrimination of relative importance is possible” 
(Cobb & Griffin, 1976, p. 154). 
While discussing the first tenet, where subjectivity bestows intrinsic value, 
Benzoni addresses adjudication: 
However, this does not mean that all creatures are of equal value in 
Whitehead’s metaphysics; he establishes a hierarchy based upon a 
creature’s capacity for rich or intense experience – the greater a creature’s 
capacity for intense experience, the greater its moral worth.  This 
conceptualization corresponds to our intuitions regarding the value of 
creatures, with living creatures being of greater worth than non-living 
ones, conscious creatures being of greater worth than non-conscious 
ones, and self-conscious creatures (that is, human beings) being of greater 
worth than those that are merely conscious. (Benzoni, 2007, p. 163) 
Through the first tenet, PM addresses the need to overcome the duality between 
humans and non-humans by granting everything some value for itself, but, with the 
second tenet, it does so in a way that allows for decisions to be made between competing 
centers of value; there is an awareness of both responsibility and repercussions.  From 
Henning’s framework, this understanding is characterized as follows: “This rich 
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metaphysical and axiological basis not only allows the ethics of creativity to appreciate 
the intrinsic value of even the most simple individual, but also the obligations of 
beauty—particularly the obligation of peace—provide a means by which to arbitrate 
between mutually exclusive ends” (Henning, 2005, p. 180). 
Whether discussing the implications of a worldview that facilitates adjudication or using 
terms like “gradations of value” or “value hierarchy,” some process metaphysicians have 
used seemingly anthropocentric language to make the case for their metaphysics (Cobb 
& Griffin, 1976, p. 63; Benzoni, 2007, p. 179).  This legitimate misunderstanding will 
be clarified in the next section (see Proper Valuing of the Human Species) and, for the 
moment, the language will stand unaltered while making the case for adjudication.  
Benzoni continues by saying: 
As long as we see ourselves as separate from the rest of creation, 
different in kind and with a telos that differs in kind, it seems difficult to 
imagine an effective response to the problems we face…Though a value 
hierarchy is needed in order to avoid paralysis, such a hierarchy need not, 
and ought not, entail a dichotomy.  There are morally legitimate 
distinctions to be made between types of creatures with different 
potentialities.  But these are distinctions within continuity. (Benzoni, 
2007, p. 179) 
Indeed, Cobb and Griffin seem to indicate that such ways of talking and thinking 
are required by the first major tenet of process metaphysics: “Ethical respect for all 
creatures requires, for any serious implementation, distinctions that have not yet been 
clarified.  Our attitude toward a rock is properly very different from that toward a dog.  
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If these discriminations are not made, undeniable beliefs about reality are flouted” 
(Cobb & Griffin, 1976, p. 77).  They go on to delineate the differences between entities, 
allowing for adjudication in a fashion similar to the explanation given at the beginning 
of this article; emphasis is given to the richness of subjective experience but is tempered 
by the understanding that all beings are subjects with moral worth coupled with the 
understanding that all beings participate in the creation of other beings. 
This allows them to “bring the process view of reality into harmony with our 
‘common sense.’  However, there is another obvious question.  We need to act.  And 
virtually every action is destructive of life.  How can we have reverence for all 
experiential wholes, at least all living ones, and continue to live?” (Cobb & Griffin, 
1976, p. 79).  Again, the ability to answer this question for Birch and Cobb is based on 
their ability to use seemingly anthropocentric language: 
There is a hierarchy of values; so when a choice must be made there is a 
basis for discriminating value judgments.  Destroying the life of some 
types of actualities is more serious than destroying that of others.  
Everything else being equal, those with greater intrinsic value are to be 
preferred, when a choice must be made. Of course, everything else is 
rarely equal.   For besides the intrinsic value of things, we must consider 
their instrumental value, the role they play in the total 
ecosystem…Accordingly, working out an ecological ethic will be a 
gigantic undertaking.  The main point of the present section is that 
process thought provides the theoretical basis for such an ethic. (Birch & 
Cobb, 1990, p. 79) 
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Armstrong-Buck uses slightly less confrontational language, and the implication 
is still there – choices need to be made, and process metaphysics gives individuals an 
informed way to make those decisions: 
The satisfactions attained by actual occasions differ in the intensity of 
feelings, the complexity of feelings, and the novelty and harmony of 
feelings which are integrated… 
Whitehead interprets this difference in experience as a difference in 
intrinsic value because for him there is an immanent purposiveness in 
Nature…God desires there to be as much novelty, harmony, intensity of 
feeling, and complexity in the experience of an actual occasion as 
possible… 
In addition, we have a greater obligation toward entities with more 
intrinsic value, that is, entities which are capable of more significant 
experience.  Our obligations apply to all entities and incorporate both the 
intensity of that entity’s own experience and its contribution to the 
intensity of experience of other members of the ecosystem in question. 
(Armstrong-Buck, 1991, p. 32-33) 
Henning goes the farthest in combating the anthropocentric persona of PM.  He 
explicitly calls out the tendency of PM theorists to privilege a being’s “onto-aesthetic 
status,” in other words its intrinsic value based on its subjective capacities (Henning, 
2005, p. 186).  Elsewhere, he makes this point by discussing invasive species and the 
necessity, in some circumstances, to terminate the individual, which has more “onto-
87 
 
aesthetic status,” for the benefit of the ecosystem, which has less (Henning, 2005, p. 
161).    
Obviously, where adjudication exists there will be a debate over the criteria used 
to make such a decision and, just as expected, will be the charges of anthropocentrism 
when the criteria happen to favor humans, Henning uses deep ecologist John Rodman to 
illustrate this point: “‘Subhumans’ may now be accorded rights but we should not be 
surprised if their interests are normally overridden by the weightier interests of humans, 
for the choice of the quality to define the extended base class of those entitled to moral 
consideration has weighted the scales in that way” (Henning, 2009, p. 112).  Therefore, 
the next step is to put together a novel, coherent argument for why a process 
metaphysics is not anthropocentric, beginning with a summary that uses the thoughts of 
process thinkers in their own terms: 
It is often overlooked that recognition of human experience as generally 
more valuable than that of non-human entities does not imply domination 
– quite the contrary.  The human ability to apprehend the 
interconnections of the ecosystem and the intrinsic value of all things 
requires a nurturing care, responsibility, and respect for nonhuman 
entities (Armstrong-Buck, 1986, p. 256). 
Also: 
Human beings do have unique value and worth that is probably not 
equaled by any other species on this planet.  But other species also have 
intrinsic worth, and in some instances great worth.  Their survival and 
free development is important also, not only when it contributes to that of 
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human beings but even when it involves some cost to the human species 
(Cobb & Griffin, 1976, p. 148). 
And: 
We humans have the responsibility to work for a world in which both 
they [non-humans] and we have habitat and opportunity to flourish.  This 
is not just a slightly modified form of anthropocentrism.  It involves a 
drastic rejection of the now dominant world system (Cobb, 2001, p. 117). 
Unfortunately, these ideas appear dwarfed in the literature by the constant 
privileging of the human species over any other.  However, this “power over” is the very 
nature of agriculture,  the selection of species for the benefit of humans, the adjudication 
between what gets encouraged and what gets suppressed, and therefore, this metaphysics 
lends itself well to the project of transpersonal agroecology.  What is needed to move 
forward is an overt characterization of the proper valuation of humankind, a realization 
that we have the capacity to act in ecologically beneficial ways on behalf of non-human 
species, even on behalf of non-living things. 
 
Proper Valuing of the Human Species 
 
The first tenet of process metaphysics, the intrinsic value of all subjects, forces 
humans, to a greater or lesser extent, to account for other beings.  Process thinkers 
believe that this accounting is within our nature to achieve, because this understanding 
can exist within our pre-established social concepts, like duty, and, in actively working 
out this requirement, humans will foster a symbiotic relationship with the non-human 
world, linking the individual good with the social and even cosmic good.  One ends up 
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with the axiom to maximize the number of humans within our ecological limits and 
within a social system that provides the most benefits to all humans and non-humans. 
Process theory “sees truth both in the focus on [human] history as the important 
arena and in the radical condemnation of this focus” (Cobb & Griffin, 1976, p. 148).  
The way forward is to acknowledge and articulate the reality of “the human species as 
simply one among many” (ibid., p. 147), existing beside the reality that human beings 
possess, in Naess’ words, “‘extraordinary’ traits” (Naess, 1995, p. 76).  Benzoni states 
“the ethical assessment of human development hinges not only on how such 
development impacts the expansion of human freedoms or capabilities, but also on how 
it impacts the capacity of other creatures to exercise their freedoms or capabilities” 
(Benzoni, 2007, p. 182).  The basis of this qualification stems from the first tenet.  To 
take seriously the interiority and, therefore, intrinsic value of all beings necessitates not 
only the accommodation of others but actual concern for their well-being. 
This puts the onus directly on the human and, in particular, human 
consciousness.  “In human beings consciousness has become conscious of itself” (Birch 
& Cobb, 1990, p. 162).  This is both a blessing and a curse; it is both the problem and 
the solution: 
Human consciousness is able to grasp the universal nature of ideals and 
symbols…Yet this same capacity for abstraction from the actual world 
allows humans to forget their rootedness in their bodies and the world, as 
well as their kinship with non-human life. (Armstrong-Buck, 1986, p. 
248) 
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This disconnection has resulted in an unsustainable way of life for the majority 
of humanity and the planet in the 21st century.  However, it is this same capacity, 
abstraction through ideals and symbols, that process theorists and transpersonal 
ecologists think will save us. 
By relating a process metaphysics to commonly held abstractions like “duty” and 
“justice,” as well as spiritual ideals, process theorists can ground this proper human 
valuing in human daily experience.  Birch and Cobb believe that this self-consciousness 
has allowed humans to see themselves and other humans as “primarily ends and only 
secondarily means” (Birch & Cobb, 1990, p. 162).  Obviously, human history can be 
seen as an exception to a statement that claims humans see other humans for who they 
are as opposed to what they can be used for, e.g. patriarchy, slavery, and other 
oppressive social structures.  Just as easily, though, history can be seen as the working 
out of that ideal – the civil rights movement, the labor movement, feminism – 
accompanied by an understanding that it can sometimes be healthy to be the means 
toward another’s ends.  In humanity’s continued evolution, Birch and Cobb see that “It 
is proper for human beings to serve as means not only to the welfare of other human 
beings but also to the welfare of other creatures.  This is not sheer sentimentality.  It is a 
duty” (ibid.).  To reiterate, “To feel and change in that way is not mere sentimentality.  It 
is appropriate to the real nature of ourselves and of our fellow creatures” (ibid., p. 161).   
The end result of this way of being in the world, self-awareness directed toward 
the benefit of all, is how Henning describes the second step in a moral decision, “to act 
so as to include the demands of others as far as possible,” with the first step being an 
education directed towards an awareness of interconnectedness (Henning, 2005, p. 153). 
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This closely correlates with Naess’ metaphysical axiom, or ultimate norm, of deep 
ecology, which he characterizes as “Maximize Self-realization!” but which he 
alternatively characterizes as “Maximize symbiosis!” (Naess, 1995, p. 80)  Indeed, Birch 
and Cobb come to similar conclusions: 
Whenever possible human beings should try to find ways to meet their 
own needs which at the same time support other forms of animal life.  
Often with a sufficiently long view there is congruence between the two 
goals.  But there are times when the conflict is not subject to resolution in 
favor of both parties.  At such times the ethical requirement is a 
compromise of human interests for the sake of the interests of other 
species…In general the need is to display how the human future and the 
future of other species can mutually support one another. (Birch & Cobb, 
1990, p. 174-175) 
Essentially, process metaphysics both supports and requires this axiom:  
maximize the number of humans within our ecological limits through a social system or 
organizational configuration that provides the most benefits to all humans and non-
humans.  It requires the maximum number of humans because of the level of their 
subjectivity and because of their value as conscious caretakers of the totality of nature.  
These humans must live within ecological limits because they themselves are subject to 
those limits, and because the non-human beings we are in relationship with have 
intrinsic value and rights, which we are responsible for upholding.  Henning put the 
axiom in these terms: “In each situation we must strive to be as inclusive of the interests 
of others without allowing experience to devolve into chaos (harmony) and in choosing 
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between different courses and competing claims we ought always to aim at that whole 
which is richer and more complex (intensity)” (Henning, 2009, p. 119).  By 
understanding that proper human development includes a concern for the development 
of the more-than-human world, and by being aware that through symbolic thinking 
humans have the capacity to incorporate this understanding into their daily awareness, 
and, finally, by correlating  the individual good with the social and cosmic good, PM 
encourages humanity to create social systems that are just and equitable for all humans 
and non-humans in order to be true to who we really are and to acknowledge the true 
nature of the beings with which we share this earth. All of this stems from properly 
valuing the human species as an ecologically benevolent actor, the capacity of which 
follows from a process metaphysics.  In turn, this proper valuing and adjudication 
engenders sustainable agricultural practices, which flow through, complement, and build 
upon transpersonal agroecology. 
 
Conclusion 
It is important to recognize that, while process metaphysics does closely 
correspond to transpersonal agroecology, it may not be the only metaphysics or ontology 
that does so.  In fact, one of the positive attributes of TPAE, both in its formation and in 
moving forward, is its ecumenism.  In TPAE’s formation, Bailey seemingly represented 
a Christian metaphysics, Fukuoka a Shinto/Zen metaphysics, and Steiner an 
anthroposophical one.  In the evolution of TPAE, it is better to acknowledge outright 
that what is essential is the mindset of the farmer, and that evaluating different 
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metaphysics for their ability to engender a TPAE mindset is an important secondary 
concern. 
That said, process metaphysics is indeed very well aligned with TPAE. There is 
overlap with identification and the process thereof, a regard for alternative 
epistemologies and methodologies, and concern for spirit.  Process metaphysics also 
contributes to TPAE a justification for adjudication and a proper valuing of the human 
being.  The first point regarding PM’s recursive bent is especially well suited for 
farmers, who tend to be more concerned with the reality of the situation than with 
theorizing about it. 
There are places in the environmental process literature where the practical 
applications of this seemingly “esoteric” theory are extremely clear.  Birch and Cobb 
talk about “Trust in Life” as a way of being that values intuition and attentiveness, 
transformation of the old as opposed to repudiation, and the renunciation of control 
(Birch & Cobb, 1990, p. 183-188).  Transpersonal agroecology is a way of farming 
based on that way of being.  Benzoni believes that the “first principle” of an ethic based 
on relationality “is the instruction to seek to enhance the richness of experience for all 
creatures in the relevant future” (Benzoni, 2007, p. 165). Transpersonal agroecology is 
this kind of thinking applied to the farm.  In perhaps the most pertinent instance of the 
possible symbiotic relationship between TPAE and PM, Gunter ends his assessment of 
process metaphysics’ relevance for environmental thinking by stating that Whitehead’s 
thinking lends itself to the “balance” that needs to take place between “wilderness and 
factory, city scape and landscape, native village and rainforest” (Gunter, 2000, p. 221).  
Nowhere will this balance be more important than in agriculture.  This is the balance 
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between human needs and the needs of the rest of the biotic community, the balance of 
selected species and the rest of the web of life in which those species are intertwined, the 
balance of the richness of experience of the farmer and the richness of the experience of 
the farm.  At this moment in time in agriculture, with the prevalence of genetic 
engineering and the consolidation of unprecedented control of seed production and food 
processing, concern for the “being” of the farmer and the other organisms of the farm 
seems to get at the root of the problems, and even the existence of this possibility, a 
transpersonal agroecology undergirded by a process metaphysics, contributes to the 
richness of experience in the present and toward the future.  To be truly agricultural 
though, at least in a Midwestern American sense, the proof will be in what the practical 
application of a transpersonal agroecology, grounded in a process metaphysics, yields. 
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CHAPTER 4. CLUES THAT OUTLAST THE DECADES: CREATING AN 
INTEGRAL AGRICULTURE THROUGH TRANSPERSONAL AGROECOLOGY 
AND THE INTERIORITY OF THE MORE THAN HUMAN WORLD 
 
Modified from a paper submitted to 
The Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 
Travis Cox 
Abstract 
Numerous theorists have analyzed either conventional agriculture or sustainable 
agriculture, or both, from ideological, paradigmatic, or cultural/historical levels in an 
attempt to get at the root of what makes conventional agriculture unsustainable. These 
theorists have identified problematic concepts in the very seedbed of ideas that make up 
conventional agriculture, and argue for alternative metaphysical paradigms that better 
support the goals of sustainable agriculture, albeit paradigms that still partake of a subtle 
form of reductionism, acknowledging only external relationships between beings. In 
reality, a fully ecological worldview would acknowledge and consider all forms of 
relationship, including relationships between subjects-as-subjects.  Integral agriculture, 
as put forward in this article, provides an intellectual and philosophical space—with an 
eye to the practical implications—to ask a very important question in the quest for a 
truly sustainable agriculture:  What would the practices of a sustainable agriculture look 
like that take seriously the interiority of the more than human world?  Transpersonal 
agroecologists have already been identified as being aware of the significant role played 
by the mindset of the farmer.  A return to these thinkers, cognizant of the question of 
interiority, yields an insistence on practices that are loving, sensitive to the 
“creatureliness” of the beings to which the farmer is relating. This gives the farmer a 
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realistic appreciation of the interconnections between self and other, and as a result of 
the extended conversations between them, the farmer embodies a sacred, non-dual, 
integral way of practicing agriculture, exhibiting right relations between herself and the 
more than human world. 
 
Introduction 
Several theorists have analyzed either conventional agriculture or sustainable 
agriculture, or both, from ideological, paradigmatic, or cultural/historical levels, as 
opposed to just comparing yields, profits, or practices, in an attempt to get at the root of 
the unsustainable nature of conventional agriculture.  These theorists have identified 
problematic concepts in the very seedbed of ideas that make up conventional agriculture, 
and they argue for alternative metaphysical paradigms that better support the goals of 
sustainable agriculture. They believe that embracing holism, systems thinking and an 
ecological worldview is sufficient to address the metaphysical problems that hinder the 
development of a truly sustainable agriculture.  
A central claim of this paper is that, while these approaches are certainly an 
improvement over the prevailing mechanistic paradigm, they fail to addresses the 
problematic nature of a materialistic worldview. Most of these theorists retain a 
commitment to what Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman describe as a “subtle 
reductionism”, but would be better termed subtle materialism, whereby ecological 
relationships are principally conceived as relationships between material objects that 
lack a subjective, interior mode of existence (2009, p. 6).   Interiority is granted to 
humans and (when relevant) to non-human sentient animals, but the primary mode of 
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description and analysis within modern agroecology is one that dismisses the interior 
dimension whenever possible and explicitly denies it to elements of the nonhuman world 
that are not judged to exhibit any form of subjectivity.  A fully ecological worldview, on 
the other hand, would be one that acknowledges and considers all forms of relationship, 
including relationships between subjects-as-subjects.  This is what is meant by a 
commitment to the “interiority of the more than human world”. 
  So-called “integral” approaches in science and philosophy incorporate interiority 
by definition into their theoretical frameworks (Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman 2009). 
One of the goals of this chapter is to argue that an explicit consideration of interiority 
serves to both complement and complete the previously articulated theory of 
“transpersonal agroecology” (TPAE) (Cox 2014). TPAE draws attention to the 
importance of the farmer’s interior life for sustainable agriculture.  “Integral 
agriculture,” the theory outlined herein, expands TPAE to include a consideration of the 
interiority of the more than human world.  
This chapter has two parts.  Part One surveys the work of agricultural theorists 
by highlighting the incongruous metaphysical concepts of industrial agriculture that 
they’ve uncovered and outlining the commonalities amongst the alternative 
metaphysical paradigms they offer as substitutes.  The section then draws attention to 
the subtle materialism of the theorists’ alternatives.  Part One concludes with a 
discussion of interiority as an antidote to subtle materialism, facilitated by a clue from 
J.Baird Callicott, given when he holds up Aldo Leopold and Thomas Berry as thinkers 
who best express the progressive eco-evolutionary thinking that is necessary for the 21st 
century.  Leopold and Berry share the view that the proper relationship between human 
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beings and the natural world involves extending interiority to the more than human 
world, and they do not balk at the radical implications of this view or the challenge it 
poses to 20th century understandings. 
Part Two elaborates on the relationship between interiority, the framework of 
TPAE, and the practice of agriculture.  A return to TPAE and its roots, deep ecology and 
transpersonal ecology unearths concepts like love, creatureliness, and a realistic 
appreciation for the interconnectedness of beings, which were originally left out of 
TPAE but have re-emerged with the awareness of the necessity of interiority, coalescing 
in order to explain why interiority is important.  Another concept that was present in 
TPAE, spirit, is here expanded into “sacred,” a way of being for the farmer that is both 
ordinary and non-dual, with the “sacred” bridging the gap between the importance of 
interiority and the actions associated with a newfound awareness of it.  Finally, the how 
is explained as the development of a kind of sensitivity that facilitates right relationship 
with the beings on the farm. 
The conclusion of this chapter is that TPAE, combined with an understanding of 
interiority, forms an “Integral Agriculture,” which takes seriously both the subjectivity 
of the farmer as well as that of the more than human world, to the benefit of all involved. 
 
Survey of Contemporary Agricultural Theory 
 
The following section is a survey of a dozen or so analyses of agriculture, some 
that have analyzed conventional/industrial agriculture, others that have focused on 
sustainable/alternative agriculture, and still more that have studied both. These analyses 
were undertaken from a “meta” perspective, or an ideological or paradigmatic level, as 
99 
 
opposed to an analysis of energy usage or yield. Hardeman and Jochemsen state, “Since 
ideologies function at the level of a cultural mind-set, countering an ideology starts with 
the essential step of becoming aware of its presence” (Hardeman & Jochemsen, 2012, p. 
670).  The first subsection here concerns itself with the perceived problems of industrial 
agriculture, which stem from a problematic worldview according to most so-called 
“meta-theorists”.  This leads to a section on neo-metaphysics, the alternative 
metaphysics that most theorists propose as substitutes for the problematic one delineated 
above.  Finally, the subtle materialism of these proposed metaphysics is emphasized as a 
way to transition to a discussion of the thinking of Aldo Leopold and Thomas Berry on 
the subject of interiority as a counter to subtle materialism. 
 
Problems with “Conventional,” “Modern,” and “Industrial” Agriculture 
In an analysis of industrial agriculture, the observations of meta-theorists 
typically fall into one of two categories: 1) the philosophical and 2) the agricultural.  We 
can begin by looking at the philosophical category. Figure 1 illustrates a list of all of the 
problematic concepts that are ascribed to the ideology of industrial agriculture and the 
modern western metaphysical system that lies behind it.  The second aspect of the meta-
theorist’s analysis, the agricultural aspect, highlights the real world implications of the 
actions undertaken from the ideological concepts that are outlined in Figure 1.  Another 
way of putting this would be to say that this agricultural analysis links the concepts in 
Figure 1 to the real world problems that are a result of the industrial practices associated 
with these particular ideological concepts.  The following are two representative (but not 
exhaustive) lists of these agricultural implications: 
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Resource degradation, desertification, salinization, pest and disease outbreaks and 
dependence on curative interventions…increased dependence on subsidies, the slow 
death of the family farm (Hill, 2006, p. 266; Hill, 1998, p. 392). 
Soil compaction, erosion, and loss of fertility; agrochemical pollution of air, surface, 
ground waters, and food itself…the replacement of local crop varieties and the 
ensuing loss of genetic diversity; rural depopulation and disruption of rural patterns 
of life and community; concentration (Callicott, 1988, p. 5). 
 
Industrial agriculture even admits to some of these problems; however, from 
within their paradigm, the solutions are, predictably, just more of the same. For instance, 
erosion can be acknowledged, but it must be dealt with either economically or 
scientifically, rather than ethically (Beus & Dunlap, 1990, p. 607; Esbjornson, 1992, p. 
24).   
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This is such a metaphysical issue that some in the industrial camp would argue 
against the characterization of some of the above implications as problematic.  For 
instance, where Hill lamented “the slow death of family farm,” Beus and Dunlap 
characterize industrialists as those who believe that “agricultural and social progress can 
be measured partly in terms of the exodus of people from the agricultural industry” 
(Beus et al., 1990, p. 604).  Indeed, the very definition of conventional agriculture that 
has been given in one analysis encompasses many of the characteristics from the 
alternative agriculturalists’ “bad” list, but it would simultaneously be proudly adopted 
by the industrialists. This definition is “Capital-intensive, large-scale, highly mechanized 
agriculture with monocultures of crops and extensive use of artificial fertilizers, 
herbicides and pesticides, with intensive animal husbandry” (ibid., p. 594). 
This dichotomy exists because industrial agriculture is an an agriculture based on 
a metaphysics that believes “because the world does not have given structures but is just 
a conglomerate of materials and building blocks, [therefore] mankind can entirely 
rearrange it for its own benefit through science and technology” (Hardeman and 
Jochemsen, 2012, p. 667). Thus, in order to truly change the practices of industrial 
agriculture, the meta-theorists believe that the underlying metaphysics must change.  As 
Liberty Hyde Bailey, father of the extension service and dean of Cornell University’s 
Agriculture College, said:  “This century will be known in history as an epoch in which 
the race came to a turning point in its habit of contemplating the origin and destiny of 
itself and of the material universe” (Morgan & Peters, 2006, p. 456). 
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Metaphysical Paradigms 
As the above section has shown, most in-depth analyses of the problems of 
industrial agriculture end up discussing the conceptual components of the modern 
western worldview as they are embodied in agricultural theory and practice.  Theorists 
use a variety of frameworks to undertake this type of analysis including “ideological,” 
“metaphysical,” “historical and cultural,” and especially through “paradigms” or an 
understanding of “worldviews” (Hardeman et al., 2012; Callicott, 1989, 1998, 2011; 
Esbjornson, 1992; Beus et al., 1990; Freudenberger, 1994; Morgan et al., 2006).  For 
example, here is Callicott relating the analysis of the problems of industrial agriculture 
with an understanding of worldviews: 
But these are all literally “problems,” however enormous, to be “solved” 
by more of the same concepts and methods…only if one takes the world 
view in which industrial agriculture is embedded to be an objective 
description of things as they are.  Those for whom these “problems” are 
less literally problems capable of “solution” than symptoms of a deeper 
malaise…in effect reject the mechanical paradigm and see the world 
through the lens of a new complex of ideas. (Callicott, 1998, p. 6) 
Regardless of the framework used, the theorists conclude that, indeed, “worldviews,” 
“paradigms,” and the like, play a significant role, if not the most significant role, in 
perpetuating the problems of industrial agriculture.  Therefore, most theorists put 
forward an alternative ideology or metaphysical paradigm that they believe could take 
the place of the current metaphysical system that lies at the root of the problems. 
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One finds three overarching themes in the proposed alternative paradigms:  1) 
the necessity of a “conversion” experience from our current metaphysics to a new one, 
in other words, a worldview revolution, a new awareness or consciousness (Callicott 
1989, 2011,  Esbjornson 1992, Morgan et al. 2006, Hill 1998, Hardeman et al. 2012), 2) 
a conviction that this change will have a broad effect on the norms, values, and 
philosophical and spiritual understanding of all peoples (Hardeman et al. 2012, Morgan 
et al. 2006; Callicott 2011, Esbjornson 1992) and 3) the inclusion of the development of 
what is broadly described as an “ecological-evolutionary worldview” (Callicott, 2012, p. 
12, Soule & Piper, 1992 p. 150). 
All of the theorists in this alternative tradition agree with the position of Esbjörn-
Hargens and Zimmerman, that “some [philosophical] views are better (because they are 
more comprehensive, more inclusive, and more far-seeing)” (Esbjörn-Hargens et al., 
2009, p. 34).  These theorists believe that each of their particular alternative 
metaphysical paradigms are “better” in the sense that they are more comprehensive and 
inclusive.  The theory of integral agriculture articulated herein also provides these 
benefits.  Such views strive to “venture[s] entirely beyond the present system” 
(Freudenberger, 1986, p. 358), which is a desirable feature.  The ‘going beyond’ of the 
industrial system qualifies each individual theory as ‘better’ because the alternative 
agricultural camp has as a criterion “a complete revamping of the U.S. agricultural 
system” as “necessary” (Beus et al., 1990, p. 591).  The integral agriculture that is 
proposed at the end of this paper has the virtue of going beyond the present system by 
explicitly considering within its framework the interiors of the more than human world.  
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As will be shown, this embrace of interiority has both ideological and practical 
applications. 
 
Subtle Materialism 
 
As previously stated, subtle reductionism is the characterization of something in 
completely materialistic terms.  Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman differentiate “gross 
reductionism,” or “the reduction of all reality to individual, objective phenomena,” from 
“subtle reductionism,” which they define as “the reduction of all interiors to 
intersubjective phenomena (reducing the ‘I’ and ‘we’ perspectives to interwoven 
systems, ‘its’)” (Esbjörn-Hargens et al., 2009, p. 6).  So, while all of the theorists are 
able to resist gross reductionism through the incorporation of ecology or systems 
thinking into their frameworks, most of them, with Morgan and Peters being the possible 
exception, still commit subtle reductionism or, more descriptively, subtle materialism—
since what they are doing is reducing organisms’ experience to a solely materialistic 
conception, and they do so in two ways.  First, they tend to characterize their position as 
“holistic,” believing  that systems thinking is all that is necessary to move into a 
sustainable agriculture, without taking into account the interiors of the more than human 
world (in the way that Leopold and Berry do, as will be shown in the next section).  Or, 
they will also advocate for a completely scientifically minded worldview as the proper 
way forward.  Either way, the subjectivity of non-human beings gets a short shrift in 
their metaphysical paradigms. 
One of the easiest ways to identify the first kind of subtle materialism is the 
conception “of the cosmos in terms of the ‘great web of life,’ a great interlocking order 
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of beings, each mutually interwoven with all others,’ but wholly lacking interiority and 
intersubjectivity,”; examples include Freudenberger, Soule and Piper, and Callicott 
(Callicott, 1989, p. 23, 110; Freudenberger, 1986, p. 358; Soule et al., 1992, p. 73, 81, 
124).  However, Callicott does give some context for the pervasiveness of subtle 
materialism in ecology as a whole.  In 1935, Arthur Tansley consciously attempted to 
move science away from conceptions of “communities” by coining the term 
“ecosystem”: “Tansley’s ecosystem model of biotic processes was intended to bring 
ecology as a science out of a qualitative, description stage, with anthropomorphic and 
mystic overtones, and transform it into a value-free, exact quantitative science” 
(Callicott, 1998, p. 106). 
Tansley, then, serves as a model for the second type of subtle materialism, where 
an “ecological” metaphysics is still purposefully conceived of from within a 
materialistic scientific paradigm.  Luckily, this type of subtle materialism isn’t as 
rampant.  It mainly appears as an unexamined aside in the work of Callicott, 
Freudenberger, and Esbjornson (Callicott, 2011, p. 520-522; Callicott, 1999, p. 279; 
Callicott, 1986, p. 360, 21, 26).  One reason that this second form of subtle materialism 
isn’t as rampant as it could be is that most of these theorists have an acute awareness of 
scientism in general, even if this awareness isn’t complete enough to banish subtle 
materialism altogether.  Remember that at least six sets of theorists make some sort of 
connection between the ideology of scientism and industrial agriculture’s 
unsustainability (see Figure 1).   
But, for all the awareness of scientism, there has not been the adoption of subtle 
materialism rejection by any of the meta-theorists.  Both Hill and Freudenberger also 
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object to industrial animal agricultural practices, confined animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs), but both fail to mention interiority, and both reaffirm subtle materialism: “It 
should be noted that intensive, feedlot, and battery production systems deprive livestock 
of playing an ecologically helpful role within both agroecological systems and 
landscapes in general,” and “The issues of large confinement livestock operations, 
genetic alterations, and the impact of these systems on human health, the health of the 
environment and rural farming communities, and the prospects of once again developing 
diversified and integrated farming systems have to be confronted” (Hill, 1998, p. 399; 
Freudenberger, 1994, p. 51).   
The next sub-section will analyze some of the work of J. Baird Callicott, who 
has, until recently, partaken of subtle materialism, to provide a way out through his more 
recent understanding of Aldo Leopold, as evidenced in his 2011 articles, “The Other in 
A Sand County Almanac: Aldo Leopold’s Animals and His Wild-Animal Ethic” and 
through his invocation of Thomas Berry in an article entitled “The Worldview Concept 
and Aldo Leopold’s Project of ‘World View’ Remediation.”  Callicott’s lengthy 
oversight of Leopold’s concern for interiority can be forgiven when one understands the 
majority of Leopoldian scholars as having over-looked it as well, prompting them to also 
promulgate subtle materialism.  These Leopoldian scholars too deserve our pardon, 
given the extent to which Leopold himself upholds a subtly reductionistic metaphysics.  
However, what is important for this paper is that it can be shown that Leopold’s core 
beliefs were ones that went beyond subtle materialism, as did Thomas Berry’s.   
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Interiority, Subjectivity, Awareness 
While Callicott has a history of recapitulating subtle materialism, what is 
noteworthy are the two ways, one explicit, the other implicit, in which he has diverged 
from that past as of late.  Both instances come from 2011, his “Other” article being 
explicit, and his “World View” article being implicit.  While it is odd that Callicott 
doesn’t include a discussion of Leopold’s understanding of interiority in this latter 
article, given the ground-breaking nature of the former article, what is most interesting 
for the current discussion is that, in this latter article, Callicott puts forward Thomas 
Berry, alongside Leopold, as a 20th century exemplar of “appreciating the positive 
aesthetic and spiritual potentiality in the scientific worldview” (Callicott, 2011, p. 527).  
This is interesting because both of these individuals share a further commonality, that is, 
their awareness of the interiority of the more than human world and its relevance for any 
future environmental ethic.  While Callicott, a Leopoldian scholar bar none, might have 
neglected to mention this association between Berry and Leopold and seems to have 
overlooked Leopold’s awareness of interiority until his “Other” article, there are 
additional theorists, Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman, Pryor, and Nash, who have 
picked up on Leopold’s awareness and assist in making a case for it.  Meanwhile, 
anyone who has familiarity with Berry’s work will be instantly familiar with his 
emphasis on interiority through, perhaps, one of his most famous quotations which has 
been articulated in different ways in different works.  Here, Hargens provides the most 
succinct version: “The universe is a communion of subjects, not a collection of objects” 
(Hargens, 2011, p. 99). 
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This association by Callicott of Leopold and Berry, along with their common 
acceptance of the interiority of the more than human world, forms the basis of the 
analysis for this paper and also inspires its name.  It is the basis for analysis because the 
thesis of this paper is that non-human interiority and subjectivity have to be taken 
seriously in order to have a truly holistic and sustainable agriculture.  It inspires the 
name in two ways.  First, Leopold’s awareness of interiors and the role they should play 
in an environmental ethic has not been obvious to many environmental ethicists, to say 
nothing of the average reader, hence the use of his own words to describe that situation: 
“clues that outlast the decades” (Leopold, 1949, p. 57).  A Sand County Almanac is filled 
with clues to point us toward the awareness of interiority.  Second, while Callicott’s 
association of Leopold and Berry wasn’t overtly based on interiority, his grouping 
together of these two thinkers served as a “clue” to the importance of interiority for the 
task of worldview remediation, even if it is something that went unmentioned by 
Callicott himself. 
In terms of subtle materialism and interiority, there are two positions which are 
frequently represented in Leopoldian scholarship, Callicott having held both.  Esbjörn-
Hargens and Zimmerman represent one position where Leopold could be understood to 
be employing “subjective and intersubjective perspectives [in Sand County], which 
[Leopold] referred to as aesthetic (subjective) and ethical and cultural (intersubjective)” 
in order to articulate “the need for including human and animal interiority in our 
understanding of the natural world and humanity’s relationship to it” (ibid., p. 10-11). 
Nash presents Flader as holding a counter position, where Flader describes Leopold’s 
later thinking, including A Sand County Almanac, to be from the perspective of “an 
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ecologist rather than a metaphysician and theologian” (Nash, 1987, p. 78).  Nash himself 
agrees “in part” and sees Leopold’s emphasis on an understanding that “the glue holding 
the earth together consist[ing] of food and energy circuits rather than divine forces or 
noumena” as “not so much a switch as an extension” (ibid.).  Nash’s agreement is partial 
because, in addition to the subtle materialism above, he also believes that Leopold’s 
intellectual lineage is comprised of people who share Leopold’s concern for the more 
than human world: 
Henry David Thoreau:  
Every creature is better alive than dead, men and moose and pine trees. (Nash, 
1987, p. 65) 
John Muir:  
What good are rattlesnakes for?...good for themselves, and we need not 
begrudge them their share of life. (ibid., p. 66) 
Nash on Charles Darwin:  
Ultimately, Darwin thought that, as ethics evolved, all ‘sentient beings’ 
would come to be included in this moral community. (ibid., p. 68) 
Nash on Edward Payson Evans:  
Evans branded as wrong ‘maliciously breaking a crystal, defacing a gem, 
girdling a tree, crushing a flower, painting flaming advertisements on 
rocks, and worrying and torturing animals.’ (ibid., p. 70) 
J. Howard Moore:  
All beings are ends…No creatures are means…All beings have not equal 
rights, but all have rights. (ibid., p. 71) 
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 Albert Schweitzer:  
Today it is thought an exaggeration to state that a reasonable ethic 
demands constant consideration for all living things down to the lowliest 
manifestations of life.  The time is coming, however, when people will be 
amazed that it took so long for mankind to recognize that thoughtless 
injury to life was incompatible to with ethics. (ibid., p. 74) 
However, Leopold’s language makes it easy for people like Callicott to present him with 
a subtly reductive bent.  One of the main culprits in Leopold’s lexicon would be 
“energy.”  Here again, Callicott has Leopold borrowing from Tansley, who “pointed out 
that from the perspective of physics, the ‘currency’ of the ‘economy of nature’ is 
energy.” (Calliott, 1987, p. 202)  One can see this in Leopold:  “Plants absorb energy 
from the sun.  This energy flows through a circuit called the biota,” or “Land, then, is 
not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and 
animals”  (Leopold, 1949, p. 215, 216).   
 Leopold’s language aside, there are others who can see past it and intimate 
Leopold’s other aim of overcoming subtle materialism and bringing the human 
awareness of the non-human subject to bear on environmental issues.  In addition to 
Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman, Pryor has made an excellent case for asserting 
Leopold’s place in this effort (Pryor, 2011).  By not dismissing out of hand the influence 
that P.D. Ouspensky had on Leopold and comparing Ouspensky’s language and 
philosophy with Leopold’s, Pryor argues that Leopold “believed these [non-human] 
entities possessed some kind of mind, consciousness, or psyche”, which gives 
philosophical, rather than poetic, credence to Leopold’s tendency to write not only about 
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how “these ‘other than human’ beings look like and act, but very often, if 
controversially, also what and how they feel and even how they think”  (ibid., p. 471, 
473).   
 Finally, to be fair to Callicott, it must be pointed out that, regardless of his 
previous silence on the subject, 2011 found him articulating an understanding of 
Leopold almost identical to Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman’s understanding from 
2009, albeit one that stems from a very different analysis.  In “Others”, Callicott et al. 
analyze A Sand County Almanac through “the lens of continental philosophy” for the 
purposes of articulating an ethic for “hunting and killing animal subjects,” and still 
Leopold’s concern for a “trans-scientific, interspecies, intersubjectivity” comes through 
(Callicott et al., 2011, p. 115, 118).  In the words of Callicott et al., “We suggest that the 
descriptive encounter with animal Others provided by Leopold in the Almanac serves to 
redefine and transform the self…Key to both self and Self transformation is the counter 
with animal Others, less as objects than as Other subjects” (ibid., 2011, p. 116).  
 While the belief in the subjectivity of the more than human world might have a 
controversial history in the world of Leopoldian scholarship, it essentially defines the 
parameters of the discussion with regard to Thomas Berry.  Esbjörn-Hargens’ interest in 
interiority brings him to comment on Berry’s work as well.  In his essay that is entitled 
“Ecological Interiority: Thomas Berry’s Integral Ecology Legacy,” Esbjörn-Hargens 
describes his commentary on Berry as “a joy-filled observance of [Berry’s] emphasis on 
the interior dimensions of ecological and evolutionary realities” (Esbjörn-Hargens, 
2011, p. 93).  It would be difficult for a treatment of Berry to do otherwise, particularly 
if it is focused on Berry’s The Great Work, which is filled with references to everything 
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from the necessity to further develop “our capacity for intimacy in our human-Earth 
relations” to the assertion that the “governing principles of evolution” be seen “in terms 
of its three movements towards differentiation, inner spontaneity, and comprehensive 
bonding” (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2011, p. x, 169). 
Though Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman believe that interiors “must be 
interpreted on their own terms,” currently they are not, mostly because “corresponding 
to any exterior sociopolitical, economic, or technological dominator hierarchy is an 
interior dominator hierarchy” (Esbjörn-Hargens et al., 2009, p. 20, 40).  Many of the 
concepts from Figure 1 correspond to these hierarchies, e.g. economism as an economic 
dominator hierarchy.  What is missing from Figure 1, and what this paper is seeking to 
include, is an awareness of that latter hierarchy, the “interior dominator hierarchy,” 
because, as Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman point out, “unless a critical mass of 
people evolve to postmodern levels of interiority [i.e. acknowledge the subjectivity of 
non-human beings], in which heedless domination of human and nonhuman beings 
becomes unacceptable and immoral , environmentalism will remain a reform movement 
within technological modernity” as opposed to a genuinely sustainable movement with 
an integral agriculture in its ranks (ibid., 2011, p. 41). 
 
Transpersonal Agroecology, Interiority, and Integral Agriculture 
Transpersonal Agroecology (TPAE) is a theory that is based on the writings of 
many of the leading alternative agricultural theorists of the 20th century, including 
people already cited herein, such as Bailey, Leopold, Rudolf Steiner, progenitor of 
biodynamic agriculture, Masanobu Fukuoka, creator and practitioner of natural farming, 
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Wes Jackson, agricultural meta-theorist and perennial polyculture scientist, and Wendell 
Berry, Kentucky farmer and man of letters.  This theory proposes that a farmer’s internal 
state is just as important for alternative agriculture as are the external practices.  TPAE 
encourages 1) the critical analysis of the role that economics and science play in 
agriculture, 2) a sense of identity with the farm and the beings on the farm, and a 
continual process by which that identification is reflected upon and, 3) an awareness of 
the role that values, spirit, and alternative epistemologies and methodologies play in this 
enterprise (Cox, 2014).  TPAE is juxtaposed against a paradigm that Keller and 
Brummer call a “productionist paradigm”, one that recapitulates many of the 
unsustainable assumptions of the modern western worldview. As Freudenberger noted: 
“a land and community enhancing agriculture cannot orbit around a society that goes the 
other way” (Keller & Brummer, 2002, p. 265; Freudenberger, 1994, p. 52).   
Transpersonal agroecology has as its disciplinary analogue transpersonal ecology 
(TE), as conceived of by Fox (Fox, 1995).  In turn, TE was derived from deep ecology 
(DE), an environmental philosophy that asks “deep” questions about the assumptions of 
modernity and includes an articulated set of philosophical principles.  Fox advocated for 
the position that self-realization was DE’s true distinction from other environmental 
philosophies and, as such, he offered the term “transpersonal ecology” as more apt.  The 
term “transpersonal” describes experiences that transcend the skin-encapsulated 
boundaries traditionally reinforced through a modern western metaphysics, experiences 
that can include, amongst other things, the recognition of the interiority of the more than 
human world.   
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Fox’s key concept, which facilitates this transformation or self-realization, is 
identification.  Fox highlights three ways that an individual can experience identification 
with the more than human world: personal, cosmological, and ontological.  The personal 
is based on an individual’s experience with another being, whereby an understanding of 
commonality brings about identification.  Cosmological identification results from the 
awareness that all things in the universe are part of a single unfolding reality.  The 
ontological experience of identification stems from the profound realization of Being.  
These three forms of identification have proven to be valuable for both TE and TPAE.   
Unfortunately, like most of the theorists above, TPAE doesn’t explicitly address 
subtle materialism.  It does, however, contain within itself the capacity to do so, 
primarily through the previously unexplored concepts of love and creatureliness, as well 
as through the criteria of providing a realistic account of interconnections as a method 
for facilitating identification.  Additionally, TPAE also provides some practical means to 
accomplish this intersubjective experience through the aforementioned alternative 
methodologies, which include consultation and conversation with the more than human 
world, as well as developing sensitivities in order to achieve right relations. 
 
TPAE and Interiority: Why? 
In its initial conception, TPAE specifically addressed the mindset of the 
sustainable agriculture practitioner.  As such, it didn’t explicitly address the subjectivity 
of the more than human world.  However, does this mean that TPAE theorists are 
unaware of interiority?  A revisiting of the precursors of TPAE, deep ecology and 
transpersonal ecology, as well as input from TPAE theorists themselves, shows not only 
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why interiority is important for TPAE, but also how farmers are expected to deal with 
this understanding, which is so contrary to the modern western worldview.   
There are three reasons that interiority is important for TPAE.  First, it is implicit 
in TPAE’s sense of identification, particularly as it pertains to a newly articulated 
concept of “love.”  Second, it correctly situates the frequently invoked concept of 
“creatureliness” that is applied to both humans and non-humans by TPAE theorists.   
Third, it fulfills the requirement of providing the most realistic appreciation of the 
interconnectedness of things.  The gap between ‘why’ and ‘how’ is bridged through an 
understanding of the sacred, which is a way of being in the world by which the duality 
of spirit and matter, and self and other, is overcome, a way of being that is available to 
anyone.  Finally, just how the understanding of interiority should impact the farmer is 
addressed: through conversation and consultation with nature and a sensitivity that leads 
to right relations.   
 
Love 
In addition to the three forms of identification outlined above, there is another 
form of identification that is essential for TPAE as it pertains to identification, one that 
Fox dismissed but needn’t have.  Fox acknowledges Maslow’s precursory term 
“identification-love,” but discredits it as being too anthropocentric (Fox, 1995, p. 201).  
This rejection is premature, especially since Fox himself notes transpersonal 
psychology’s anthropocentrism but still moves forward in using it as a framework for 
his proposal of a transpersonal ecology.  Therefore, the term “love” will be used here, 
though Maslow’s boundary at the human species will be rejected in favor of freeing love 
to spread across the boundaries between species, in effect, giving Maslow the benefit of 
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the doubt when Fox asks: “One must wonder, did Maslow never identify with a cat, a 
dog, a wild animal, or a place?” (Fox, 1995, p. 202).   
Fox’s renunciation of Maslow’s term is especially odd, given its affinity with an 
Aristotelian definition of love, which, if adopted, could easily eclipse the boundaries 
between species.  Maslow defined “identification-love” as “a kind of transcendence, 
e.g., for one’s child, or for one’s beloved friend.  This means ‘unselfish.’  This means 
transcendence of the selfish Self.  It also implies a wider circle of identifications” 
(Maslow, 1971, p. 272).  If one were to use the definition of love as provided by 
Aristotle in the second book of Rhetoric (here presented in non-anthropocentric 
language), “Let loving be defined as wishing for a [being] those things which you 
consider to be good—wishing them for his sake, not your own—and tending so far as 
you can to effect them”, then the concept of “identification-love” explicitly provides for 
a sense of interiority (Cooper, 1960, p. 102-103). 
In fact, if Fox had included love in his identification, it would’ve provided even 
more guidance for the interpretation of commentary that occurred later on in his efforts, 
such as where he quotes Naess as stating, “Through identification they may come to see 
their own interest served by conservation, through genuine self-love, love of a deepened 
and widened self,” and “We need not say that today man’s relation to the nonhuman 
world is immoral.  It is enough to say that it lacks generosity, fortitude, and love” (Fox, 
1995, p. 218, 221). It would also be helpful where Fox uses Drengson to explain, “the 
follower of the Deep Ecology Way practices extended self-identification…This sense of 
extended caring was expressed well in Spinoza’s observation that we are as large as our 
loves” (ibid., p. 235)  Even Fox himself uses the term “love” when discussing the 
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implications of cosmological identification: “Over time, steadfast friendliness often 
comes to be experienced by the recipient as a deep form of love precisely because it 
does not cling or cloy but rather gives the recipient ‘room to move,’ room to be 
themselves” (Fox, 1995, p. 257). 
However, the same can be said for TPAE: where’s the love?  In its initial 
conception and articulation, there was only one place where love was invoked.  Wendell 
Berry states (Cox, 2014, p. 47):  
Good work is not just the maintenance of connections—as one is now 
said to work “for a living” or “to support a family”—but the enactment of 
connections. It is living, and a way of living; it is not support for a family 
in the sense of an exterior brace or prop, but is one of the forms and acts 
of love. (Berry, 1997, p. 139) 
In the same way that embracing love helps to explain Fox’s use of the above 
quotations, so too does it help with the following Berry quote: “the enactment of 
connections…is one of the forms and acts of love.”  By honoring the interiority of the 
more than human world, the farmer enacts deep connections between herself and those 
beings, which is a form and act of love.   
In order for the interiority of the more than human world to be taken seriously by 
TPAE, the role of love in identification will have to be made explicit.  Luckily, the 
support for that argument exists in abundance, even if it was left out of TPAE’s initial 
articulation.  For instance,  Berry noted:  “Farming by the measure of nature…means 
that farmers must tend farms that they know and love, farms small enough to know and 
love, using tools and methods that they know and love, in the company of neighbors that 
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they know and love” (Berry, 1990, p. 210).  While another definition of love might be 
necessary to explain the love of tools and methods, the Aristotelian definition explains 
the rest in a way that becomes obvious, loving small farms and neighbors by wishing for 
their good and tending to them; in this case, the ‘farm’s good’ is, at heart, the good of 
the beings on the farm.  
This inclusion of love as a natural fit with the concept of identification is just as 
true for Bailey.  In a section of Outlook to Nature entitled “The nature-ward tendency,” 
Bailey uses the term “nature-love” when this tendency is applied to farmers, and he says 
it will develop “slowly and non-theoretically…I am sometimes told…that I am 
idealizing…but I hope that the ideals are attainable” (Bailey, 2013, p. 87). He goes on to 
close the book with a light-hearted example of this attainable ideal: 
In these matters, I will substitute trust for faith. If I cannot remove the 
dandelions form the lawn, then I will love the dandelions.  Where once 
were weeds are now golden coins, bees reveling in color, and the spring 
sunshine kissing the blossoms with lips of dew.  It is so sweet and restful 
that I abide in peace. (ibid., p. 195) 
In Holy Earth, Bailey ties this love, this unselfishness, as both he and Maslow see it, to 
evolution, in a similar way that evolution was invoked above by the theorists: 
If we are parts in the evolution, and if the universe, or even the earth, is 
not made merely as a footstool, or as a theatre for man, so do we lose our 
cosmic selfishness and we find our place in the plan of things…This is 
the philosophy of the oneness in nature and the unity in living things. 
(Bailey, 1988, p. 23) 
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While Jackson might not have used love in the sources consulted to craft TPAE, he did 
use it in his article cited herein with the meta-theorists, and in such a way that the 
concern for the other shines through: “Abuse a hillside and the sins of the fathers will 
visit the sons even unto the third and fourth generations but not necessarily forever, for 
redemption of the wasted hillside is possible if loving care is given it” (Jackson, 1984, p. 
171). 
 Finally, Leopold is conspicuous in the number of times he invokes love, 
especially in The Land Ethic: 
When one of these non-economic categories is threatened, and if we 
happen to love it, we invent subterfuges to give it economic importance.”  
“We can be ethical only in relationship to something we can see, feel, 
understand, love, or otherwise have faith in.”  “It is inconceivable to me 
that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect and 
admiration for land, and a high regard for its value… I mean value in the 
philosophical sense (Leopold, 1949, p. 210,214, 223). 
One sees Leopold’s intention more clearly with the insertion of an Aristotelian 
understanding of love: when we are concerned for the well-being of the more than 
human world, we give it economic importance; we are ethical when we are concerned 
about the good of the other for its sake. An ethical relation to land cannot exist without 
that concern. 
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Creatureliness 
 
Another way that an understanding of interiority helps to explain the writings of 
TPAE theorists is through “creatureliness.”  Here again, Berry, Leopold, and Bailey are 
at the forefront.  In the initial conception of TPAE, Berry states that scientism and 
economism have come to dictate that “it is the destiny of every creature (humans not 
excepted) to have a price and to be sold” (Cox, 2014, p. 43).  Here, Berry insinuates that 
humans are creatures.  Elsewhere, he is explicit, such as when he writes “We are 
working well when we use ourselves as the fellow creatures of the plants, animals, 
materials, and other people we are working with” (Berry, 1997, p. 140).  As with Berry’s 
conception of love, it is difficult to surmise what the creatureliness of the materials 
would be, and what that characterization would entail in terms of obligations, but what is 
important is the interiority that Berry’s characterization ascribes, as well as how his 
conception of creatureliness is intricately tied to other important TPAE concepts, such as 
spirit, as will be shown in a later section. 
Leopold also invokes humans as creatures in TPAE: “men are only fellow-
voyagers with other creatures in the odyssey of evolution.  This new knowledge should 
have given us, by this time, a sense of kinship with fellow-creatures” (Cox, 2014, p. 45).  
Outside of TPAE’s initial articulation, Leopold extends this awareness by giving it a 
famous new name: “In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from 
conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it.  It implies respect 
for his fellow members, and also respect for the community as such” (Leopold, 1949, p. 
204, emphasis added).   
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Perhaps it will be easiest to see the association of creatureliness and interiority in 
the writings of Bailey.  In one instance, which is not cited in TPAE’s original 
conception, Bailey explicitly connects humans with the more than human world: “Man 
finds himself upon [the earth], with many other creatures, all parts in some system 
which, since it is beyond man and superior to him, is divine” (Bailey, 1998, p. 4).  This 
characterization mirrors that of Berry and Leopold, but Bailey was explicit in his 
invocation of creaturely interiority, even in TPAE.  In one instance, he describes farming 
as a drama including “a thousand actors moving in and out, always going, always 
coming,” and while he, a human, is one of the actors, so too are the plants that he 
planted, “tender things…that had not been seen on the earth before” (Cox, 2014, p. 38).  
Elsewhere, Bailey describes an oak tree as a “moral object because it lives its life 
regularly and fulfills its destiny” (ibid., p. 50).  Now, we can compare Bailey’s last 
quotation with one from Sessions as quoted in Fox (Fox, 1995): “Naess [as a deep 
ecologist]…speaks of the equal right of all things to live and blossom into their own 
unique forms of self-realization” (Fox, 1995, p. 223).  Taken together, and in light of the 
deep ecology quote, these three quotations from Bailey can be seen to indicate interiority 
as a function of creatureliness.  Added to the previous quotes from Berry and Leopold, 
they tend towards an assurance that the concept of interiority is a necessary one for 
TPAE. 
 
“Realistic Appreciation” 
A third example that points towards the necessity of interiority is again related to 
identification in the original TPAE.  It was indicated there, through paraphrasing Fox, 
that “a realistic appreciation of the ways in which we are intimately bound up with the 
122 
 
world around us, especially the farm and the beings on the farm, inevitably leads to 
wider and deeper identification, and hence alternative modes of farming” (Cox, 2014, p. 
37).  The crux of the argument to follow is that an inclusion of interiority of the more 
than human world gives a farmer a more realistic appreciation of interconnection; this 
leads to an even wider and deeper sense of identification, which is the essence of TPAE.  
Another way to think about it comes from Fox:  “If one has a deep understanding of the 
way things are…then one will (as opposed to should) naturally be inclined to care for 
the unfolding of the world in all its aspects” (Fox, 1995, p. 247). 
There are two instances that illustrate an understanding of the importance of a 
realistic appreciation of interconnections in the original conception of TPAE and, 
looking back in light of subtle materialism and interiority, they are significant.  First, 
Jackson stated:  “Here lies my worry.  Most proposals for bringing about a sustainable 
agriculture and culture carry the fingerprints or markings of the Baconian-Cartesian 
worldview.  At best, it amounts to Smart Resource Management” (Cox, 2014, p. 51).   
There are two things to note here.  To begin with, a case could easily be made as 
to why subtle materialism carries the “markings of the Baconian-Cartesian worldview,” 
as indicated through Keller and Brummer’s conception of the productionist mentality as 
one that denies intrinsic value to nature (Keller et al, 2002, p. 264).  Next, through the 
analysis of this paper, it is obvious that this denial of interiority, coupled with the 
concept of ecosystemic relations as external, “amounts to Smart Resource 
Management.”   Simply acknowledging the subjectivity of the more than human world 
goes a long way towards easing Jackson’s worry. 
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Second, Berry contends: “To define knowledge as merely empirical is to limit 
one’s ability to know; it enfeebles one’s ability to feel and think” (Cox, 2014, p. 51).  
This isn’t the only way that Berry has expressed this concern.  Elsewhere he has written: 
For a while it has been possible for a free and thoughtful person to see 
that to treat life as mechanical or predictable or understandable is to 
reduce it.  Now, almost suddenly, it is becoming clear that to reduce life 
to the scope of our understanding (whatever “model” we use) is 
inevitably to enslave it, make property of it, and put it up for sale. (Berry, 
2000, p. 7) 
And: 
Reduction does not necessarily limit itself to compacting and organizing 
knowledge; it also has the power to change what is known. (ibid., p. 101) 
To summarize Berry’s concerns, empiricism and reductionism limit one’s ability 
to know, enslave life, and actually have the power to change the object of knowledge.  
In the same way that the move towards interiority ameliorates Jackson’s worry, so too 
can it address Berry’s concerns.  As will also be shown later in this paper, the 
acceptance of interiority opens epistemological vistas that have previously been 
constrained through empiricism.  As discussed above, it frees life to “fulfill its destiny.”  
Finally, it doesn’t comport the more than human world to fit in with reductionism’s 
model, thus changing those beings.  Instead, it acknowledges the subjective space of 
those beings, liberating it to engender more ways of feeling and thinking in the farmer, 
her relationship to the farm, and her process of farming.   
Again, this understanding will be fleshed out more in the next two sections.   For 
now, a return to TPAE’s transpersonal and deep ecology roots will assist the 
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solidification of the role of a realistic appreciation of interconnectedness.  For example, 
by acknowledging interiority and providing a more “authentic” understanding of 
interconnectedness, and thus “human existence,” Zimmerman believes that “human 
existence functions to serve, not to dominate” (Fox, 1995, p. 239).  In a turn especially 
relevant to the next section, he goes on to state, “In the moment of releasement, 
enlightenment, or authenticity, things do not dissolve into an undifferentiated mass.  
Instead, they stand out or reveal themselves in their own unique mode of Being” (ibid., 
emphasis added).  Rodman has another way of putting it; as he says, “the human 
personality discovers its structure though interaction with the nonhuman order”, and 
Callicott et al., discussing deep ecologist Paul Shepard, yet another: “[Shepard] explores 
the way intersubjective interaction with animal Others not only changes our 
understanding of what it means to be human, intersubjective interaction with animal 
Others is indeed what made Homo sapiens human” (ibid., p. 240, Callicott et al., 1990, 
p. 128).  Finally, here is a paraphrase of Fox, as a way to return these transpersonal 
concerns to agriculture:  “Indeed, if a particular way of farming or farmer imposes 
themselves unduly upon the more than human world, an impartially based sense of 
identification may lead a person to feel that one has no real choice but to oppose…the 
destructive or oppressive, unsustainable way of farming” (Fox, 1995, p. 256).   
   
TPAE and Interiority: The Sacred as an Ordinary but Integral Way of Being that Leads 
to Action 
To invoke the terms “sacred” or “spiritual” is, in the minds of some, to invoke 
something that can only obfuscate the efforts here.  MacDonald goes a long way towards 
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dispelling that misconception, particularly as spirituality relates to identity (MacDonald, 
2009).  He explores the possibility of a more empirically and scientifically oriented 
definition of spirituality in an effort to show how spirituality relates to the individual 
conception of self.  In that exploration, he puts forward a definition that ultimately 
doesn’t fit his purposes, but works well here:  “Spirituality…is considered to entail an 
experientially grounded sense of connection with, or participatory consciousness of, the 
‘sacred,’ ‘transcendent,’ ‘numinous’ or some form of higher power or intelligence” 
(ibid., p. 87).  This section will show how a ‘spiritual’ or ‘sacred’ experience of reality 
bridges the gap between why interiority is necessary and how one enacts that knowledge, 
that this way of being in the world is taken to be ‘ordinary’ both by some TPAE 
theorists and Leopoldian scholars alike is significant.  What is of utmost importance, 
however, is that this spiritual way of being does not conceive of itself as separate from 
the material world; it exists alongside it; in some ways, they are one and the same thing. 
Wendell Berry addresses this issue through the lens of the economy, seeing it as 
a system that perpetuates the “disease” of disconnection: “Together, these 
disconnections add up to a condition of critical ill health, which we suffer in common—
not just with each other, but with all other creatures.  Our economy is based upon this 
disease.  Its aim is to separate us as far as possible from the courses of life (material, 
social, and spiritual)… It fragments the creation and sets the fragments into conflict with 
one another” (Berry, 1997, p. 138).  What can be taken from the above statement is that 
the material and the spiritual have been unduly fragmented, separated, and forced into 
competition, and as a result, the human and the more than human worlds suffer.  This is 
what Berry meant elsewhere when he stated, “As a people, we have lost sight of the 
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profound communion—even the union—of the inner with the outer life” (ibid., p. 11).  
For the present purposes, the fullness of Berry’s conviction is best expressed in this way: 
“[Our bodies] are not distinct from the bodies of plants and animals, with which we are 
involved in the cycles of feeding and in the intricate companionships of ecological 
systems and of the spirit” (ibid., p. 103). 
Two things are of note.  First, notice how companionship is defined both as an 
ecological relationship as well as a spiritual one.  Subtle materialism is unnecessary—
thinking of interconnections materialistically is not mutually exclusive with thinking 
about interconnections subjectively or spiritually.  Second, it is worth noting that Berry’s 
statements were made in relation to healing, and he goes on to conclude that “Healing is 
impossible in loneliness; it is the opposite of loneliness.  Conviviality is healing.  To be 
healed we must come with all the other creatures to the feast of Creation” (ibid., p. 103). 
Fukuoka makes similar points: “To break experience in half and call one side 
physical and the other spiritual is narrowing and confusing,” and “This is what I mean 
when I say that agriculture has become poor and weak spiritually; it is concerning itself 
only with material development” (Fukuoka, 2009, p. 112, 111).  So too does Bailey, and, 
as noted in TPAE’s initial articulation, he does so in such a holistic way that his 
statements simultaneously address the spiritual and the practical:   
The countryman’s training, whether in home or school, should be such as 
to intensify his spiritual reactions. There is a danger that we miss the 
reverential attitude toward life… 
One stimulates it in himself only as he feels that the earth is holy and that 
all the things that come out of the earth are holy….Such an attitude of 
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mind as inclines one to pause to listen to a bird’s song…to give more 
than a passing glance to a potato plant…will produce in him a sweet 
seriousness that will stand him in good stead in stress and strain, and will 
much reinforce his spiritual stability. (Bailey, 1915/2013, p. 80, 87–88, 
189) 
Bailey takes this marriage of spirit and matter one step further.  For him, and for TPAE 
as it pertains to interiority, the key is not only to not see these two as separate—exterior 
and interior, our ecological relations and our psychological relations—the key is also to 
see this as ordinary, as was highlighted in the quotation above. 
In fact, the quotidian nature of this spiritual way of being in the world was so 
important for Bailey, as it should be given the nature of his referent—the daily 
agricultural activities of an enlightened farmer—he repeated himself in various ways 
and often (Cox, 2014, p. 39, 50):  
I preach the near-at-hand, however plain and ordinary, -- the cloud and 
the sunshine; the green pastures…the rough bark of trees; the frost on 
bare thin twigs; the mouse skittering to its burrow; the insect seeking its 
crevice…the leaf that clings to its twig or that falls when its work is done. 
Wisdom flows from these as it can never flow from libraries and 
laboratories. (Bailey, 1915/2013, pp. 9–10)   
And: 
The good spiritual reaction to nature is not a form of dogmatism or 
impressionism. It results normally from objective experience, when the 
person is ready for it and has good digestion. (Bailey, 1915/1988, p. 52) 
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In addition to Berry’s quotation in the love section, where something ordinary 
like the “support for a family” was honored as an “enactment of connections…one of the 
forms and acts of love,” Berry’s emphasis on the ordinary flows into his discussion of 
conservation, which has so far failed because “it is not yet sensitive to the impact of 
daily living upon the sources of daily life” (Cox, 2014, p. 47). 
Maslow, Swan, Devall—a deep ecologist, and Pryor are also keen to the 
possibility that this alternative—a spiritual way of being in the world in which one 
identifies with the more than human world—is one which is “ordinary.”  Fox states that 
Maslow “was always concerned to point out that his theorizing was grounded in 
empirical reality and that his proposals were open to empirical investigation” (Fox, 
1995, p. 201).  Swan, in “Transpersonal Psychology and the Ecological Conscience” 
states: “ancient wisdom and modern science can agree on the existence and validity of 
transpersonal experiences in natural settings as being a cornerstone of an ecological 
conscience, and such experiences are considered normal in traditional, non-western 
cultures” (Swan, 2010, p. 21).  Devall, a deep ecologist cited by Fox, actually has a term 
for the ordinariness that connects it back to a realistic appreciation of interconnectivity, 
“Deeper perception of reality and deeper and broader perception of self is what I call 
ecological realism” (Deval, 1990 p. 226). Finally, Pryor describes it as “a most basic 
truth: that ordinary people in the course of their ordinary lives experience flashes of 
something greater than themselves—a ‘mystical’ dimension that binds all the beings of 
the world together” (Pryor, 2011, p. 486).   
To summarize up to this point: the sacred is an integral, non-dual way of existing 
in the world, one aspect of which is the recognition of interiority, which is accessible to 
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anyone and is tied up with a realistic appreciation of interconnection as well as 
creatureliness. Finally, the role that spirit and interiority play in the practice of 
biodynamic agriculture has been reserved until the end of this section as a way to show 
the continuity between spirit and interiority, its ordinary enactments, and the agricultural 
practices that can follow. 
In TPAE’s initial conception, Koepf et al. are quoted as stating: 
Natural science has as far as possible detached man from knowledge in 
order to reach objective results. But in the processes described here man 
works on himself in order to become an ever more complete instrument 
for understanding nature. In doing so he begins to meet layers of reality 
that must remain incomprehensible to one who proceeds only by 
measuring, counting and reckoning. He then experiences more 
consciously something belonging to the most ancient experiences of 
mankind: that in natural beings themselves something lives and works 
that can only be comprehended if he compares it with his own will and 
indeed grasps it with his own will. This is the path that is likely to suggest 
itself to the farmer. (Koepf et al., 1976, p. 200–201) 
A further exploration of the thinking of these authors reveals a deeper 
complexity that follows the trajectory of spirit moving through the ordinary into 
farming.  In the section “Understanding the Bio-dynamic method”, they state that “much 
depends on the individual’s capabilities, discernment and the entirely personal and 
cordial relationship [the farmer] has to the things he deals with” (Koepf et al., 1976, p. 
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24).  Should there be any doubt that Koepf et al. are referring to interiority “of the things 
he deals with”, they quote Steiner himself from the fourth agricultural course as saying: 
Nature and the working of the spirit through nature must be recognized 
on a large scale, in an all-embracing sphere.  Materialistic science has 
tended more and more to the investigation of minute, restricted 
spheres…But the world in which man and the other earthly creatures live 
cannot be judged from such restricted aspects. (ibid., p. 24) 
 The understanding of the working of spirit and the interiority of the more than 
human world must not be removed from the daily experience of the practitioner, and 
Koepf et al. state as much: “It is not a question of ‘believing’ in it or not, but, to start 
with, in ordinary day consciousness, it may have the value of a hypothesis” (ibid., p. 28).  
But this hypothesis gets confirmed by “those who actually do the work in the field and 
garden” who “[have] the advantage of direct experience of the more intimate interplay 
that exists in the growth of plants, the rhythms of the seasons, the thriving of the 
livestock, and in general the communities of the field or garden.  A personal relationship 
to all these arises out of his daily work.  Experience shows him that the methods are 
justified” (ibid., p. 28-29). 
 Just how is a farmer supposed to undertake this task of being open to the spiritual 
and interior depths of the more than human world in her daily life?  Simply by doing it, 
in the case of biodynamic farming, with an understanding of the farm as organism:  
“Achieving a living understanding of these relationships is a task we have as yet hardly 
begun, but Steiner’s ideas about the organism of a farm indicate a path that can be 
followed by the practicing farmer, since it involves the very things with which his daily 
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work confronts him” (Koepf et al., 1976, p. 25).  Koepf et al. provide a succinct 
summary after quoting Liebig (of all people!) relative to interiority: “[Liebig’s] idea of 
the organism cannot be found at the level of discursive reasoning.  It is rather a matter of 
creating a real relationship with life phenomena, a relationship based on the expanded 
capacities of a person seeking knowledge through inner training” (ibid., p. 26).  Here, all 
three components are found—an understanding of interiority through ordinary 
relationships undertaken in service to agricultural practices.  Those ‘practices’ could 
benefit from a better definition than “seeking knowledge through inner training,” though 
that does provide a start, as does Koepf et al.’s aside: “Since time immemorial the 
farmer’s calling has been based on a certain inner attitude” (ibid., p. 29).  Addressing the 
farmer’s inner attitude was the intent of TPAE, though it has now been shown to be 
partial.  What is now necessary is the development of agricultural practices that take into 
account both the interiority of the farmer as well as the interiority of the more than 
human world: such is the very definition of an integral agriculture. 
 
TPAE and Interiority: How? 
 Much of what will be discussed in this final section comes from the first 
articulation of TPAE (again returning to it), transpersonal ecology, and deep ecology, 
with a newfound understanding of the necessity for agriculture to recognize the 
interiority of the more than human world.  The actual application of this integral 
understanding to the farm and the beings on the farm comes in two forms.   The first is 
more outwardly directed, though it should be pointed out that these actions, by coming 
from a spiritual way of being, are always at heart participatory, meaning they always 
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involve both the farmer and the other subject though the emphasis is on one or the other.  
The first mode, as compared to the second, is more inwardly directed.  It is within the 
context of the realistic appreciation of interconnectedness that a sense of interiority 
develops a ‘sensitivity,’ or a new ‘attitude,’ within the farmer.  The second is more 
outwardly directed, being ‘guided’ by nature and having a ‘consultation’ with it, if not a 
‘conversation.’  Undertaking both of these activities, the inward sensitivity and the 
outward relationship with the beings of the farm, puts the farmer into a ‘correct 
relationship’ that facilitates identification, which then facilitates a truly holistic, integral 
agriculture.  Finally, it should be noted that the previous discussion of love fits in well 
here, so well in fact that a revisiting of the topic seems superfluous. How can a farmer 
become an integral farmer?  By loving the farm and the beings on the farm! 
 Obviously, as TPAE is explicitly concerned with the mindset of the farmer, there 
are also some redundancies in going over that the material again here.  However, with 
the addition of interiority, the material on “sensitivity” undergoes a refined alteration.  
For instance, Bailey stated that a “sensitiveness to life is the highest product of 
education,” Berry put forward that “kindly use,” by which he meant treating every field 
with the consideration deserving of its uniqueness, “depends upon intimate knowledge, 
the most sensitive responsiveness and responsibility,” and Koepf et al. suggest that “it is 
also important to be able to feel one’s way into the processes of nature.  It is then 
important to form thoughts that can penetrate into the structure of nature[,] for such 
thoughts will stimulate rather than banish the appropriate sensitivity” (Cox, 2014, p. 51).  
All of these quotations can now be interpreted to suggest that the farmer is becoming 
sensitive to the interiority of the more than human world and the responsibility that 
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brings.  This has to be what Bailey meant when he stated, “The reverential attitude is the 
result of our feeling toward the materials of life, -toward the little things and the 
common things that meet us hour by hour” (Bailey, 1915/2013, p. 88). 
 The awareness of interiority also better situates the TPAE theorist’s suggestion 
to dialogue with nature.  For instance, Jackson uses the term “consultation of nature” 
when discussing the science of ecology, but switches to “a dialectical interaction with 
nature” when discussing a new agricultural research agenda which culminates in “a 
conversation with nature” (Cox, 2014, p. 38, 51).  Berry, who has been more overt in 
raising the issue of interiority, also uses the term conversation, again invoking the 
concepts of creatureliness and process, when he writes “The conversation [between 
place and inhabitant] itself would thus assume a kind of creaturely life, binding the place 
and its inhabitants together, changing and growing to no end, no final accomplishment, 
that can be conceived or foreseen” (ibid., p. 45).  Yet again, Berry’s language might be 
philosophically ambiguous—how can a conversation between two entities itself have an 
interiority?—but one need only think of Bateson’s concept of mind in order to 
accommodate that particular presentation (Bateson, 1972, p. 491). 
 This example was given to illustrate a general awareness and not to advocate for 
a particular understanding.  This family resemblance, as opposed to direct 
correspondence, is also true for Fukuoka who tends not to emphasize a conversation 
with nature per se, more so our conscious service to it:  “The world exists in such a way 
that if people will set aside their human will and be guided instead by nature there is no 
reason to expect to starve…So for the farmer in his work: serve nature and all is well.  
Farming used to be sacred work” (Fukuoka, 2009, p. 113).  This understanding is still 
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properly transpersonal and also relevant to interiority given Callicott et al. and 
Zimmerman’s previously noted characterization of human existence consisting of being 
in service to the more than human world, and that to be in service reveals the role of 
interiority.  
 Thus, one finds with TPAE’s emphasis on the mindset of the farmer, alongside a 
correct understanding of the subjectivity of the nonhuman world, a truly holistic, integral 
agriculture has been formulated, and this way of being and relating seems to be what 
progressive TPAE theorists had in mind all along.  Here are Bailey and Fukuoka as 
quoted in Cox (2014, p. 53, 38): 
The sacredness to us of the earth is intrinsic and inherent. It lies in our 
necessary relationship and in the duty imposed on us to have dominion, 
and to exercise ourselves even against our own interests. We may not 
waste that which is not ours. To live in sincere relations with the 
company of created things and with conscious regard for the support of 
all men now and yet to come, must be of the essence of righteousness. 
(Bailey, 1915/1988, p. 11, xi, 20, 78) 
And: 
In one of the huts on the mountain I left the words, “Right Food, Right 
Action, Right Awareness” inscribed on a pinewood plaque above the 
fireplace. The three cannot be separated from one another. If one is 
missing, none can be realized. If one is realized, all are realized. 
(Fukuoka, 1978/2009, p. 147) 
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“Right Awareness” would be the awareness of the necessity of the appropriate mindset 
of the farmer and the acknowledgement of the interiority of the more than human world.  
“Right Action” would be to take that awareness and live in “sincere relations with the 
company of created things.”  To apply these to agriculture would be to give humanity 
“Right Food” and to create an integral agriculture. 
 
Conclusion: Clues for a Future Integral Agriculture 
 
 To be clear, none of the alternative metaphysical frameworks cited herein 
represent a systematic attempt to connect agriculture with our ethical relationship with 
the more than human world, given its inherent subjectivity.  However, TPAE, coupled 
with the current discussion on interiority, does just that, thus creating an integral 
agriculture.  Taken collectively, integral agriculture provides an intellectual and 
philosophical space—with an eye to the practical implications—to ask a very important 
question in the quest for a truly sustainable agriculture:  What would the practices of a 
sustainable agriculture look like that take seriously the mindset of the farmer and the 
interiority of the more than human world?  With the clues contained in this essay, an 
attempt was made to provide the grounds to legitimately ask such a question, and some 
answers were put forward — the practices are loving ones, sensitive to the 
“creatureliness” of the beings to which the farmer is relating. This gives the farmer a 
realistic appreciation of the interconnections between self and other, and as a result of 
the extended conversations between them, the farmer embodies a sacred, non-dual, 
integral way of practicing agriculture, exhibiting right relations between herself and the 
more than human world. However, this effort in no way purports to definitively answer 
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such a complex and important question. In chapter four, when process metaphysics was 
offered as a ground for TPAE at the metaphysical level, it did so in a way that left open 
the possibility of other metaphysical root stocks (Cox, forthcoming).  The case is the 
same here; the question of an integral agriculture can be answered in many ways.  But at 
the very least, it is easy to say that industrial agriculture can’t give an answer.  Given the 
analysis of this article, it is easy to say that any metaphysical system that perpetuates 
subtle materialism won’t give a full answer.  Perhaps Leopold himself left yet another 
clue at the beginning of his “Marshland Elegy.”  Leopold begins that essay with an 
exquisite description of day break on the crane marsh.  He quickly expands his focus to 
include not just this one particular day, but the “sodden pages” of that marsh’s history 
and, as such, the crane’s history as well, and here the narrative turns existential:  “To 
what end?” What is the ultimate purpose of this ecosystem and the beings that make it 
up?  What should be our relationship to it?  As Leopold goes on, it becomes apparent 
that he is invoking, in no small part, the discussion herein: “Our ability to perceive 
quality in nature begins, as in art, with the pretty.  It expands through successive stages 
of the beautiful to values as yet uncaptured by language.  The quality of cranes lies, I 
think, in this higher gamut, as yet beyond the reach of words” (Leopold, 1949, p. 96).  
His repeated use of the phrase “as yet” is interesting here.  It suggests that there may be 
a time when the value of nature can be captured by language and the quality of cranes 
can be expressed in words.  Perhaps the language suggests to humanity that the value of 
nature has to be one that takes nature’s interiority seriously. And perhaps the words that 
truly capture the quality of cranes will not be human words.  Perhaps they may be ‘crane 
words.’  I think Leopold would agree: “To what end?  Out on the bog a crane, gulping 
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some luckless frog, springs his ungainly hulk into the air and flails the morning sun with 
mighty wings.  The tamaracks re-echo with his bugled certitude.  He seems to know” 
(Leopold, 1949, p. 96). 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
Allow me to summarize the results of this dissertation by way of telling yet 
another story.  When I thought about what I wanted to write for my conclusion, I 
definitely wanted to explore suggestions for further research.  As feedback for my first 
article, one of my committee members asked me “Where are the women?”  I told her 
that knew I had left out Lady Eve Balfor, founder of the Soil Society, as well as 
Vandana Shiva, but my excuse was that I wanted to use sources with which American 
farmers might be more familiar, with the possible exception of Fukuoka.  In my heart, 
though, I knew she was right.   
As such, one of the first things I hope to do is to write an eco-pedagogical 
critique of my second chapter.  In it, I hope to bring more voices into the conversation.  
Besides Balfor and Shiva, I’d like to study the works of Cezar Chavez, George 
Washington Carver, Machaelle Small Wright, Rachael Carson, and others, in the hopes 
of gaining a broader transpersonal agroecological understanding, as well as expanding 
TPAE’s reach.  Secondly, I hope to write an article discussing process metaphysics’ 
(PM) suitability as a metaphysics to undergird integral agriculture, which should be 
readily apparent to any reader of this dissertation, whereby the third chapter highlights 
PM’s belief that awareness, or interiority, goes ‘all the way down.’ 
Finally, I would like to enter into discussion with those persons interested in 
integral theory.  For instance, while Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman use Wilber ‘s 
understanding of integral almost exclusively, they do acknowledge (though mostly in 
footnotes) that the integral world is not exclusively Wilber’s domain (see p. 3, footnote 
4; p. 10, footnote 14; p. 35, footnote 45; p. 203 ,footnote 76; and p. 561, footnote 13).  
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Therefore, I think it would be valuable to the field of integral theory and to the concept 
of integral agriculture to add more non-Wilberian voices by using theorists that Esbjörn-
Hargens and Zimmerman acknowledge are integral as well, including Thomas Berry and 
Gregory Bateson, as well as Leonardo Boff, Sri Aurobindo, Jean Gebser, Edgar Morin, 
Sean Kelly, and more. 
But I had also wanted to use the space afforded me in this conclusion to spotlight 
a Nobel prize-winning cytogeneticist whose work fits well into an integral agriculture, at 
least as it relates to research.  Barbara McClintock worked on maize cytogenetics 
through a technique her biographers called a “feeling for the organism,” meaning “one 
must have the time to look, the patience to ‘hear what the material has to say to you,’ 
[and] the openness to ‘let it come to you’” (Keller & Mandelbrot, 1983, p. 198).  On one 
double page in McClintock’s biography, several of the concepts from this dissertation 
are addressed: 
Interiority and Sensitivity:   
A motivated observer develops faculties that a casual spectator may never be 
aware of.  Over the years, a special kind of sympathetic understanding grew in 
McClintock, heightening her powers of discernment, until finally, the objects of 
her study have become subjects in their own right; they claim from her a kind of 
attention that most of us experience only in relation to other persons. (ibid., p. 
200-201) 
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Scientism: 
She shares, with at least some, the additional awareness that reason and 
experiment, generally claimed to be the principal means of this pursuit, do 
not suffice. (ibid.) 
Identification:  
A deep reverence for nature, a capacity for union with that which is to be 
known—these reflect a different image of science from that of a purely 
rational enterprise. (ibid.) 
Alternative epistemologies and methodologies:  
In [McClintock’s] mind, what we call the scientific method cannot by 
itself give us ‘real understanding.’ ‘It gives us relationships which are 
useful, valid, and technically marvelous; however, they are not the truth.’  
And it is by no means the only way of acquiring knowledge.  (ibid.) 
However, one of my committee members encouraged me to “get practical” with 
my conclusion.  He suggested that I give an idea of what the ideas and concepts 
contained within would mean for a farmer.  I was hesitant.  While my father grew up on 
a farm (he was the only one of four boys to leave the farm) and some of my friends and 
family are farmers, I didn’t feel comfortable hypothesizing what this way of being 
would be like for individual farmers on a day to day level.  I could understand the value 
in such a move, and I could certainly see it as a natural extension of my scholarship 
here, but I also felt the need to value the experience of the people who will be carrying 
out this work by not pontificating on possibilities.  Luckily for me, I was reminded of an 
experience I had while working on the second chapter of my dissertation.  The content 
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of that chapter stemmed from a presentation that I gave during Iowa State’s first course 
on organic agriculture, taught by Dr. Kathleen Delate.  The title of my presentation was 
“Profits or Prophets?” and was my first attempt to articulate something like 
transpersonal agroecology.  When I returned to Steiner’s Agricultural Course for my 
dissertation, a notecard from that presentation fell out.  On it, I had written Vic 
Madsen’s name, who is a farmer from Western Iowa that came and spoke to Dr. 
Delate’s class.  I remembered thanking him during my presentation because his honesty 
about his relationship to the land gave me the courage to explore the possibility of that 
which would become transpersonal agroecology.  Remembering that card gave me the 
idea to contact Vic as a way of “getting practical” with my ideas. 
I got Vic’s contact information from Dr. Delate, and he and I set up a time to 
talk.  When I got him on the phone, I told him that I remembered his participation in Dr. 
Delate’s course, I explained to him that I needed to write a conclusion for my 
dissertation, and that I hoped to get some inspiration from our conversation, to which he 
agreed (Vic Madsen, personal communication, September 23, 2014).  I asked him to 
begin by repeating what he remembered of what he had said in our class.  From there, it 
effortlessly moved into a dialogue, during which I mostly asked him clarifying 
questions.  Finally, I recapped our conversation, noting the overlap between what he said 
and the concepts of my dissertation, in order for him to agree that we were discussing 
the same things, more or less.  Vic agreed.  What follows is similar to the previous 
treatment of McClintock; concepts from this dissertation will be matched up with 
examples from my conversation with Vic.   
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For instance, while Vic had an appreciation for science--indeed, the Practical 
Farmers of Iowa field trials that he did on limited nitrogen fertilizer applications for corn 
got him to think about going organic--he also stated that “lots of things don’t lend 
themselves to scientific evaluation…science is great but it is limited,” which mirrors the 
TPAE concept of scientism.  He talked about the pervasive nature of economism, where 
conventional farmers get “preached at” by herbicide and insecticide commercials, 
which, coupled with other agribusiness commercials, condition conventional farmers not 
to talk about anything but the economics of farming:  “They want you to believe you 
can’t farm without it. [Even when you switch to organic], it takes a while to get that out 
of your mind.” 
Vic was very open about the ‘conversational’ aspects of his farming practices 
(addressed in chapter four), stating that his “view toward nature has changed” as a result 
of going organic, where he now views nature as “a partner, not an obstacle.”  Also, Vic 
had a phrase for the ‘sensitivity’ discussed in chapter four, calling it the “eye of the 
master,” where, in livestock, for example, a farmer is “in tune with his animals” and can 
notice issues based solely on their “body language: the arch of a back, or the color of 
their hair coat.”  Though Vic didn’t use the term values explicitly, he did invoke the 
concept by acknowledging the trade-off between the efficiency of monocropping all of 
his land and his practice of breaking his 250 acres into various fields where he “matches 
the enterprise with the land.”  In this instance, Vic is unapologetic about sacrificing 
economic value for the “satisfaction” he gets from knowing that he is caring for the land.  
Vic had another phrase that matched up well with a TPAE concept: he described his 
penchant for alternative methodologies as the “hunch factor.”  He said, by developing 
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the aforementioned sensitivity, he says he will have an idea just “come into my mind,” 
then he thinks about it, and many times, he tries it.  Vic contrasts that way of acting with 
that of a conventional farmer who evaluates his action against a different set of criteria, 
like “trials and ‘facts.’” 
Finally, though Vic didn’t seem to really want to talk about it much, he did 
venture into the realm of the sacred.  He said “the best fertilizer for the land is the 
farmer’s footsteps”, and he went on to say “I don’t want to say it’s mystical, but it 
almost becomes it, with the land telling you what to do.”  He finished his thoughts on 
the subject by saying, “When you realize it, [that you can farm with nature], it is an 
epiphany.”  I told Vic that I wanted to get a grant, maybe from PFI or the Leopold 
Center, to go around and meet with organic farmers and the like, and to see if I could get 
even more farmers to corroborate the concepts of my dissertation.  He said it was going 
to be “difficult” because it is “not macho.”  “They aren’t going to talk about their softer 
side.  They won’t admit it.”  He then told me a story about his neighbor, who is farming 
organic, doing a great job, but always talks about how he is in it for the money:   “He’ll 
never admit the social aspects of why he does what he does.”  So I asked Vic why he 
talks about it.  In a way reminiscent of the epitome of the modern American Midwestern 
farmer, Vic answered “Because I’m too old to care.” 
Here I’d like to take the time to thank Vic again.  Not only did he inspire that 
initial presentation, but that presentation inspired this dissertation.  And while I 
appreciate his perspective on everything we talked about, I’m going to have to kindly 
sidestep this last comment of his for two reasons.  First, I believe that if there is one 
person like Vic Madsen, there have to be two, and most likely more, particularly among 
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so many young people who are currently entering agriculture and may be more open to 
discussing this “softer side”.  Secondly, I believe that, through my dissertation, I’ve 
made the case for why the mindset of the farmer and the interiority of the more than 
human world are not only a part of alternative agriculture but are indeed a necessary part 
of it.  As such, the sooner we have the types of conversations that Vic and I had, the 
sooner we’ll have an integral agriculture across the landscape. 
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